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This thesis considers the intersection of international investment law and 
international human rights law in ICSID arbitration by reference to the 
‘fragmentation’ of public international law. More specifically, it argues that it is 
possible to establish a procedural basis for a host state human rights defence in 
ICSID arbitration. Utilising a systemic conception of public international law driven 
by state consent, it is posited that regime conflict between international investment 
law and international human rights law in ICSID arbitration justifies the 
introduction of a host state human rights defence. By reference to the ICSID Arbitral 
Rules, this thesis establishes a viable basis for the introduction of international 
human rights law into ICSID arbitration by a host state. Finally, it is argued that a 
procedural basis for a host state human rights defence in ICSID arbitration has the 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Public international law is intended to regulate conduct between states.1 The 
ambitious nature of this aim necessitates that public international law operates in an 
organised manner to address the breadth of issues that may arise. Consequently, to 
function as effectively as possible, public international law has divided into discrete 
legal regimes2 by reference to the subject matter that is regulated.3  
 The classification of public international law into distinct categories results in 
each legal regime exhibiting unique characteristics4 that distinguish it from other 
legal regimes falling under the umbrella term of ‘public international law’. The 
distinctiveness of each regime flows from the subject matter being managed and how 
states seek to respond to the regulatory challenges that arise.5 The variations between 
the regimes become magnified as each regime utilises approaches designed to 
ameliorate specific problems only encountered as part of the limited subject matter 
being addressed.6 Through this process, each regime becomes more distinctive, and 
potentially self-governing. As a result, questions are often raised regarding the extent 
to which each regime evidences the hallmarks of being ‘independent’ and the nature 
of the interrelationships that may (or may not) exist between legal regimes.7 Whether 
each regime displays characteristics associated with autonomy (and any 
accompanying notions of self-sufficiency) has implications for public international 
law’s ability to coherently function as a legal system.8 These considerations form the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 V Lowe, International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 5; MN Shaw, International Law (6th 
edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 5. 
2 The definition of a regime is discussed in Chapter 2, and in particular, section 2.4.1.2. 
3 ILC, 'Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law' (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 11. 
4 Ibid 14. 
5 Ibid 15. 
6 Ibid 14. 
7 O Casanovas, Unity and Pluralism in Public International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 62 – 63; 
ILC (n 3) 66; B Simma and D Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in 
International Law' (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 483, 492 - 493; D Lapaš, 'Some 
Remarks on Fragmentation of International Law: disintegration or transformation?' (2007) 40 The 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 1, 5; A Gourgourinis, 
'General/Particular International Law and Primary/Secondary Rules: United Terminology of a 
Fragmented System' (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 993, 1020. 
8 ILC (n 3) 14; A-C Martineau, 'The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law' 
(2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 1, 4; B Simma, 'Universality of International Law from 
the Perspective of a Practitioner' (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 265, 270; S Singh, 
'The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics' (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 23, 24 - 25; E Guntrip, 'Systemic Integration and International Investment Law' in J 
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crux of the debate over whether the establishment, and development, of what have 
been termed lex specialis regimes has initiated the ‘fragmentation’ of public 
international law.9   
 International investment law and international human rights law are lex 
specialis regimes within public international law.10 They both focus on a particular 
subject matter, and have adopted techniques to address specific difficulties 
encountered in their respective fields.11 Thus, they both exhibit attributes associated 
with the ‘fragmentation’ of public international law. Therefore, broader concerns 
regarding the extent to which the process of ‘fragmentation’ is embodied within 
public international law, and whether public international law remains systemic in 
nature, are captured by the manner in which the international human rights law 
regime intersects with the international investment law regime in practice. 
The link between the international investment law regime and the 
international human rights law regime is formed as a result of host state regulatory 
conduct.12 The international investment law regime governs foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and provides protection for foreign investors from host state 
conduct that is detrimental to the foreign investor’s interests.13 Hence, the focus of 
investment disputes is directed towards the impact of the host state’s conduct on the 
rights of the foreign investor. However, considerations external to the international 
investment law regime may influence the host state conduct that is the subject of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Crawford and S Nouwen (eds), Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law 
Volume 3 2010 (Hart Publishing 2012) 258. 
9 The term ‘fragmentation’ is utilised in two contexts in public international law. The first relates to 
the creation of specialist legal regimes in the manner described above. The second refers to the 
proliferation of international tribunals that may compete for jurisdiction over a particular dispute. The 
creation of multiple tribunals stems from the evolution of specialist legal regimes. However, 
discussion of fragmentation in this thesis is limited to the former definition as this study centres on 
one form of dispute resolution, that is, ICSID arbitration. 
10 ILC (n 3) 11. 
11 Ibid. 
12 A Al Faruque, 'Mapping the Relationship between Investment Protection and Human Rights' (2010) 
11 The Journal of World Investment and Trade 539, 543; SW Schill, 'Cross-Regime Harmonization 
through Proportionality Analysis: The Case of International Investment Law, the Law of State 
Immunity and Human Rights' (2012) 27 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 87, 88. For 
a full discussion of the intersection between host state regulatory conduct and international 
investment law, see UNHCR, 'Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights - Human rights, 
trade and investment' (2 July 2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9. 
13 This is achieved through a network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and international 
investment agreements (IIAs). See C McLachlan, L Shore and M Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration: Substantive Principles (Oxford University Press 2007) 3 – 8; A Newcombe and L 
Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law 
International 2009) 1 – 2. 
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review. For example, should an investment cause the human rights of the host state 
population to be violated, host state conduct intended to protect those human rights 
may be contemporaneously detrimental to a foreign investor.14 In these instances, the 
interaction between international investment law and international human rights law 
becomes significant.  
A host state is legally bound to comply with obligations sourced from both 
international investment law and international human rights law, despite the 
application of one regime potentially contradicting obligations under the other.15 
This dichotomy has arisen in a series of claims before investment treaty arbitral 
panels16 where justifications for host state regulatory conduct have referred to the 
need to breach foreign investor’s rights, conferred by international investment law, 
in order to comply with international human rights law. Such human rights have 
included the ‘right’ to water,17 indigenous rights18 and policies designed to ensure 
non-discrimination in the aftermath of apartheid regimes.19 Claims such as these 
have raised issues concerning how the international investment law regime should 
manage conflicts with principles sourced in international human rights law. Based on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 U Kriebaum, 'Privatizing Human Rights: The Interface between International Investment Protection 
and Human Rights' in A Reinisch and U Kriebaum (eds), The Law of International Relations - Libor 
Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold (Eleven International Publishing 2007) 170. 
15 States are bound by international legal obligations and non-compliance with international 
obligations invokes state responsibility (Article 1, ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Wrongful Acts in J Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press 2002) 77 – 81). See Kriebaum (n 
14) 170; M Toral and T Schultz, 'The State, a Perpetual Respondent in Investment Arbitration? Some 
Unorthodox Considerations' in M Waibel and others (eds), The Backlash against Investment 
Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law International 2010) 581 – 582. 
16 Many of these claims have stemmed from the Argentine economic crisis in 2001/2002 discussed in 
Chapter 3. For example, Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, 6 
February 2007; Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 
Award, 28 September 2007; Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and 
Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic (Decision on Liability) ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 30 
July 2010; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAgua Servicios Integrales 
del Agua S.A. v Argentine Republic (Decision on Liability) ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, 30 July 
2010; SAUR International S.A. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Liability, 6 June 2012. 
17 See Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic; Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic; Suez, 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic (n 
16); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del 
Agua S.A. v Argentine Republic; SAUR International S.A. v. Argentine Republic (n 16). 
18 Border Timbers Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani 
Development Co. (Private) Limited v. Republic of Zimbabwe ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25, Procedural 
Order No. 2, 26 June 2012 and Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/15, Procedural Order No. 2, 26 June 2012. 
19 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/1, Award 4 August 2010. 
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current jurisprudence, it remains unclear whether these interests can be reconciled,20 
and even if this is possible, what the most appropriate methodology would be to 
achieve the desired integration.21  
The significance of this dilemma is twofold. First, host states are likely to be 
faced with a normative conflict.22 A host state’s adherence to international human 
rights standards may contemporaneously breach protections offered in accordance 
with the international investment law regime to foreign investors. The existence of 
mutually exclusive legal requirements may thus give rise to a host state’s liability in 
the international arena for non-compliance with an international obligation.23 
Secondly, this issue directly affects those individuals seeking to rely on the benefits 
conferred upon them. The individuals concerned may be foreign investors 
safeguarded by international investment law, or host state populations, negatively 
affected by FDI, seeking the protection conferred by international human rights law. 
When host states are unable to comply with either of these obligations as a result of 
fulfilling the other, a loss of protection arises for either the foreign investor or the 
host state population. This scenario may also give rise to a host state’s liability in 
public international law.24 Consequently, the issue of whether public international 
law displays characteristics associated with ‘fragmentation’ takes on a wider 
significance rather than primarily constituting a theoretical question.  
Normative conflict and potential host state liability reflect only one 
perspective of the ‘fragmentation’ of public international law. Dispute resolution 
procedures also influence the degree of segregation that exists between lex specialis 
regimes.25 In response to the specific nature of investment disputes, the international 
investment law regime has generated a unique form of dispute resolution in the form 
of investment treaty arbitration (ITA).26 ITA confers foreign investors with the right 
to claim directly against host states for violations of investment protection standards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 As yet, no investment treaty tribunal has fully addressed the intersection of international investment 
law and international human rights law. 
21 The viability of several methodologies is considered in Chapter 6. 
22 This concept is addressed fully in Chapter 6. 
23 Article 1, ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts in Crawford (n 15) 77 - 81. 
24 Ibid. 
25 T Treves, 'Fragmentation of International Law: the Judicial Perspective' (2007) 23 Communicazioni 
e Studi 821, 827. 
26 G Van Harten and M Loughlin, 'Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law' (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 121, 122. 
 
	  
	   	   5 
in accordance with the terms of the international investment agreement (IIA) that 
governs the FDI.27 However, the creation of ITA has impacted upon the 
‘fragmentation’ of the international investment law and international human rights 
law regimes. This is particularly true of ITA in the form of ICSID arbitration, due to 
the specific circumstances in which it evolved.  
IIAs and ITA were established as part of international investment law in 
response to calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) made during the 
1960s and 1970s.28 The NIEO was an ideological claim made by newly independent 
developing states that sought global economic reform in order to achieve economic 
independence as well as political independence.29 Given their lack of economic 
independence, developing states embraced expropriation as a means of achieving 
economic liberation, giving rise to investment disputes and political uncertainty for 
foreign investors.30  
At this time, the World Bank, which had been directly involved in the 
resolution of several foreign investment disputes, initiated plans for a specialised 
dispute resolution mechanism to address these disputes and to instil foreign investors 
with confidence in light of the on-going political risk.31 These plans resulted in the 
entry into force in 1966 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of other States32 (ICSID Convention),33 which 
established the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) in 1967.34 To administer the dispute resolution process, a definitive set of 
arbitral rules governing ITA came into effect on 1 January 196835 (ICSID Arbitral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Newcombe and Paradell (n 13) 1 - 2. 
28 JW Salacuse, 'The Treatification of International Investment Law' (2007) 13 Law and Business 
Review of the Americas 155, 155; Newcombe and Paradell (n 13) 33; Guntrip (n 8) 260. 
29 M Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order (United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organisation 1979) 85; A Parra, The History of ICSID (Oxford University Press 2012) 
11. 
30 Parra (n 29) 12. 
31 Ibid, 21; Newcombe and Paradell (n 13) 27; M Stevens, 'The ICSID Convention and the Origins of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration' in A Jan Van Den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention: 
ICCA International Arbitration Conference (Wolters Kluwer 2009) 69 – 70. 
32 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 
(adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 171 (ICSID Convention). 
33 Parra (n 29) 97. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 117. 
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Rules).36 The combined effect of these instruments was to establish ICSID 
arbitration, a specialised form of dispute resolution that would solely be used for 
investment disputes, monitored under the auspices of ICSID (which unlike the 
World Bank, was able to act as a dedicated institution). Whilst the narrow focus of 
ICSID’s remit contributed to it becoming the pre-eminent body that administers 
investment disputes, it also limited the ability of ITA conducted under the ICSID 
Arbitral Rules to readily incorporate principles sourced from other regimes within 
public international law, thereby isolating international investment law from other 
fields of public international law. Consequently, the specialist manner in which the 
international investment law regime has addressed dispute resolution has contributed 
to the ‘fragmentation’ of this regime from international human rights law. 
In conclusion, the embodiment of the ‘fragmentation’ of public international 
law, as evidenced by the interrelationship of international investment law and 
international human rights law, gives rise to both theoretical and pragmatic concerns. 
The inability of international investment law and international human rights law to 
integrate may result in host state liability and deny individual protections under 
either regime. The likelihood that these outcomes will eventuate is magnified by the 
limited focus of ICSID arbitration as the exemplar form of dispute resolution for 
investment disputes. This thesis seeks to resolve these dilemmas by ‘de-fragmenting’ 
international investment law and international human rights law. 
1.1 ACHIEVING ‘DE-FRAGMENTATION’  
In light of the above, this thesis considers the extent to which international 
investment law and international human rights law are ‘fragmented’ in public 
international law and examines their ability to intersect within ICSID arbitration. It 
posits that these regimes, whilst specialist, are not fragmented to such a degree that 
excludes their mutual application within the framework of the ICSID Convention 
and the ICSID Arbitral Rules. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (ICSID Arbitral Rules) available at 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=RulesMain
> accessed 4 July 2013. 
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To demonstrate this proposition, this thesis proposes a procedural basis on 
which international investment law and international human rights law can be ‘de-
fragmented’ in ICSID arbitration by way of a host state human rights defence. 
Examining the procedural basis for a host state human rights defence in ICSID 
arbitration serves a dual purpose. First, it demonstrates the current ability of 
international investment law and international human rights law to interact within the 
specialist scope of ICSID arbitration. Additionally, it highlights where the regimes 
have the potential to be become further ‘de-fragmented’ and how this might be 
attained. This analysis is achieved by reference to the theoretical considerations that 
underlie the process of ‘fragmentation’. 
At variance to some recent works,37 this thesis focuses on a party centric 
viewpoint, rather than relying on conceptions of what has been termed as the ‘global 
public interest’. Although this line of thought is valuable, it is the author’s view that 
a similar result can be achieved without reference to this particular theory. A party 
centric view is also adopted so that the host state human rights defence has the 
potential to be directly applied in ICSID arbitration.  
To achieve its aims, this thesis is both expositive and evaluative in nature. It 
is expositive as it ascertains the current scope of the law and identifies the degree to 
which it permits the interaction of international investment law and international 
human rights law within the framework of ICSID arbitration. The identification of 
this relationship is undertaken by reference to both primary and secondary sources, 
in addition to jurisprudence. The limits that are identified form the basis of the 
evaluative analysis. This utilises the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2 as 
its evaluative gauge, and measures the degree to which the interaction between 
international investment law and international human rights law within ICSID 
arbitration displays characteristics associated with ‘fragmentation’. By reference to 
this evaluation, subsequent discussion focuses on the manner in which a host state 
human rights defence is able to rectify the deficiencies identified and become 
operational in ICSID arbitration.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 A Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 
2012); B Choudhury, 'International Investment Law as a Global Public Good' (Lewis & Clark Law 
School’s 17th Annual Business Law Fall 
Forum 2012) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2181414> accessed 4 July 2013. 
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To address the issues raised, this thesis is divided into two parts. Part A 
assesses the current degree of interaction between international investment law and 
international human rights law. It proceeds with this appraisal in two stages.  
Chapter 2 outlines the understanding of public international law used in this 
thesis by reference to three key concepts. The first relates to the legal basis on which 
public international law is deemed to be binding. A consent driven positivist stance 
is adopted, not because this is necessarily the most accurate depiction of public 
international law, but because it provides the most challenging understanding of 
public international law within which to establish a host state human rights defence. 
The implications of a positivist conception of public international law are then 
discussed by reference to the notion of international legal personality. This is 
significant because IIAs confer rights upon foreign investors, who do not inherently 
possess international legal personality, to enable them to utilise ICSID arbitration. 
Finally, the systemic operation of public international law is considered in order to 
establish a definition of ‘fragmentation’, and in light of this definition, examination 
turns to the impact of ‘fragmentation’ on public international law’s systemic nature, 
with a particular focus on regime conflict. 
Chapter 3 builds upon this foundation by highlighting instances of regime 
conflict between international investment law and international human rights law to 
justify the introduction of a host state human rights defence. By undertaking this 
analysis, it is possible to identify where both regimes are currently fragmented. 
Consideration is given to the latest generation of IIAs, focusing on recent BIT 
practice, to determine the manner in which states are attempting to address the 
intersection of international investment law and international human rights law. 
ICSID arbitral practice is then isolated to determine the attitude of all participants in 
the ICSID arbitral system. Finally, the effectiveness of amicus curiae procedures, as 
the primary means of introducing human rights considerations within ICSID 
arbitration, albeit by third parties, is discussed. The chapter concludes by 
establishing the key attributes required of a host state human rights defence in light 
of this discussion. 
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Having identified where fragmentation between international investment law 
and international human rights law exists, Part B seeks to ascertain a viable means of 
introducing international human rights law into ICSID arbitral proceedings. Chapter 
4 examines the manner in which a host state human rights defence could be 
established in ICSID arbitration on procedural grounds. Two approaches are 
considered. The first seeks to deny an ICSID tribunal of its jurisdiction by relying on 
‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses. The effect of these clauses is to deny an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal the requisite state consent to proceed to ICSID arbitration on 
the merits of the claim. Therefore, these clauses could be invoked by a host state to 
deny the jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal should a foreign investor’s 
violations of international human rights law simultaneously breach host state law. 
The second approach considers the role of admissibility, and whether there are 
policy justifications that merit an ICSID arbitral tribunal refusing to hear a claim 
when a foreign investor has violated international human rights law. 
Chapter 5 addresses the means of establishing a substantive host state human 
rights defence by way of counterclaim procedures sourced from the ICSID Arbitral 
Rules. This chapter examines the scope and application of ICSID counterclaim 
procedures to determine how they could be used to establish a host state human 
rights defence. As part of this analysis, the impact of a foreign investor’s limited 
international legal personality on the proposed host state human rights defence is 
discussed. To illustrate the potential operation of a host state human rights defence 
founded on counterclaim procedures, the extent to which an ICSID arbitral tribunal 
is able to apply international human rights law is discerned by reference to the scope 
of the ICSID Convention’s provisions that address applicable law. 
The final chapter of the thesis outlines the conclusions of this study by 
arguing that the ‘de-fragmentation’ of international investment law and international 
human rights law is possible given that a procedural basis for a host state human 
rights defence in ICSID arbitration exists.  
1.2 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
As with any study, this thesis is subject to certain assumptions and limitations. The 
first limitation concerns the scope of the thesis, which excludes any discussion of the 
remedies available as a result of invoking the host state human rights defence. This is 
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because the study focuses on the role of ‘fragmentation’ as a limiting factor 
precluding the interaction of international investment law and international human 
rights law. As such, once international human rights law is introduced into ICSID 
arbitration effectively, and can be applied in an appropriate manner, the regimes 
have been ‘de-fragmented’. Available remedial measures do not impact the ‘de-
fragmentation’ of these regimes within ICSID arbitration, and are therefore beyond 
the scope of the current research. 
Whilst any individual that falls within the definition of an investor in the 
applicable IIA is protected,38 corporate bodies undertake almost all large-scale 
investment. Consequently, this thesis, while addressing FDI generally, tends to focus 
on foreign investors that use a corporate form. In some instances, host states require 
that corporate investors incorporate in accordance with local laws.39 Thus, these 
corporate bodies are technically not foreign investors. However, the definition of 
investor in most IIAs attributes these corporate bodies with the status of a foreign 
investor.40 This thesis will take a similar approach. Although some issues may be 
applied differently in instances where the foreign investor is registered as a host state 
corporation, they will be treated as being registered in a different jurisdiction on the 
basis of their foreign control.41  
This thesis seeks to focus specifically on the interaction of international 
investment law and international human rights law. In so doing, at times it 
recognises the relationship between international human rights law and, for example, 
international environmental law. Nevertheless, the majority of the thesis focuses on 
‘pure’ human rights instruments. In particular, it limits consideration to the nine core 
UN instruments and three regional human rights instruments.42 Examples are drawn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Newcombe and Paradell (n 13) 68. 
39 Ibid 68 – 69. 
40 Ibid 69. 
41 For further consideration of this issue see L Schicho, State Entities in International Investment Law 
(Nomos Publishers 2012). 
42 These are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1961) 660 UNTS 195 (ICERD); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 
December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW); Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 
December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85 (CAT); Convention on the Rights 
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from these instruments to illustrate specific points and to highlight differences, but in 
the vast majority of cases, the arguments raised in this thesis apply to all of these 
legal documents. 
Finally, this study is limited to consideration of the ICSID Arbitral Rules. 
Whilst other arbitral rules may be applied to ITA,43 these are primarily intended for 
international commercial arbitration (ICA) and do not specifically address the unique 
characteristics of ITA. As a result, they cannot be said to form part of the specialist 
regime of international investment law. The ICSID Arbitral Rules do fulfil this remit 
as they are the pre-eminent investment arbitral rules and govern the conduct of the 
only specialist international investment law dispute resolution forum. 
 
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 
(CRC); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (adopted 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003)  2220 UNTS 
39481 (ICRMW); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, 
entered into force 3 May 2008) A/RES/61/106, Annex I (ICRPD); International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (adopted 20 December 2006, entered into 
force 23 December 2010) Doc.A/61/488 (ICAED); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 
UNTS 221 (ECHR); American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 21 November 1969, entered 
into force 18 July 1978) 144 UNTS 123 (ACHR); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (African Charter). 
Reference is also made to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) 
UNGA Res 217 A(III). 
43 For example, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules 
(UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules); International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration (ICC Arbitral 
Rules); London Court of International Arbitration Arbitration Rules (LCIA Arbitral Rules). 
 
	  








AN EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT INTERACTION 
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 









	   	   13 
2. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN EVALUATIVE 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Given its state centric approach, public international law displays unique 
characteristics that distinguish it from domestic legal systems. As a result, it is 
difficult to definitively categorise the manner in which public international law 
functions and to provide a thorough theoretical foundation to explain its operation. 
Questions regarding the existential basis of public international law have 
accompanied its development, resulting in differing formulations of the 
jurisprudential foundations of public international law. Therefore, there is no single, 
uniform conception of public international law. In light of public international law’s 
apparent fragmentation, questions referring to the theoretical basis of public 
international law remain relevant, and if anything, have become more pervasive. 
Therefore, this chapter seeks to contextualise what is meant by ‘public international 
law’ by reference to established jurisprudence. In doing so, it does not seek to 
reconsider the foundations of public international law, but rather, due to the variety 
of approaches that may be taken, it outlines the understanding of public international 
law that is utilised in this thesis, in order to place the current study within the 
framework of the preceding debates.  
The concept of ‘public international law’ will first be considered in light of 
legal theory. This section considers the impact of competing schools of legal 
philosophy that can broadly be described as naturalism and positivism. In doing so, it 
is contended that a host state human rights defence can be introduced into ICSID 
arbitration without the need to adopt an overtly conducive theoretical basis, such as 
naturalism. Moreover, it is argued that by adopting a positivist conception of public 
international law, the foundations for a host state human rights defence are 
strengthened. 
In light of the positivist conception of public international law adopted, the 
chapter proceeds to consider the position of the foreign investor in public 
international law. As a non-state entity, a foreign investor is only conferred with 
rights and responsibilities to the extent that they are bestowed with international 
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legal personality.1 Which entities possess international legal personality is dependent 
on the theoretical foundation adopted.2 By assuming a consent driven positivist 
stance as the foundation of public international law in this thesis, it is submitted that 
the scope of a foreign investor’s international legal personality is contingent upon 
the conferral of state consent. Consideration in this section will focus on the 
jurisprudential formulation of international legal personality adopted within this 
thesis. The practical significance of this concept for the establishment of a host state 
human rights defence will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
Having outlined the broader context in which this thesis considers public 
international law to operate, the chapter then proceeds to examine what is meant by 
the fragmentation of public international law, and as a corollary, the author’s 
intention behind the use of the term ‘de-fragmentation’. This section conceptualises 
the wider operation of public international law, of which international investment 
law and international human rights law form part, to understand how both regimes 
are thought to interact with each other. It is posited that public international law 
broadly operates in a systemic manner.  
The chapter concludes by linking the theoretical foundations discussed to the 
main argument formulated throughout this thesis.  
2.2 NATURALISM, POSITIVISM AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW  
By proposing a procedural basis for a host state human rights defence, this thesis 
argues that host states can justify violations of IIAs by reference to international 
human rights law within ICSID arbitration. Therefore, this thesis evidences an 
approach that supports the inclusion of altruistic considerations within international 
investment law. Those who oppose this position are likely to take the view that this 
argument is based on a moral stance, and that human rights do not belong within a 
legal regime that is primarily aimed at protecting a foreign investor, seeking to make 
economic gains in a foreign jurisdiction, from the vagaries of host state regulation.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 F Green, 'Fragmentation in Two Dimensions: The ICJ's Flawed Approach to Non-State Actors and 
International Legal Personality' (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 47, 50. 
2 Ibid; MN Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 196; R Hansen, 'The 
International Legal Personality of Multinational Enterprises: Treaty, Custom and the Governnance 
Gap' (2010) 10 Global Jurist 1, 10. 
3 An indication of this view is given in Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Procedural Order No. 2, 26 June 2012 [57] – [60] and Border Timbers 
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Such an argument is precisely why this section considers the role of morality in law 
from a theoretical perspective. It is by identifying how streams of legal philosophy 
approach the significance of morality, that the appropriate formulation of public 
international law can be identified, that will not only permit the introduction of 
international human rights law into international investment law and ICSID 
arbitration, but also fully address counter-arguments including the one raised above. 
To consider the available methodologies in more detail, this section briefly outlines 
the opposing legal philosophies of naturalism and positivism, before justifying the 
stance taken in this thesis. In doing so, this section cannot elaborate upon all 
manifestations of both of these schools of thought. Consequently, it focuses on the 
common elements that are generally associated with each philosophy, rather than the 
works of individual philosophers. 
Naturalism, or natural law, refers to an understanding of law that deems that 
law and morality should be intertwined.4 More precisely, its foundation is that law 
gains authority from its basis in morality. The earliest progenitors of this view, such 
as Aquinas, linked law to ethics, espousing that ‘an unjust law is no law at all’.5 The 
theological underpinning of natural law at this time made identifying what was ‘just’ 
referable to the laws of God.6 However, the dominant purpose of ‘just law’ was that 
it served, and promoted, human good.7 A law that lacked this purpose could, 
therefore, either fail to bind in a moral sense, or alternatively be devoid of both 
moral and legal effect, depending on how Aquinas’ proposition is construed.8 On 
either interpretation, an unjust law was not a fully effective law.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. (Private) 
Limited v. Republic of Zimbabwe ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25, Procedural Order No. 2, 26 June 2012 
[57] – [60]. 
4 K Greenawalt, 'How Persuasive is Natural Law Theory?' (2000) 75 Notre Dame Law Review 1647, 
1651. 
5 T Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Benziger Bros 1947) question 96, article 4. 
6 P Soper, 'In Defense of Classical Natural Law in Legal Theory: Why Unjust Law is No Law at All' 
(2007) 20 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 201, 203; J d'Aspremont, Formalism and the 
Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules (Oxford University Press 
2011) 41. 
7 Greenawalt (n 4) 1651; R West, Normative Jurisprudence: An Introduction (Cambridge University 
Press 2011) 31. 
8 B Bix, 'Natural Law Theory' in D Patterson (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory (Blackwell Publishers 1999) 226; West (n 7) 17 – 18. 
9 N MacCormick, 'Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals' in RP George (ed), Natural 
Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford University Press 1992) 106; Bix (n 8) 226. 
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 Early jurisprudential scholars in public international law initiated conceptions 
of law that departed from natural law thinking,10 giving rise to the ideology of 
positivist law.11 Positivism separates law and morals,12 and instead focuses on the 
legitimacy of sources of law within the legal system, so as to confer law with 
binding authority. The authority required to confer law with its binding nature varies 
depending on the conception of positivism adopted.13 The main consequence of 
positivism is that social constructs, such as the state or a sovereign, rather than 
reference to a divine ruler or a human good, determine the validity of the law.14 
Thus, law may reflect the moral position of society, but by itself, this in insufficient 
to bind those subject to the law.15 Equally, a valid law by reference to its source may 
be deemed to be unjust.16 Consequently, law is identified in an empirical manner 
whilst any evaluation of the merits of the law occurs at a subsequent stage.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Bix (n 8) 227; S Hall, 'The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the Limits of 
Legal Positivism' (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 269, 273 – 274. These included 
Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel. See A Orakhelashvili, 'The Origins of Consensual Positivism- 
Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel' in A Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on the Theory and History 
of International Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 93 onwards. 
11 d'Aspremont (n 6) 83. Hobbes and Bentham further developed the bases of positivist theory. See 
ibid 42 – 46. 
12 J Waldron, 'The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity' in RP George (ed), Natural Law Theory: 
Contemporary Essays (Oxford University Press 1992) 160; MacCormick (n 9) 107; J Goldsworthy, 
'Fact and Value in the New Natural Law Theory' (1996) 41 The American Journal of Jurisprudence 
21, 21; B Simma and AL Paulus, 'The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in 
Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View' (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 302, 304; S 
Coyle, 'Positivism as a Statist Philosophy of Law' (2008) 59 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 49, 51; 
MV Totaro, 'Legal Positivism, Constructivism, and International Human Rights Law: The Case of 
Participatory Development' (2008) 48 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 719, 724, 730; T-H 
Cheng, 'Positivism, New Haven Jurisprudence, and the Fragmentation of International Law' in T 
Weiler and F Baetens (eds), New Directions in International Economic Law: In Memoriam Thomas 
Walde (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 425. 
13 For example, Austin sources the authority of law to the command of the sovereign. Compliance 
results from the sanctions that flow from disobeying the law (Soper (n 6) 205; JL Coleman and B 
Leiter, 'Legal Positivism' in D Patterson (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(Blackwell Publishers 1999), 244 – 245). Whereas Hart distinguishes between laws that set out 
obligations, and secondary rules that confer authority upon these rules (ibid, 244 – 245). The legal 
system justifies the coercion (Soper (n 6) 205). 
14 MacCormick (n 9) 107; Waldron (n 12) 160; Coleman and Leiter (n 13) 241; Soper (n 6) 205; 
Totaro (n 12) 724 – 725; Cheng (n 12) 425.  
15 MacCormick (n 9) 107; Coleman and Leiter (n 13) 241. Incorporationism, a variation on 
positivism, permits the inclusion of moral principles into law, provided the rule of recognition 
incorporates morality into law (ibid, 251 – 252). However, such a position is rejected by Dworkin 
(who considers that morality may be introduced by way of interpretation) and Raz (who considers 
that authority is drawn from convergent conduct by officials (ibid, 255)). 
16 West (n 7) 60; SR Ratner, 'From Enlightened Positivism to Cosmopolitan Justice: Obstacles and 
Opportunities' in U Fastenrath and others (eds), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in 
Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press 2011) 155. 
17 Soper (n 6) 206; d'Aspremont (n 6) 39. 
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Modern approaches to natural law have responded to the detachment of law 
and morality that forms the basis of positivism. As a result, recent conceptions of 
natural law do not necessarily base morality on ethical considerations.18 Rather, 
these philosophies concentrate on whether law reflects social practice and social 
institutions.19 In particular, they reject an acceptance of law derived from an 
authoritarian source that is devoid of the social or moral environment from which it 
is drawn.20 By referring to an idealised moral position, naturalism has been criticised 
by positivists for not distinguishing between what the law ‘is’, and naturalists’ views 
as to what the law ‘ought to be’.21  
In the context of public international law, naturalism formed the basis of 
early legal scholarship.22 This was in part due to the lack of a hierarchical structure 
within public international law, given that a source of ultimate sovereignty is 
difficult to identify23 in light of a lack of international legislature and the equality of 
states.24 However, it was the same characteristics that justified a swing to a positivist 
conception of public international law. As states were unable to defer to a higher 
authority or greater good in a naturalist sense either, it was contended that the only 
means available for states to relinquish their sovereign power was through state 
consent.25 Therefore, rather than determining the law by reference to moral 
considerations, consensual agreement between states became the social construct 
that validated international legal principles. At present, a predominantly positivist 
approach is accepted within public international law,26 with the need for consent 
underpinning fundamental aspects of the legal system, such the sources of public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Greenawalt (n 4) 1652. 
19 For example, J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press 1980) who used 
Aquinas as the foundation of his treatise, but differentiates between natural law and the will of God 
(48 – 49). However, Finnis does not consider natural law theory to deem a law as valid. See 
d'Aspremont (n 6) 84. 
20 Bix (n 8) 231. 
21 MacCormick (n 9) 107; Simma and Paulus (n 12) 304. 
22 Hall (n 10) 270. 
23 Totaro (n 12) 723; D Dyzenhaus, 'Postivism and the Pesky Sovereign' (2011) 22 European Journal 
of International Law 363. 
24 Totaro (n 12) 724. 
25 Hall (n 10) 282 – 283. 
26 Ratner (n 16) 155. 
 
	  
	   	   18 
international law (primarily treaties),27 and key institutions (including the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ)).28  
The introduction of international human rights law into ICSID arbitration, which 
arguably draws from humanitarian, and thus moral justifications, could indicate a 
predilection towards natural law thinking. Instead, this thesis deliberately seeks to 
establish a host state human rights defence by relying on a positivist approach to 
increase the prospects of its widespread acceptance. A naturalist perspective would 
militate against the potential acceptance of a host state human rights defence given 
the broadly positivist stance that forms the foundations of modern public 
international law. Further, a naturalist approach would leave the introduction of a 
host state human rights defence vulnerable to claims that the defence can only be 
established when supported by a theoretical basis that is conducive to moral or social 
justifications. Such a perception would undermine the credibility of the defence and 
lead to debate regarding whether the defence would apply outside of this naturalist 
framework. In contrast, when based on positivism and state consent, the defence 
clearly demonstrates its feasibility without reference to wider considerations of 
morality. Consequently, this thesis utilises existing legal obligations, to which states 
have already consented, in order to demonstrate that a valid host state human rights 
defence can be established in ICSID arbitration. This avoids the critique that a host 
state human rights defence is promoting what the law ‘ought to be’ rather than what 
it actually ‘is’.  
2.3 FOREIGN INVESTORS AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The adoption of a positivist, state driven conception of public international law 
strengthens the viability of a host state human rights defence. However, by focusing 
on the element of state consent in public international law, it raises theoretical 
questions regarding the rights and responsibilities of non-state actors, such as foreign 
investors, under public international law. The extent to which foreign investors can 
be considered to be actors in the international arena depends on the degree to which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Treaties enter into force following the required number of ratifications, which is an expression of 
state consent. See Articles 2(1)(b), 14(1) and 16 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT). 
28 The contentious jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is established by way of 
consent. See Article 36 Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
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they exhibit international legal personality.29 The basis of international legal 
personality is conditional on the theoretical foundation that is accepted.30 Therefore, 
this section considers the concept of international legal personality within a positivist 
framework by setting out the theoretical grounding utilised in this thesis. 
2.3.1 International Legal Personality 
International legal personality refers to the ability of an entity to possess rights and 
responsibilities governed by public international law.31 International legal 
personality stems from the Vattelian conception of the state as a separate legal 
persona.32 Prior to this formulation, both states and individuals33 were considered to 
be actors for the purposes of public international law.34 However, the widespread 
adoption35 of the view that the state has the capacity to act as an independent legal 
entity resulted in a state driven conception of public international law36 that excluded 
other actors, and in particular, individuals.37 A further consequence of this altered 
dynamic was the adoption of the ‘subjects’ doctrine,38 which distinguished between 
those who had the capacity to create, and be bound by, public international law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Green (n 1) 50. 
30 Ibid; Shaw (n 2)196; Hansen (n 2) 10. 
31 Shaw (n 2) 196; A Gatto, Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights (Edward Elgar 2011) 48 – 
49. 
32 JE Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry Into the History and 
Theory of International Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2004) 83; R Portmann, Legal Personality in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 35 – 36.  
33 The term ‘individual’ in this section is used inclusively to address both natural and legal persons, 
thereby encompassing foreign investors. 
34 Early theories regarding the role of public international law deemed it to either govern individuals 
qua individuals or addressed the conduct of individuals in their capacity as an element of the state. 
For example, the law of nations established by Grotius was not driven by a modern conception of the 
state (M St Korowicz, 'The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals' (1956) 50 The 
American Journal of International Law 533, 534). Rather, it focused on the acts of individuals 
involved in the conduct of international relations (ibid; Nijman (n 32) 50). Hobbes, Pufendorf and 
Wolff developed conceptions of the state as a separate entity (H Aufricht, 'Personality in International 
Law' (1943) 37 The American Political Science Review 217, 217 – 219; St Korowicz (n 34) 534; 
Portmann (n 32) 36 – 37). However, they considered that both the state and the individual were bound 
by public international law, and in doing so, conferred recognition upon individuals within this sphere 
(St Korowicz (n 34) 534; Portmann (n 32) 34 – 35). 
35 A Bianchi, 'Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors' in G Teubner (ed), 
Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth 1997) 180. 
36 Nijman (n 32) 83; Portmann (n 32) 35 – 36; A Clapham, Brierly's Law of Nations (7 edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012) 36 – 40. 
37 J Klabbers, '(I Can't Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State 
Actors' in J Petman and J Klabbers (eds), Nordic Cosmopolitanism: Essays in International Law for 
Martti Koskenniemi (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003) 355; Nijman (n 32) 83; Green (n 2) 51; 
Portmann, (n 32) 35 – 36. 
38 R Higgins, Problems and Processes: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press 1994) 
49; Nijman (n 32) 83; see St Korowicz (n 34) 535. For a discussion of Leibniz’ political philosophy 
which established this doctrine, see Nijman (n 32) 58 – 80. 
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(subjects)39 and those whose conduct was controlled by the subjects of the 
international law (objects).40 Given their independent legal persona, states were 
conferred with subject status,41 whilst individuals were classified as objects42 and 
only bound by principles of public international law when re-formulated as 
municipal legal obligations.43 As a result, states became the primary holders of 
international legal personality. 
Vattel’s theory has generated conceptual difficulties regarding the interaction 
of individuals and states from the perspective of international legal personality in 
public international law. In essence, the issue is one of whether the legal construct of 
the state should be considered the key protagonist in the international legal system, 
or whether individuals remain the prime concern, given that the state is merely a 
collective representation of individuals.44 To address these challenges, varied 
theories relating to international legal personality have been developed in an attempt 
to understand the respective roles of states and individuals within the international 
legal system. These approaches can be broadly categorised into those that prioritise 
the international legal personality of the state, and in doing so, minimise or exclude 
the role of the individual,45 and those that seek to reject Vattel’s theory and confer 
parity within international legal relations upon both the state and the individual.46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 OI Tiunov, 'The International Legal Personality of States: Problems and Solutions' (1993) 37 St 
Louis University Law Journal 323, 324. Regarding the difficulties of defining a ‘subject’ of 
international law see Klabbers (n 37) 352. 
40 H Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of the Law of Nations' (1947) 63 Law Quarterly Review 438, 439; H 
Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of International Law' in E Lauterpacht (ed), International Law: Being the 
Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht Volume I: The General Works (Cambridge University Press 
1970) 137; Hansen (n 2) 12. 
41 Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of the Law of Nations' (n 40) 439; Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of 
International Law' (n 40) 136; Higgins (n 38) 48. 
42 Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of the Law of Nations' (n 40) 440. 
43 Tiunov (n 39) 333. 
44 See Aufricht (n 34); Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of International Law' (n 40) 147 – 149; J Klabbers, 
'Legal Personality: The Concept of Legal Personality' (2005) 11 Ius Gentium 35, 39 – 50.  
45 This view evidences the positivist understanding of public international law (see Portmann (n 32) 
42 – 79). The primacy of states under this conception is seen to stem from their sovereignty (Aufricht 
(n 34) 230), with individuals ‘submit[ing] to the legal order of the state in which they are found’ 
(Tiunov (n 39) 333). Consequently, in accordance with this view, international legal obligations must 
be adopted by the state as municipal legal obligations in order to bind the individual (See Polish 
Postal Service in Danzig (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Rep Series B No 11, 17 – 18). 
46 When asserting the role of the individual within public international law, focus is often placed on 
the individuals and states being equal beneficiaries of the humanitarian purposes of international law, 
for example, Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of the Law of Nations'; Lauterpacht, 'The Subjects of 
International Law'. See K Nowrot, 'Reconceptualising International Legal Personality of Influential 
Non-State Actors: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibilities' (2006) 80 
Philippine Law Journal 563, 572; Portmann (n 32) 126, 133. Alternatively, they consider the extent to 
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Having adopted a positivist viewpoint of public international law that is 
reliant on state consent, this thesis adopts a conception of public international law in 
which international legal personality may be conferred upon individuals, but only 
with the consent of the state. In doing so, it prioritises the Vattelian state centric 
approach, taking as its starting point that the role of individuals is limited to that of 
objects, rather than subjects of public international law. This standpoint ensures that 
a consistent theoretical basis is adopted throughout this thesis. Similarly to the stance 
taken in relation to positivism, this conservative approach also demonstrates that a 
host state human rights defence is feasible, even to those that seek to curtail the role 
of individuals within public international law. The operation of this state-centric 
formulation of public international law in relation to international legal personality 
will now be considered in more detail. 
2.3.2 The Role of State Consent 
Under a state driven understanding of public international law, states possess 
international legal personality.47 This results in states being the primary holders of 
both rights and duties in public international law.48 In order to confer international 
legal personality (and any attending rights and duties) on other entities, states need to 
relinquish their rights as the exclusive holders of international legal personality. The 
ICJ has recognised two instances in which other entities may be conferred with 
international legal personality by states. The first is when states expressly confer 
such a right through the use of specific treaty language.49 The second is by 
implication through state conduct.50  
The LaGrand51 decision evidences the express conferral of international legal 
personality through a treaty provision. The decision in LaGrand was in response to a 
claim by Germany challenging the United States of America regarding the use of the 
death penalty in relation to two German nationals in instances where the convicted 
individuals had not been informed of their rights to consular access in accordance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which individuals already participate in law creation within the public international law framework, 
For example, Higgins (n 38) 48 - 55. See Portmann (n 32) 210, 212.  
47 Green (n 1) 51. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Hansen (n 2) 13; Portmann (n 32) 82. 
50 Hansen (n 2) 13; Portmann (n 32) 82.  
51 LaGrand (Germany v USA) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466. 
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with Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations52.53 This 
provision provides, in part, that ‘the said authorities shall inform the person 
concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph’. When interpreting 
the language of this provision, the ICJ emphasised the use of ‘his rights’ within the 
clause, and held that ‘Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights, which, by 
virtue of Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court by the 
national State of the detained person’.54 Consequently, the ICJ focused on the 
specific language of the treaty, and in particular, to its reference to the individual 
(rather than the state) in the terminology of the provision. This was deemed 
sufficient to grant the right to be informed of consular assistance directly upon the 
individual, as opposed to it being considered a right of the state exercised in the 
interests of the individual.55 As this provision created an individual right, Germany 
was entitled to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the nationals concerned to 
enforce this right against the United States of America in the ICJ.56	  	  
Hence, under this formulation, should a state confer rights or responsibilities 
upon a non-state actor through a treaty provision, the non-state actor acquires 
international legal personality to the extent permitted by the treaty provision. For 
example, IIAs permit foreign investors to initiate ICSID arbitration against host 
states through the use of treaty language directed at the foreign investor. While IIAs 
may vary in the terminology used to convey legal standing upon an investor, the 
ability of an investor to commence ICSID arbitration is considered to be a right that 
is directly conferred upon the investor, rather than their home state.57 This 
interpretation accords with the drafting intentions behind the ICSID Convention:  
[F]rom a legal point of view the most striking feature of the Convention 
is that it firmly establishes the capacity of a private individual or a 
corporation to proceed directly against a State in an international forum, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 
1967) 596 UNTS 261. 
53 LaGrand (Germany v USA) (n 51) 471 – 473. 
54 Ibid 494.  
55 O Spiermann, 'Individual Rights, State Interests and the Power to Waive ICSID Jurisdiction Under 
Bilateral Investment Treaties' (2004) 20 Arbitration International 179, 183. 
56 See R Jennings, 'The LaGrand Case' (2002) 1 The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals 13, 47 – 48. 
57 Spiermann (n 55) 185. 
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thus contributing to the growing recognition of the individual as a 
subject of international law.58 
In the case of Occidental v Ecuador,59 the English High Court stated its 
understanding of the role of IIAs by confirming that ‘the State Parties to the BIT 
intended to give investors the right to pursue, in their name and for themselves, 
claims against the other State party’.60 The transition from state centric dispute 
resolution to one in which individuals may commence proceedings under the ICSID 
Convention, was also noted by the SGS v Philippines61 tribunal when it recognised 
that ‘under modern international law, treaties may confer rights, substantive and 
procedural, on individuals’.62 Although it remains unclear whether by initiating a 
claim the investor is conferred with a procedural or a substantive right in ITA,63 
these authorities indicate that IIAs, through their express provisions can confer 
specific rights on individuals. By doing so, IIAs confer limited international legal 
personality to enable foreign investors to commence a claim in accordance with the 
ICSID Institution Rules. 
Whilst the use of express terms evidences a clear intention of the state to 
confer rights to the individual, this may also be achieved implicitly. In the 
Reparations Advisory Opinion,64 the ICJ considered whether the United Nations 
(UN) had international legal personality. This question was raised in the broader 
context of whether the UN had the ability to bring a claim against Israel following 
the death of Count Bernadotte in his capacity as UN Mediator for Palestine.65 The 
ICJ recognised that international legal personality was not limited to states66 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 A Broches, 'The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States' (1972) 136 Recueil des Cours de l'Acadamie de Droit Internationale 331, 
349.  
59 Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Company [2005] EWHC 774 
(Comm) (HC QBD). 
60 Ibid [61].  
61 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004. 
62 Ibid [154]. See also Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005 [34]. 
63 Z Douglas, 'The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration' (2003) 74 British Yearbook 
of International Law 151, 162 – 164; A Roberts, 'Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty 
Interpretation: The Dual Role of States' (2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 179, 184 – 
185. 
64 Reparation for Injuries Sufffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] 
ICJ Rep 174. 
65 A Reinisch, International Organizations Before National Courts (Cambridge University Press 
2000) 55. 
66 Reparation for Injuries Sufffered in the Service of the United Nations (n 64) 178. 
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concluded that the UN had international legal personality, albeit limited to the extent 
that its functions required it. The foundation for the UN possessing international 
legal personality was, in part, due to its Members: 
It must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain 
functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have 
clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions to be 
effectively discharged. 67 
The Court stressed that, in conferring legal personality, it had not equated the UN 
with the equivalent standing of a state: 
the Organization is an international person. That is not the same thing as 
saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal 
personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State.68 
The Court’s consideration of international legal personality evidences that state 
conduct may result in international legal personality being conferred upon non-state 
entities. The lack of express provisions in the UN Charter did not preclude the ICJ 
from finding that states, by their conduct, had transferred rights to the UN as an 
international organisation. Therefore, state conduct may provide an additional route 
by which foreign investors can be attributed with rights and duties in public 
international law. The significance of conferring non-state actors with international 
legal personality for the establishment of a host state human rights defence is 
considered in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
In summary, a positivist conception of public international law requires that 
states endow non-state actors with international legal personality, either expressly or 
impliedly. While this approach emphasises the role of the state within public 
international law at the expense of the individual, it provides a secure grounding for 
a host state human rights defence. A strong foundation provides a host state human 
rights defence with the greatest chance of being accepted and implemented in ICSID 
arbitration. 
Having determined the wider theoretical basis that underlies the formation of 
public international law for the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to consider 
how public international law functions within this philosophy. By examining the 
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manner in which public international law functions, and in particular its systemic 
nature, content can be given to the notion of ‘fragmentation’ as it is utilised in this 
thesis.  
2.4 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A ‘SYSTEM’ 
To determine how a host state human rights defence might ‘de-fragment’ 
international investment law and international human rights law, the process of the 
‘fragmentation’ of public international law needs to be understood. The use of 
terminology such as ‘unity’ and ‘cohesion’, and conversely, ‘fragmentation’ and 
‘diversification’ in relation to public international law implies that public 
international law operates in a systemic manner.69 Given this inference, it is 
necessary to discuss differing perceptions of how public international operates to 
determine whether it can function systemically.  
The jurisprudential hallmarks of a ‘legal system’ are primarily drawn from the 
structure and operation of municipal legal systems.70 Yet, public international law 
exhibits characteristics that distinguish it from domestic legal systems. These 
qualities include that legal relationships primarily exist between states,71 there is 
notional equality of states (and as a consequence, a lack of centralised authority)72 
and that states create the law by consent driven methods whilst simultaneously being 
the subjects of public international law.73 It has been argued that these traits preclude 
public international law from functioning as a coherent legal system.74 Relying on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 B Simma, 'Fragmentation in a Positive Light' (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 845, 
847. 
70 W Twining, 'General Jurisprudence' (2007) 15 University of Miami International and Comparative 
Law Review 1, 9. 
71 V Lowe, International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 5; Shaw (n 2) 5. 
72 M Craven, 'Unity, Diversity and Fragmentation of International Law' (2003) 14 The Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law 3; Shaw (n 2) 6; C Tomuschat, 'International Law as a Coherent 
System: Unity or Fragmentation?' in MJ Arsanjani and others (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on 
International Law in Honour of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 330, 332. 
73 P Weil, 'Towards Relative Normativity in International Law' (1983) 77 The American Journal of 
International Law 413, 420; Shaw (n 2) 6. 
74 Early theorists, such as Austin and Bentham, required a legal system to evidence, amongst other 
things, a sovereign power and coercive sanctions (see AJ Sebok, 'Misunderstanding Positivism' 
(1995) 93 Michigan Law Review 2054, 2063 - 5; D Armstrong, T Farrell and H Lambert, 
International Law and International Relations (Cambridge University Press 2007) 75). Neither of 
these elements are considered to be present within public international law (O Casanovas, Unity and 
Pluralism in Public International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 6.  Regarding sovereign power see 
Lowe (n 71) 6 - 7).  
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this proposition, public international law has been deemed by some75 to consist of 
separate, but overlapping, self-sustaining regimes.76 The primacy given to the 
purposes and characteristics of each regime77 consequently renders a discussion 
regarding the unity and fragmentation of public international law as a systemic 
whole redundant. 
 In contrast to this approach, public international law can also be portrayed as 
evidencing characteristics that support a systemic viewpoint. The basis of this 
position is summarised in the conclusions of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission (ILC) on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law which declare 
at the outset that: 
International law is a legal system. Its rules and principles (i.e. its norms) 
act in relation to and should be interpreted against the background of 
other rules and principles. As a legal system, international law is not a 
random collection of such norms.78 
This thesis is premised on a systemic conception of public international law. This 
view of public international law is drawn from its reliance on general principles and 
secondary norms that have the potential be applied in a unified manner to all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 This view is predominantly taken by international relations scholars. 
76 For example, see J Goldsmith and E Posner, 'A Theory of Customary International Law' (1999) 66 
University of Chicago Law Review 1113; G Hafner, 'Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of 
International Law' (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 849; A Fischer-Lescano and G 
Teubner, 'Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law' 
(2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999, who argue that there is no unity in public 
international law as it is a ‘legal reproduction of collisions between the diverse rationalities within 
global society’ (at 1017); C Leathley, 'An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation of 
International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity?' (2007) 40 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 259; HG Cohen, 'From International Law to International Conflicts of 
Law: The Fragmentation of Legitimacy' (2010) 104 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 49. 
77 B Simma and D Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International 
Law' (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 483, 504. 
78 ILC, 'Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law' (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 and UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.682/Add.1 at [1]. See also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) (Compensation owed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo the Republic 
of Guinea) (Judgment) 2012 http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=7a&case=103&code=gc&p3=4 accessed 7 July 2013, 
Declaration of Judge Greenwood [8] where he stated ‘[i]nternational law is not a series of fragmented 
specialist and self-contained bodies of law, each of which functions in isolation from the others; it is a 
single, unified system of law’. 
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substantive areas of public international law.79 Accordingly, these general principles 
and secondary norms form part of the wider body of public international law in 
which specialist regimes operate,80 and hence, provide it with a common 
underpinning.  
 General principles of public international law can be considered to be those 
principles that are binding on all members of the international legal system,81 and as 
such, have universal application.82 Examples of general principles of public 
international law include the rules of state responsibility as codified by the ILC83 and 
the rules of treaty interpretation as set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT)84 that have become customary principles. General principles can be 
juxtaposed with inter partes principles entered into between specific participants of 
the legal system and which only have binding legal effect on those participants.85 As 
a result, despite the increasing specialisation of substantive norms (and the 
establishment of particular regimes to administer these norms) through the 
development of inter partes principles, general principles of public international law 
continue to apply across all fields of public international law, by default, to the 
extent that they are not specifically excluded.86 Consequently, subordinate reliance 
on general principles of public international law gives credence to the proposition 
that public international law operates in a systemic fashion.87 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 A similar position is taken by A Gourgourinis, 'General/Particular International Law and 
Primary/Secondary Rules: United Terminology of a Fragmented System' (2011) 22 European Journal 
of International Law 993. 
80 J Pauwelyn, 'Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-
Connected Islands' (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 903, 906. 
81 Casanovas (n 74) 56. For a full discussion of the potential conceptions of this term, including its 
relationship to general principles of international law as set out in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, see Gourgourinis (n 79) 1004 – 1016. 
82 Simma and Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law' 
(n 77) 500 fn 83. 
83 Set out in J Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press 2002). See Pauwelyn (n 80) 906; 
Simma and Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law' (n 
77) 500. 
84 VCLT (n 27). See Pauwelyn (n 80) 906. 
85 Casanovas (n 74) 56; Gourgourinis (n 79) 1010 – 1011. 
86 Simma, 'Fragmentation in a Positive Light' (n 69) 847; Pauwelyn (n 80) 906; Simma and 
Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law' (n 77) 500; 
JD Fry, 'International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law's 
Unity' (2007) 18 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 77, 145. 
87 Pauwelyn (n 80) 906. 
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 A further dichotomy may be drawn between primary and secondary rules. 
Unlike inter partes and general principles of international law, which are 
distinguished by their respective scope of application, the differentiation between 
primary and secondary norms focuses on the function of the norms.88 This 
distinction is often (but not always) drawn from HLA Hart’s treatise The Concept of 
Law.89 Hart posits that primary norms are those that regulate the conduct of those 
subject to the law, whilst secondary norms provide a supporting legal basis for the 
operation of these rules (and can be considered to be rules governing the 
adjudication of disputes, amendments to primary rules and the recognition of sources 
of binding law).90  In the context of international investment law, examples of 
primary norms would be rules governing host state conduct towards foreign 
investors that are contained in IIAs. Secondary norms would include rules 
determining the validity of the IIA as a source of binding law, rules governing its 
interpretation and rules setting out the consequences of breaching the terms of the 
IIA. In this sense, secondary norms function in a similar manner to general principles 
of international law. They operate as a unifying framework (to the extent that they 
are not specifically excluded) by dictating the manner in which all primary norms are 
to perform. Thus, they give rise to an underlying system within public international 
law.91 
Hart does not recognise that public international law possesses the necessary 
hallmarks of a system of law.92 This is partly due to its lack of secondary rules93 
when compared to municipal legal systems.94 Nevertheless, this thesis proceeds on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Gourgourinis (n 79) 994 – 995. 
89 H Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1994). It is not clear if the ILC developed 
the rules of state responsibility in light of Hart’s theory or independently (See Crawford (n 83) 14). 
For discussion regarding the manner in which the ILC Rapporteurs approached the distinction 
between primary and secondary norms see Simma and Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe: Self-
Contained Regimes in International Law' (n 77) 493 – 494; Gourgourinis (n 79) 1016 – 1020. 
90 Hart (n 89) 94 - 97. See also Casanovas (n 74) 16. With regard to their application, see especially 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) (Judgment) 
[1980] ICJ Rep 3 41. 
91 Prost argues that the use of Hart’s theory of primary and secondary norms of itself is insufficient to 
establish that public international law is a legal system (M Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2012) 83 – 125). This work does not seek to utilise Hart’s 
argument in this manner. It merely seeks to identify an underlying unity within public international 
law that goes beyond the conception that public international law merely consists of independent, self 
sustaining regimes. 
92 Hart (n 89) Chapter 10. 
93 Ibid 230 – 231. 
94 Ibid 216. 
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the basis that public international law shares sufficient unifying characteristics to 
operate in a systemic manner. Whilst public international law may not share all of 
the same characteristics as municipal legal systems, and as such may not amount to a 
‘legal system’ by reference to jurisprudential standards,95 general principles of 
international law and secondary norms evidence a clear structural basis.96 The ILC’s 
conception of public international law as a system is driven by a minimalist view of 
what amounts to a legal system, that is, a non-random collection of rules and 
principles. Despite the informal nature of this proposed structure, it should not be 
discredited. It is submitted that this conceptualisation is sufficient to give rise to 
public international law being understood as operating in a systemic manner.  
2.4.1 ‘Unity’ and ‘Fragmentation’  
The recognition of the systemic nature of public international law is inadequate to 
fully consider its cohesiveness. This requires consideration regarding the extent to 
which public international law evidences ‘unity’ or ‘fragmentation’. The notions of 
‘unity’ and ‘fragmentation’ are both relative to the degree of coherence evident in 
the selected construct of public international law.97 Even when their particular 
context is established, the terms ‘unity’ and ‘fragmentation’ can be broadly 
construed and both phenomena can operate to varying degrees.98 Hence, before 
evaluating the degree of interaction between international investment law and 
international human rights law by reference to the extent to which they evidence 
‘fragmentation’, it is necessary to define these terms.  
It may seem counterintuitive when considering ‘fragmentation’ to commence 
with a definition of ‘unity’. However, when considering ‘fragmentation’, the unity or 
coherence of public international law is often presumed.99 The term ‘fragmentation’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Weil (n 73) 413; J Crawford, 'The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect' (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 874, 880. 
96 Crawford, 'The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A 
Retrospect' (n 95) 880.  
97 M Prost, 'All Shouting the Same Slogans: International Law's Unities and the Politics of 
Fragmentation' (2006) 17 The Finnish Yearbook of International Law 131, 131 – 132, 149; IH 
Scheltema, 'The Fragmentation of International Law: Framing the Debate' 2010) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1581425> accessed 19 June 2012, 16. 
98 Prost, 'All Shouting the Same Slogans: International Law's Unities and the Politics of 
Fragmentation' (n 97) 131, 149. 
99 PS Rao, 'Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of 
International Law or its Fragmentation?' (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 929, 930; 
Prost, 'All Shouting the Same Slogans: International Law's Unities and the Politics of Fragmentation' 
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itself infers that what was once a whole is now broken.100 Discussion regarding the 
manner in which law is ‘fragmented’ reiterates this presumption.101 Therefore, when 
using ‘fragmentation’ as a benchmark, it is necessary to refer to the understanding of 
‘unity’ against which it is measured.102 This is especially so when both terms have 
the potential to be applied in a variety of manners. Thus, for these reasons, prior to 
defining ‘fragmentation’, ‘unity’ must be defined. 
2.4.1.1 Unity  
Unity within public international law may be defined by reference to several 
factors.103 For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘unity’ will be used to refer to 
substantive unity, that is, unity that prevents conflict between substantive norms104 
of public international law.105 It is accepted that conflicts between substantive norms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(n 98) 134; B Simma, 'Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner' (2009) 
20 European Journal of International Law 265, 267; Gourgourinis (n 79) 995 – 996; S Singh, 'The 
Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics' (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 23, 31. 
100 T Treves, 'Fragmentation of International Law: the Judicial Perspective' (2007) 23 
Communicazioni e Studi 821, 821; Simma, 'Universality of International Law from the Perspective of 
a Practitioner' (n 99) 270, A-C Martineau, 'The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in 
International Law' (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 1, 5; Tomuschat (n 72) 323 – 324; 
A Bjorkland and S Nappert, 'Beyond Fragmentation' in T Weiler and F Baetens (eds), New Directions 
in International Economic Law: In Memorium Thomas Walde (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 
440. However, it has been contended that the ‘fragmentation’ of public international law ‘did not arise 
out of some intrinsic weakness’ of public international law but rather, resulted from the 
‘unprecedented normative and institutional expansion’ of public international law (M Prost and PK 
Clark, 'Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How Much Does the 
Multiplication of International Organisations Really Matter?' (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 341, 343).  
101 Gourgourinis (n 79) 994. 
102 Scheltema, (accessed 19 June 2012) (n 97) 16; Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public International 
Law (n 91) 14 – 15. 
103 See Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public International Law (n 91). Prost identifies six forms of 
unifying characteristics within public international law, evidencing the multiplicity of ways in which 
the term may be used. The six forms of unity identified are material unity (the absence of conflict 
between positive obligations), formal unity (the universal acceptance and consistency of secondary 
rules), corporate unity (international law as a professional field), grammatical unity (international law 
as a discursive field), ontological unity (unity through a common postulate or principle of 
interpretation) and axiological unity (unity through shared over-arching values). Reference has 
previously been made to the common origins of international investment law and international human 
rights law as a means of substantiating claims of similarity between these particular regimes. See P-M 
Dupuy, 'Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International 
Investment Law and Human Rights Law' in P-M Dupuy, F Francioni and E-U Petersmann (eds), 
Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009); TG 
Nelson, 'Human Rights Law and BIT Protection: Areas of Convergence' (2011) 12 Journal of World 
Investment and Trade 27. 
104 ‘[T]wo norms are … in a relationship of conflict if one constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a 
breach of the other’ (J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Relates 
to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2003) 175- 176). 
105 Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public International Law (n 91) 48. 
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of public international law may arise. Nevertheless, in a unified conception of public 
international law, any such conflicts would be avoidable.  
In adopting this interpretation, ‘unity’ reflects that public international law is 
framed around general principles and secondary norms. The inclusion of general 
principles and secondary norms is implicit to this conception of ‘unity’ as it is 
general principles and secondary norms that provide the basis for the source of 
primary norms, their interpretation and determine the consequences of any breaches. 
These are all relevant considerations when examining how best to resolve norm 
conflict in public international law.  
For example, one manner in which secondary norms may resolve norm 
conflict is by reference to the notion of systemic integration. Systemic integration 
draws upon the language of the secondary norms set out in Article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT to posit that, when interpreting a treaty, the relationship of the treaty with 
other principles of public international law, and the position of the treaty within the 
international legal framework should be taken into account.106 Article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT makes it clear that it is mandatory for the treaty interpreter to take into 
account ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties’. This prevents the interpreter of the treaty from taking an isolated view of 
the law because ‘the normative environment cannot be ignored and ... the principle 
of integration should be borne in mind’.107 Through the use of a secondary norm, 
systemic integration demonstrates how it is possible to achieve substantive unity 
within the formulation of public international law adopted in this thesis.  
2.4.1.2 Fragmentation 
The relative nature of fragmentation results in its definition being contingent on the 
proposed form of unity.108 Accordingly, there is a considerable degree of variability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 C McLachlan, 'The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention' (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279; VP Tzevelekos, 'The Use 
of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR: An Effective Anti-Fragmentation 
Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human Rights Teleology? - Between 
Evolution and Systemic Integration' (2010) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 621, 632. See J 
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107 ILC (n 78) 211. 
108 Prost, 'All Shouting the Same Slogans: International Law's Unities and the Politics of 
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in what is perceived to amount to fragmentation and its potential consequences.109 
Given that the focus of this thesis is on the substantive unity of norms, fragmentation 
in this setting refers to the process by which individual areas of public international 
law are becoming increasingly specialised and divided, that legal principles are 
becoming incoherent, and, as a consequence, public international law is losing 
general applicability and, simultaneously, its cohesiveness.110  
In part, the process of fragmentation has resulted from the development of 
specialised subsystems within the public international law framework (leges 
speciales).111 These are typically characterised by treaty-based regimes that provide 
for legal obligations that vary from the principles of general international law.112 
When varying general international law, the parties may deviate from general 
principles by altering the secondary rules,113 or both the primary and secondary rules 
that would usually apply.114 The phrase lex specialis may also be used to refer to 
specialist regimes in public international law more generally.115 In this thesis, unless 
otherwise stated, lex specialis refers to the form of specialisation involving 
variations in both primary and secondary norms.  
The extent to which leges specialis may deviate from general international 
law to form a ‘self-contained regime’ has been the subject of much debate.116 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Ibid 133. Prost identifies three broad schools of thought regarding the effects fragmentation 
including those who view fragmentation as a threat, those that consider the dangers to be overstated 
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110 ILC (n 78) 11; Simma, 'Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner' (n 
99) 270; Martineau (n 100) 4; Singh (n 99) 24 – 25; E Guntrip, 'Systemic Integration and International 
Investment Law' in J Crawford and S Nouwen (eds), Select Proceedings of the European Society of 
International Law Volume 3 2010 (Hart Publishing 2012) 258.  
111 Rao (n 99) 933 - 934; McLachlan (n 106) 284; Simma, 'Universality of International Law from the 
Perspective of a Practitioner' (n 99) 270; D Lapaš, 'Some Remarks on Fragmentation of International 
Law: disintegration or transformation?' (2007) 40 The Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa 1, 2; Guntrip (n 110) 258. 
112 Casanovas (n 74) 56; ILC (n 78) 91; Guntrip (n 110) 258. 
113 ILC (n 78) 68; A Khrebtukova, 'A Call to Freedom: Towards a Philosophy of International Law in 
an Era of Fragmentation' (2008) 4 International Law and International Relations 51, 54. See United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) (n 90) 3 c.f. S.S. 
Wimbledon PCIJ Rep Series A No 1 which focused on specialised primary rules. 
114 ILC (n 78) 68; Khrebtukova (n 113) 54; Guntrip (n 110) 258. 
115 ILC (n 78) 68; Treves (n 100) 826. This is achieved by classifying the subsystems by reference to 
the subject matter that they regulate (such as international investment law, international human rights 
law and international environmental law).  
116 This is evidenced by the varied approaches taken by the ILC: ‘The International Law 
Commission’s stand with regard to the existence of so-called self-contained regimes concerning state 
responsibility has varied with each special rapporteur taking up the subject of legal consequences of 
internationally wrongful acts. In a nutshell, the ILC first appeared to embrace the concept of self-
contained subsystems (Riphagen), then became highly critical of the systematic feasibility of such 
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Academic commentators have contended that treaty based regimes may act 
independently from public international law by excluding the applicability of all 
general secondary norms, and in particular, state responsibility117 (forming the basis 
of arguments countering the systemic nature of public international law).118 
However, consistent with the systemic attributes of public international law forming 
the foundation of this thesis, it is argued that a true ‘self-contained regime’ is not 
possible.119 Both general principles and secondary norms of public international law 
will still be utilised by these regimes (albeit to a limited degree).120 Treaty 
interpretation provides a good example of how this might operate.121 A treaty 
establishing a ‘self-contained regime’ may set out the manner in which it should be 
interpreted, including definitions of key provisions. Nonetheless, should, for 
example, a definition be ambiguous, the VCLT, either as a treaty or customary 
international law may be applied to resolve the ambiguity. In short, should the 
specialist attributes of the subsystems fail, then general principles and secondary 
norms will apply in their absence.122 Consequently, the term ‘fragmentation’ refers 
to the increasing independence exhibited by lex specialis regimes, but does not 
extend to their complete isolation from public international law in all respects.123 
2.4.2 Diversity and Regime Conflict  
The distinction between unity and fragmentation outlined above, when applied to a 
systemic understanding of public international law, becomes less definite and more 
dynamic. This is due to the systemic nature of public international law being 
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123 G Abi-Saab, 'Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks' (1999) 31 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 919, 926; Crawford, 'The ILC's Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect' (n 95) 880; Simma and 
Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law' (n 77) 492; 
Khrebtukova (n 113) 63 - 64. 
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contingent on both unity and fragmentation simultaneously. The conception of 
public international law as a system presupposes a certain degree of diversity 
between lex specialis regimes.124 Without this diversity of lex specialis regimes, a 
system is not required to unify the regimes.125 Conversely, the degree to which 
divergence is permitted must be curtailed so as to ensure a requisite degree of 
uniformity to justify public international law being classified as a system.126 Without 
sufficient unity, public international law becomes fragmented. As a result, a balance 
must be struck between diversity and unity that enables variation between lex 
specialis regimes of public international law whilst preventing its fragmentation. 
Fragmentation may result from the increasing diversity and independence of 
lex specialis regimes. Too much diversity and independence can limit the extent to 
which legal regimes within public international law interact because each regime 
will tend to exhibit structural bias in favour of the subject matter that it regulates.127 
This precludes instruments setting out substantive norms and dispute resolution 
mechanisms from referring to principles from other lex specialis regimes that may 
apply to a given situation.128 Even if principles from other regimes are taken into 
account, dispute resolution mechanisms are structurally unable to adequately address 
all of the substantive law that may apply to the dispute at hand.129 Thus, each 
specialised form of dispute resolution can only fully consider and resolve a dispute 
by favouring the application of the provisions set out in the treaties establishing the 
regime of which it forms part.130 Hence, similar disputes that traverse several lex 
specialis regimes may result in differing outcomes depending on which dispute 
resolution forum is selected. This degree of specialism, both in relation to content 
and dispute resolution, undermines the cohesiveness of public international law as a 
system, which contributes to its fragmentation. In turn, it results in an increased 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Craven (n 72) 12. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Leathley (n 76) 265; M Koskenniemi, 'The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique 
and Politics' (2007) 70 The Modern Law Review 1, 4; Khrebtukova (n 113) 56; A van Aaken, 
'Defragmentation of Public International Law Through Interpretation: A Methodological Proposal' 
(2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 483, 484. 
128 These characteristics have been described as ‘norm fragmentation’ and ‘authority fragmentation’. 
See T Broude, 'Principles of Normative Integration and the Allocation of International Authority: the 
WTO, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Rio Declaration' (2009) Loyola 
University of Chicago International Law Review 173 
129 Khrebtukova (n 113) 56; Broude (n 128) 179. 
130 Khrebtukova (n 113) 56. 
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likelihood of conflict between legal regimes when two or more fields of specialist 
public international law apply to a particular scenario.131 Accordingly, should lex 
specialis regimes exhibit too much diversity, the cohesiveness of public international 
law may be reduced, increasing the likelihood of fragmentation, and with it, regime 
conflict.   
 The term ‘de-fragmentation’, as it is used in this thesis, refers to the 
prevention of regime conflict in the manner described above. It is submitted that the 
establishment of a host state human rights defence can achieve the aim of 
minimising regime conflict between international investment law and international 
human rights law. However, in order to achieve this aim, the defence must take into 
account the specialist nature of ICSID arbitration and consider the impact of any 
attributes displayed by ICSID arbitration that may favour the application of 
international investment law, and hinder the introduction of international human 
rights law. These factors are fully considered in Part B of this thesis. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The introduction of a host state human rights defence within ICSID arbitration 
requires a theoretical basis that does not render it open to unnecessary criticism. By 
adopting a positivist stance in relation to public international law, it is possible to 
formulate a widely accepted and justifiable defence. The nature of this 
jurisprudential basis restricts international legal personality to states, apart from 
those instances where states have consented to the conferral of rights upon 
individuals. Although this may be perceived as a conservative understanding of 
public international law, it reinforces the strong foundation required for a widely 
accepted host state human rights defence. Throughout this thesis these bases will 
inform the potential foundations for, and application of, the proposed defence.  
 The operation of the defence is based on a systemic viewpoint of public 
international law. This position is adopted based on the unifying features of general 
principles and secondary norms of public international law. These, in turn, inform 
the definition of the concepts of ‘unity’ and ‘fragmentation’, which further evidence 
the cohesive nature of public international law. The potential operation of a host 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Lapaš (n 111) 2; Tomuschat (n 72) 336. 
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state human rights defence will be considered by reference to these concepts. 
Particular emphasis will be placed on how fragmentation, resulting from the 
diversity and independence of lex specialis regimes, may result in regime conflict if 
taken too far. This occurs when lex specialis regimes are structurally unable to 
consider principles sourced from other regimes. Focus will be placed on the ability 
of the host state human rights defence to reverse this process, by ‘de-fragmenting’ 
international investment law and international human rights law. Prior to the ‘de-
fragmentation’ stage of this process, the next chapter considers the extent to which 
international investment law evidences this form of regime conflict, and highlights 
the attributes required by a host state human rights defence in ICSID arbitration so as 
to remedy some of the problems that arise as a result of the fragmentation of 
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3. REGIME CONFLICT AS JUSTIFICATION FOR A HOST 
STATE HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENCE IN ICSID ARBITRATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The fragmentation of public international law into leges speciales increases the 
likelihood of regime conflict.1 The creation of specialised legal regimes, with 
differing aims and diverse approaches to dispute resolution, has the potential to 
jeopardise the ability of public international law to provide a common solution to a 
single problem.2 The intersection of international investment law and international 
human rights law illustrates the risk of conflict at several levels of analysis.  
At its broadest conception, international investment law and international 
human rights law are two specialised regimes that, whilst sharing common elements 
drawn from general principles of public international law, seek to achieve differing 
aims.  As a result, each regime focuses on substantive norms that promote their 
singular objectives. The danger that accompanies such an approach is that each 
regime is unable to adequately address scenarios that extend beyond its own aims.  
The hypothetical nature of this regime conflict becomes tangible when states 
seek to comply with both regimes simultaneously. Given the failure of each regime 
to consider consequences extending beyond its own substantive norms, a state, when 
acting in compliance with one regime, may be unable to comply with obligations set 
out in the other.3 This results in a conflict of norms.4 For example, an investment 
project that is causing human rights violations may require a host state to act in 
breach of the terms of an IIA so as to comply with its international obligations to 
prevent human rights violations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Chapter 2, section 2.4.2. 
2 T Treves, 'Fragmentation of International Law: the Judicial Perspective' (2007) 23 Communicazioni 
e Studi 821, 827. 
3 D Lapaš, 'Some Remarks on Fragmentation of International Law: disintegration or transformation?' 
(2007) 40 The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 1, 2; C Tomuschat, 
'International Law as a Coherent System: Unity or Fragmentation?' in MJ Arsanjani and others (eds), 
Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honour of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 336. 
4 ‘[T]wo norms are … in a relationship of conflict if one constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a 
breach of the other’ (J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Relates 
to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2003) 175- 176).  
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Finally, in the specific framework of dispute resolution, the limited mandate 
of each dispute resolution forum is likely to preclude the introduction of principles 
and concepts external to those set out in the treaties establishing the regime.5 This is 
demonstrated by ICSID arbitration, which provides for procedural mechanisms that 
are designed to support the international investment law regime, but may create 
hurdles that prevent the full introduction of international human rights law. Regime 
conflict at each of these levels can undermine the unity of public international law, 
unless mechanisms are available to resolve these conflicts. 
 This chapter endeavours to identify, and evaluate, the conflict encountered 
when attempting to introduce international human rights law into the international 
investment law regime at each of these levels of analysis. By undertaking this 
appraisal, both the degree of interaction between these regimes and the barriers that 
may hinder their cohesiveness can be understood. Most importantly, based on this 
understanding, it is possible to establish a foundation from which to formulate a 
workable solution. In light of this aim, this chapter seeks to justify the introduction 
of, and determine the best structure for, a host state human rights defence in ICSID 
arbitration proceedings as a means of uniting international investment law and 
international human rights law. 
To achieve this outcome, the chapter initially outlines the manner in which 
international investment law and international human rights law interrelate within 
IIAs, given that IIAs form the legal basis for most ICSID arbitrations. This section 
considers the current extent to which IIAs evidence the unity (or fragmentation) of 
the two regimes to assess whether an express term permitting a host state human 
rights defence could be inserted into IIAs. Having considered the legal instruments 
that form the foundations of ICSID arbitrations, the focus of the chapter then turns to 
the manner in which ICSID arbitral tribunals have addressed human rights 
arguments raised by the respondent host state. By considering a selection of arbitral 
awards that have considered human rights based host state arguments, it is possible 
to identify broader trends in both host state and arbitral practice that preclude 
international human rights law from being fully considered by ICSID arbitral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 T Broude, 'Principles of Normative Integration and the Allocation of International Authority: the 
WTO, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Rio Declaration' (2009) Loyola 
University of Chicago International Law Review 173, 179. 
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tribunals. Discussion then focuses on the purpose and scope of the ICSID Arbitral 
Rules that permit amicus curiae submissions, which is the key procedure that 
currently permits human rights considerations to be raised in ICSID arbitration 
proceedings by non-disputing parties. The ability of these procedures to introduce 
international human rights law into ICSID arbitration is examined. Based on the 
preceding analysis, and by way of conclusion, the chapter seeks to justify that a host 
state human rights defence provides the necessary link to unify international 
investment law and international human rights law in ICSID arbitration whilst 
simultaneously setting out the proposed attributes of a host state human rights 
defence.  
3.2 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN IIAs 
IIAs provide the legal foundations for the lex specialis nature of international 
investment law by varying the terms of general public international law that would 
govern FDI, and by establishing specialist dispute resolution mechanisms including 
ICSID arbitration. Should IIAs be fragmented by showing a singular focus on 
international investment law, it is unlikely that ICSID arbitration will be able to 
adequately address concerns raised within the international human rights law regime, 
resulting in host states potentially breaching international human rights law in order 
to comply with the terms of the IIA. This is one type of regime conflict that a host 
state human rights defence seeks to avoid.  
A potential means of introducing a host state human rights defence is to 
include an express provision within IIAs permitting host states to rely on 
international human rights law to justify a breach of the IIA. An analysis of the 
current interaction of these regimes within IIAs can assist in determining whether a 
‘host state human rights defence’ clause is a possibility. Having established the 
definitions of ‘public international law’, ‘unity’ and ‘fragmentation’ in Chapter 2, it 
is possible to use these notions to assess the degree to which international investment 
law and international human rights law interact within IIAs. Should there be a 
tendency of IIAs to exhibit characteristics associated with ‘unity’, this increases the 
chances of an express provision setting out a host state human rights defence being 
successfully introduced into IIAs. 
 
	  
	   	   40 
Therefore, to consider the option of an express host state human rights 
defence provision in IIAs, this section will examine the terms of selected Model 
BITs that address international human rights law,6 to evaluate the extent to which the 
provisions used evidence the unity (or fragmentation) of international investment 
law and international human rights law. The implications for a host state human 
rights defence are considered in light of the analysis of each Model BIT. Finally, the 
reasons for the current degree of unity or fragmentation are discussed, before initial 
conclusions are drawn.  
3.2.1 Human Rights Provisions in BITs  
The focus of the analysis in this section is centred on selected Model BITs. This is 
for two reasons. First, BITs are investment protection instruments that primarily deal 
with investment. In contrast, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), whilst often having an 
investment chapter, primarily address broader trade related issues. Consequently, 
BITs most accurately reflect state practice with regard to investment protection. 
Therefore, whilst two FTAs refer to international human rights law in their 
preambles,7 this is not necessarily indicative of the specific relationship between 
international human rights law and international investment law. An exception is 
made in relation to the North American Free Trade Agreement8 (NAFTA), given that 
it initiated the introduction of provisions addressing interests external to the 
international investment law regime in IIAs.  Second, Model BITs exemplify the 
ideals of negotiating states. Model BITs therefore clearly evidence a state’s 
investment policy. The selection of Model BITs has been based on states whose 
Model BITs are particularly influential, or those states that have taken strong policy 
positions on international human rights law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Further examples are discussed in UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995 - 2006: Trends in 
Investment Rulemaking (United Nations 2007) 94 – 99. 
7 Free Trade Agreement (European Free Trade Association and Singapore) (adopted 26 June 2003, 
entered into force 1 January 2003) <http://www.efta.int/free-trade/free-trade-
agreements/singapore.aspx> accessed 11 July 2013 (EFTA/Singapore FTA) states in the preamble 
‘REAFFIRMING their commitment to the principles set out in the United Nations Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. The Free Trade Agreement (Canada-Colombia) (adopted 21 
November 2008, entered into force 15 August 2011) <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/colombia-colombie/can-colombia-toc-tdm-can-
colombie.aspx> accessed 11 July 2013 (Canada/Colombia FTA) states in the preamble ‘AFFIRMING 
their commitment to respect the values and principles of democracy and promotion and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’. 
8 North American Free Trade Agreement  (opened for signature 17 December 1992, entered into force 
1 January 1994) 32 ILM 289, 605. 
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Prior to the negotiation of NAFTA, IIAs were silent with regard to the 
relationship between international human rights law and international investment 
law. However, due to lobbying from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) during 
its concluding stages,9 NAFTA entered into force in 1994 with two side agreements, 
which specifically addressed environmental and labour standards respectively.10 
Additionally, the main text of NAFTA included Article 1114(2) precluding the 
relaxation of environmental measures as a means of attracting FDI. Following 
NAFTA, the practice of referring to labour standards and environmental standards 
has been replicated in subsequent BIT practice. 
Given their focus on environmental and labour standards, NAFTA, and 
subsequent BITs including similar terms, do not directly evince reliance on human 
rights obligations. Nonetheless, significant linkages exist between labour standards 
and human rights obligations and environmental standards and human rights 
obligations. International human rights instruments provide general statements of 
principle that closely reflect the ‘core labour standards’ set out in International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions.11 Further, a strong correlation exists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 E Guntrip, 'Labour Standards, the Environment and US Model BIT Practice: Where to Next?' (2011) 
12 Journal of World Investment and Trade 101 , 104 – 106. See R Housman and P Orbuch, 
'Integrating Labor and Environmental Concerns into the North American Free Trade Agreement: A 
Look Back and a Look Ahead' (1993) 8 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 
719; R Housman, 'The Treatment of Labor and Environmental Issues in Future Western Hemisphere 
Trade Liberalization Efforts' (1994-1995) 10 Connecticut Journal of International Law 301. 
10 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (adopted 14 September 1993, entered 
into force 1 January 1994) 32 ILM 1480 and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (adopted 14 September 1993, entered into force 1 
January 1994) 32 ILM 1499. See Housman, 'The Treatment of Labor and Environmental Issues in 
Future Western Hemisphere Trade Liberalization Efforts' (n 9) 306; D Vogel, 'The Environment and 
International Trade' in O Graham Jnr. (ed), Environmental Politics and Policy: 1960s-1990s 
(Pennsylvania State University Press 2000), 88-89; JJ Schott, 'Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane 
of the World Trading System?' in JJ Schott (ed), Free Trade Agreements: US Strategies and Priorities 
(Institute for Intenational Economics 2004) 41. 
11 Freedom of association and collective bargaining are addressed by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) in the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention (adopted 9 July 1948, entered into force 4 July 1950) 68 UNTS 17 (ILO Convention No. 
87) and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (adopted 1 July 1949, entered 
into force 18 July 1951) 96 UNTS 257 (ILO Convention No. 98). Similar rights are set out in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 in Articles 6 to 9. Article 22 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 
171 provides for freedom of association, including the right to join a trade union. Provisions 
regarding freedom of association and collective bargaining are also found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) and 
regional instruments including the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221.  
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between substantive environmental obligations and human rights obligations such as 
the right to life, the right to health, the rights to a private and family life, property 
rights and indigenous and minority rights.12 In light of these connections, wider 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The ILO provides for freedom from forced labour in the Forced Labour Convention (adopted 28 June 
1930, entered into force 1 May 1932) 39 UNTS 55 (ILO Convention No. 29) and in the Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention (adopted 25 une 1957, entered into force 17 January 1959) 320 UNTS 291 
(ILO Convention No. 105). Similar concepts are contained in Article 4 of the UDHR (which prohibits 
slavery) and Article 8 of the ICCPR (which forbids slavery and forced or compulsory labour). Both 
slavery and forced or compulsory labour are to be progressively abolished in accordance with the 
Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention Slavery, 
Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices Convention (adopted 25 September 
1926, entered into force 9 March 1927) 60 LNTS 253 and the Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (adopted 7 
September 1956, entered into force 30 April 1957) 226 UNTS 3. 
The prohibition on child labour is governed by the ILO in its Convention concerning Minimum Age 
for Admission to Employment (adopted 26 June 1973, entered into force 19 June 1976) 1015 UNTS 
297 (ILO Convention No. 138) and the Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action 
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (adopted 17 June 1999, entered into force 19 
November 2000) 2133 UNTS 161 (ILO Convention No. 182). The prohibition on the economic 
exploitation of children is also addressed in Article 10(3) of the ICESCR and Article 32(1) of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 
1990) 1577 UNTS 3.  
In relation to non-discrimination, the ILO has adopted the Equal Remuneration Convention (adopted 
29 June 1951, entered into force 23 May 1953) 165 UNTS 303 (ILO Convention No. 100) and the 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (adopted 25 June 1958, entered into force 
15 June 1960) 362 UNTS 31 (ILO Convention No. 111). Non-discrimination provisions in relation to 
employment are also set out in Article 23 of the UDHR, Article 5(e)(1) of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, 
entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 and Article 11 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into 
force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
See generally K Ewing, C Gearty and B Hepple (eds), Human Rights and Labour Law (Mansell 
Publishing Limited 1994); L Swepston, 'The International Labour Organization's System of Human 
Rights Protection' in J Symondies (ed), Human Rights: International Protection, Monitoring, 
Enforcement (Ashgate/UNESCO 2003); P Alston (ed), Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2005). 
12 The right to life and the right to health are contained in many human rights instruments. The right 
to life is contained in, amongst other provisions, Article 3 of the UDHR (n 11) and Article 6 of the 
ICCPR (n 11). Article 11 of the ICESCR (n 11) provides that everyone should have an adequate 
standard of living, including the right to food, clothing and housing. The right to health is set out in 
Article 25 of the UDHR (n 11), Article 12 of ICESCR (n 11) and is also contained in Article 24 of the 
CRC (n 11) and in UNGA Res 45/94 (14 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/94. The link between 
the environment and the right to life and the right to health was initially set out in the Declaration of 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (concluded 16 June 1972) UN Doc 
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973) (Stockholm Declaration) in both the Preamble and Principle 1. The Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (concluded 13 June 1992) UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 
(vol. I) (Rio Declaration) subsequently linked the concept of sustainable development to the right to 
health. The relationship between the rights to life and health and the environment has subsequently 
been addressed by the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 and in Judge 
Weeramentry’s separate opinion in Case Concerning Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v 
Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7. 
The right to a private and family life are contained in Article 8 of the ECHR (n 11). This provision 
has been used to argue that environmental pollution infringes the right to a family and home life. In 
the case of López-Ostra v. Spain (1994) Series A no 303C, the European Court of Human Rights 
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references in IIAs to labour standards and environmental law in the discussion below 
will be taken to be representative of international human rights law standards more 
generally.  
The inclusion of environmental and labour standards in NAFTA initially 
influenced the terms of the model BITs of NAFTA states, particularly Canada and 
the USA, to ensure consistency across their FDI programmes.13 Therefore, the 
manner in which these Model BITs have integrated international environmental law 
and international labour standards into their provisions is instructive for analysing 
the prospects of including a provision in IIAs allowing for a host state human rights 
defence. 
The 2003 Canadian Model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreement14 (2003 Canadian Model FIPA) provides, in Article 11, in rather weak 
terms, that states ‘should not’ offer to waive, actually waive or otherwise derogate 
from environmental measures to encourage FDI.  Article 11 adopts a similar format 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
found that severe environmental pollution may affect the well being of individuals preventing them 
from enjoying their home and family life. 
The right to property is contained in Article 17 UDHR (n 11) and in Article 21 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 21 November 1969, 
entered into force 18 July 1978) 144 UNTS 123 (ACHR). Environmentally destructive activities on 
indigenous peoples’ land may violate their right to property. It may also be considered to be a breach 
of Article 27 of the ICCPR (n 11) which protects both indigenous and minority rights, including their 
right to enjoy their culture. In  Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Finland Communication no 511/1992, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 , the indigenous Sami peoples brought a claim against the government 
for issuing quarrying permits that would disrupt their traditional reindeer herding practices. Although, 
the claim was unsuccessful on the basis that the permits granted did not interfere with the cultural 
practices of the Sami, it was recognised that this right might be violated if quarrying was permitted on 
a large scale. 
See generally M Déjeant-Pons, M Pallemaerts and S Fioravanti (eds), Human Rights and the 
Environment: Compendium of instruments and other international texts on individual and collective 
rights relating to the environment in the international and European framework (Council of Europe 
2002); R Picolotti and JD Taillant (eds), Linking Human Rights and the Environment (The University 
of Arizona Press 2003); D Shelton, 'Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific 
Environmental Rights have been Recognized?' (2006) 35 Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 129. 
13 KJ Vandevelde, US International Investment Agreements (Oxford University Press 2009) 742 – 
743. See J McIlroy, 'Canada's New Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement' (2004) 
5 The Journal of World Investment and Trade 621; M Kinnear and R Hansen, 'The Influence of 
Chapter 11 in the BIT Landscape' (2005) 12 University of California Davis Journal of International 
Law and Policy 101; G Gagné and J-F Morin, 'The Evolving American Policy on Investment 
Protection: Evidence from Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT' (2006) 9 Journal of International 
Economic Law 357; C Lévesque, 'Influences on the Canadian FIPA Model and the US Model BIT: 
NAFTA Chapter 11 and Beyond' (2006) 44 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 249. 
14 Canada Model Foreign Investment Protection and Protection Agreement 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf> accessed 8 July 2013 (2003 
Canadian Model FIPA). 
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to Article 1114(2) NAFTA.15 Alleged violations of Article 11 are to be resolved by 
way of consultations.16 The inclusion of a specific provision addressing 
environmental law within the context of FDI indicates an acceptance that FDI may 
have environmental consequences. However, this attribute associated with ‘unity’ 
remains superficial. The environmental obligations in Article 11 are limited to the 
conduct of the host state in the pre-establishment phase of FDI. Further, this 
provision is largely unenforceable due to its vague language17 and its reliance on 
informal dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Article 10 of the 2003 Canadian Model FIPA provides for ‘General 
Exceptions’, which permit a party to take measures (that are not arbitrary, 
unjustifiably discriminatory or a disguised restriction on trade or investment) to 
protect, amongst other things, human, animal, plant life or health18 and exhaustible 
natural resources.19 Under the terms of Article 10, there is partial interaction between 
the investment protection standards governing the on-going conduct of the 
investment and international environmental law. The structure of this provision as an 
‘exception’ to the investment standards indicates that international investment law 
and international environmental law may not be considered to be of equal merit 
within the FIPA. An alternative approach would have been to include a provision 
clearly establishing the environmental obligations of each party.20 Nonetheless, the 
existence of an exception that addresses environmental concerns may equally 
suggest a certain degree of unity as international investment law is not considered to 
be of paramount importance. Given that this exception is untested,21 any 
determination regarding the unity provided by this exception is contingent on the 
manner in which it will be applied in ICSID arbitration. In light of this, it is difficult 
to conclude whether this exception by itself corroborates unity or fragmentation 
between international investment law and international environmental law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 McIlroy (n 13) 635. 
16 2003 Canadian Model FIPA (n 14) Article 11. 
17 McIlroy (n 13) 635. 
18 2003 Canadian Model FIPA (n 14) Article 10(1)(a). 
19 Ibid Article 10(1)(c). 
20 R Echandi, 'Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investment Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreements: Recent Developments in Investment Rulemaking' in K Yannaca-Small (ed), Arbitration 
under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to Key Issues (Oxford University Press 2010) 
19. 
21 S Spears, 'The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment 
Agreements' (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 1037, 1062. 
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The 2003 Canadian Model FIPA does not expressly address labour standards. 
NAFTA jurisprudence during the 1990s focused on environmental claims rather than 
labour claims, which may have influenced the nature of the provisions that were 
included in the 2003 Canadian Model FIPA. Yet, the provisions addressing health 
and safety standards may be wide enough to include labour standards.22  
Whilst attempting to balance the rights of foreign investors and host states,23 
the overall approach of the 2003 Canadian Model FIPA demonstrates a structural 
bias towards international investment law. This conclusion is supported by the lack 
of express reference to labour standards, the limited scope of Article 11 and the 
exclusion of international environmental law from formal dispute resolution 
procedures. As Article 10 has not yet been invoked, a final determination cannot be 
made regarding this provision. From these attributes, and based on the definitions of 
unity and fragmentation established in Chapter 2, the international investment law 
and international human rights law regimes remain largely fragmented within the 
2003 Canadian Model FIPA.  
The 2004 USA Model BIT24 was the first USA Model BIT to refer to both 
environmental and labour standards in the operative section of a BIT.25 These 
provisions were updated, and strengthened, as part of the review process that 
resulted in the 2012 USA Model BIT26.27  As a result, it may display a greater degree 
of unity than that exhibited by the 2003 Canadian Model FIPA. 
Article 12(2) of the 2012 USA Model BIT is designed to ensure that a party 
to the BIT does not provide preferential treatment to an investor by weakening, or 
derogating from, or failing to effectively enforce environmental law as a means of 
inducing or maintaining FDI. The definition of ‘environmental law’ is limited in 
scope by Article 12(4) to only include laws that are intended to protect the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 McIlroy (n 13) 635. 
23 Ibid 644. 
24 2004 United States of America Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
<www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf>  accessed 8 July 2013 (2004 USA Model BIT). 
25 Vandevelde (n 13) 742 & 746; Guntrip (n 9) 102. 
26 2012 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
<http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf> accessed 8 
July 2013 (2012 USA Model BIT). 
27 See P Di Rosa, 'The New 2012 U.S. Model BIT: Staying the Course' 2012) 
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/06/01/the-new-2012-u-s-model-bit-staying-the-course/> 
accessed 8 July 2013; M Kantor, 'Little Has Changed in the New US Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty' (27) ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 335, 378. 
 
	  
	   	   46 
environment, or prevent ‘danger to human, animal or plant life or health’ and where 
the risk of damage arises from specified forms of conduct.28 Article 13 relates to 
labour standards. Article 13(2) provides that the parties are to ensure that they do not 
act inconsistently with labour rights as a means of inducing or maintaining FDI. 
Article 13(3) sets out which labour rights are considered to fall within the scope of 
Article 13(2). These are laws primarily drawn from the ILO Declaration on the 
Fundamental Rights and Principles of Work and Its Follow-Up29 but also address 
acceptable working conditions.30 Breaches of Articles 12 and 13 are to be resolved 
by invoking consultation mechanisms,31 and are excluded from the formal arbitration 
procedures.32 In addition to these substantive clauses, the preamble to the 2012 USA 
Model BIT refers to the parties’ ‘desire’ to achieve the objectives of the BIT ‘in a 
manner consistent with the protection of health, safety and the environment, and the 
promotion of internationally recognized labor rights’.  
Despite the recognition of environmental and labour standards within the 
preamble to the 2012 USA Model BIT, the recent modifications to its terms do not 
enhance the unity of international investment law and international human rights law 
beyond that exhibited by the 2003 Canadian Model FIPA. The application of the 
2012 USA Model BIT’s environmental and labour provisions (effectively preventing 
host state encouragement to invest based on lowered environmental and labour 
standards) extend beyond inducing FDI to its post-establishment phase and have 
restricted the use of hortative language33 regarding the nature of the obligation. 
However, neither environmental nor labour standards are fully integrated into the 
2012 USA Model BIT in the same manner as international investment law standards 
based on the comparative strength of their respective legal obligations. The scope of 
the provisions is restricted by the limited definitions of environmental law and 
labour standards. This demonstrates fragmentation between these regimes. The 
exclusion of environmental and labour standards from all formal dispute resolution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 This conduct is limited under Articles 12(4)(a) to (c) to, amongst other things, the release of 
pollutants or environmental contaminants; control over toxic materials and information related to their 
control; and, the protection of species of flora and fauna and their habitat. 
29 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (concluded 18 June 1998) 37 ILM 
1233. 
30 2012 USA Model BIT (n 26) Article 13(3)(f). See Kantor (n 27) 376 – 378. 
31 2012 USA Model BIT Articles 12(6) and 13(4) respectively. See Kantor (n 27) 376 – 378. 
32 2012 USA Model BIT Articles 24 and 37(5). This is despite the terms of more recent FTAs. See 
Guntrip (n 9). 
33 Kantor (n 27) 377. 
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procedures34 retains the structural bias towards international investment law found in 
the 2003 Canadian Model FIPA, again evidencing fragmentation.  
It is submitted that the degree of fragmentation displayed by both the 
Canadian and USA Model BITs indicates that IIAs exhibit structural bias that would 
inhibit, if not preclude, the introduction of a express provision detailing a host state 
human rights defence in future IIAs.  However, both Canada and the USA have 
closely followed the model generated by NAFTA when incorporating environmental 
and labour standards provisions within their BITs. Alternative methods of referring 
to environmental and labour standards, in addition to human rights obligations, have 
subsequently been used by non-NAFTA states. Therefore, the practice of non-
NAFTA states provides further evidence of the degree of unity (or fragmentation) 
between international investment law and international human rights law within 
IIAs. These alternative approaches offer further insight into whether a clause setting 
out a host state human rights defence could become an accepted part of IIA practice.  
The 2007 Draft Norwegian Model BIT35 provides a unique example of a BIT 
that has made express reference to international human rights law. The preamble to 
the 2007 Draft Norwegian Model BIT referred to the Parties achieving the aims of 
the BIT in a manner consistent with ‘the protection of health, safety, and the 
environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized labour rights’. In 
addition to references to environmental and labour standards, the parties to the BIT 
were to reaffirm ‘their commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in accordance with their obligations under international law, 
including the principles set out in the United Nations Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’. The substantive provisions of the BIT broadly 
reflected the approach taken in the 2004 USA Model BIT and the 2003 Canadian 
Model FIPA,36 with some modifications reflecting Norway’s regulatory policies 
intended to encourage development.37 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid 377 - 378. 
35 2007 Draft Norway Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
<www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/hoeringer/Utkast%20til%20modellavtale2.doc> 
accessed 8 July 2013 (2007 Draft Norwegian Model BIT). 
36 See, for example Article 11(1) ibid and Articles 12 and 13 2004 USA Model BIT (n 24) and Article 
24 2007 Norwegian Draft Model BIT (n 35) and Article 10 2003 Canadian Model FIPA (n 14). 
37 Norwegian Government, 'Comments on the Model for Future Investment Agreements' 2007) 
<italaw.com/documents/NorwayModel2007-commentary.doc> accessed 8 July 2013, 9, 11 & 12; PT 
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Overall, the response to the inclusion of international human rights law into 
the 2007 Draft Norwegian Model BIT was extremely negative. This was despite the 
references to international human rights law being contained in the Preamble, which 
does not generate any binding legal obligations, and at most, could inform the 
interpretation of provisions38 that were previously acceptable to Canada and the 
USA. Nevertheless, businesses were not comfortable with the inclusion of references 
to international human rights law within the BIT, and environmental and labour 
groups did not feel that it adequately protected these interests due to the lack of 
enforceable remedies for breaches of these standards.39 As a result, Norway was 
forced to temporarily abandoned its BIT program.40 This was, in part, due to the risk 
to the Norwegian government of losing the support of its dominant coalition party 
had it continued to support the proposed BIT, which could have resulted in the fall of 
the government.41 Norway’s failed attempt to balance the interests of competing 
lobby groups within the terms of the BIT, and the consequential political risk that 
flowed from countering the views of their allies within the government, demonstrate 
some of the practical challenges involved in integrating two regimes within an IIA.  
Despite the underlying political considerations, even if this attempt had been 
successful, the terms of the BIT would have been insufficient to evidence the 
unification of the international investment law and the international human rights 
law regimes. The 2007 Draft Norwegian Model BIT did not contain substantive 
provisions on international human rights obligations. Although the BIT reflected 
policies influenced by international human rights law, it remained investment 
focused by adopting the style of provisions utilised by Canada and the USA.42 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Muchlinski, 'Trends in International Investment Agreements 2008/2009: Review of the Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaties of Norway, South Africa and the United States' in KP Sauvant (ed), 
Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2009 - 2010 (Oxford University Press 2010) 57 
- 58. 
38 Preambles may be used to determine the object and purpose of the BIT (F Ortino, 'The Social 
Dimension of International Investment Agreements: Drafting a New BIT/MIT Model?' (2005) 7 
International Law Forum du droit international 243, 246; Vandevelde (n 13) 82;  Spears (n 21) 1065). 
Preambular statements have been informed the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard in ICSID awards including Azurix Corp v. The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006 [360]; Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/8, Award, 6 February 2007 [290]. 
39 D vis Dunbar, 'Norway Shelves its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty' 2009) 
<www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/06/08/norway-shelves-its-proposed-model-
bilateral-investment-treaty.aspx> accessed 8 July 2013; Muchlinski (n 37) 59. 
40 vis Dunbar, (accessed 8 July 2013) (n 39); Muchlinski (n 37) 59. 
41 Muchlinski (n 37) 81.  
42 Ibid 59. 
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preamble would not have been capable of forming the basis of a claim before dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Whilst the preamble may have been used to support a human 
rights driven interpretation of the substantive terms, this of itself, would not 
counteract the inherent fragmentation imposed by the structure of the BIT. 
Consequently, the terms of the 2007 Draft Norwegian Model BIT supports the 
position that international investment law and international human rights law are 
characterised by a fragmented relationship in IIAs.  
This review of selected Model BITs that have addressed environmental and 
labour standards, and in one case, international human rights law as well, illustrates a 
large degree of fragmentation between international investment law and international 
human rights law. This is due to several factors. Provisions addressing non-
investment law interests are phrased in weaker legal terms and claims based on these 
provisions cannot be brought before formal dispute resolution mechanisms. This 
evidences a clear structural bias in favour of investment law. Attempts to make 
express reference to international human rights law in non-legally binding forms, 
such as preambles, have proved to be too controversial to be acceptable. Therefore, 
political acceptance remains a difficult hurdle to overcome. In short, none of the 
methods adopted in the Model BITs discussed above have achieved unity between 
international investment law and international human rights law. 
An express provision in IIAs granting a host state human rights defence has 
the potential to resolve the fragmentation that exists between these regimes in IIAs. 
However, it is submitted that the structural bias that precludes unity between 
international investment law and international human rights law also prevents the 
introduction of such a clause. Given the consistent failure of states to confer equal 
legal standing upon international investment law and international human rights law 
within IIAs, the implication that can be drawn from the survey of Model BITs 
discussed above is that the international community is not ready to accept binding 
legal provisions addressing international human rights law in IIAs. This, in turn, 
prevents the introduction of a host state human rights defence directly into IIAs. 
This position is supported by reference to the general body of IIAs. 
Notwithstanding the increase in the number of IIAs mentioning environmental and 
labour standards overall, the total number of IIAs that incorporate these standards 
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into their provisions is less than nine percent of the total number of IIAs.43 This 
demonstrates that significant progress is still required before environmental and 
labour standards become commonplace within IIAs. Even sparser are direct 
references to human rights obligations within IIAs. Only two IIAs make any 
reference to human rights obligations and not within their substantive provisions.44 
These are found in FTAs, which, as outlined above, do not reflect the specific 
interaction between international investment law and international human rights law. 
The general absence of international human rights law from IIAs, regardless of their 
parity with investment law standards within IIAs, does not exhibit cohesion between 
these regimes in IIAs. This indicates that an express host state human rights defence 
in IIAs will not be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. 
It is suggested that a key factor resulting in the fragmentation between 
international investment law and international human rights law is the political 
obstacles states encounter when trying to integrate non-investment law provisions in 
IIAs. The experience of Norway in 2007 evidences the challenge of trying to 
effectively balance the competing interests of foreign investors and lobby groups 
representing the interests of those keen to promote environmental, labour and human 
rights obligations in IIAs. Whilst the final result in that instance was unusually 
extreme, differences in the approaches of stakeholders in the investment regime 
regarding the content of the terms of Model BITs is not uncommon.  
An example of the divergence in views regarding Model BIT provisions was 
exhibited during the re-drafting process that culminated in the 2012 USA Model 
BIT. As part of the review of the 2004 USA Model BIT, in July 2009, the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative and the Department of State called for 
written comments regarding the terms in which the new USA Model BIT should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In a survey conducted by the OECD in 2011 of 1623 IIAs, only 8.2% of IIAs in the sample 
contained a reference to environmental concerns. See OECD, International Investment Law: 
Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations (OECD Publishing 2008) Chapter 3 ‘International 
Investment Agreements: A survey of Environmental, Labour and Anti-corruption Issues’; K Gordon 
and J Pohl, 'Environmental Concerns in Intenational Investment Agreements: a survey' (2011) OECD 
Working Papers on Intenational Investment No, 2011/1 OECD Investment Division. 
44 EFTA/Singapore FTA (n 7) which states in the preamble ‘REAFFIRMING their commitment to the 
principles set out in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. The 
Canada/Colombia FTA (n 7) states in the preamble ‘AFFIRMING their commitment to respect the 
values and principles of democracy and promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. 
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drafted.45 The submissions received, combined with discussion at a public hearing 
held during the same month,46 indicate the polarisation of views regarding the extent 
to which environmental and labour standards should be introduced into what would 
become the 2012 USA Model BIT. 
Two approaches were clearly discernable.47 The first argued for increased 
investor protection. The policy considerations underlying this approach were 
primarily economic – for example, submissions were made seeking to include terms 
that would increase the competitiveness of USA based industries and protect USA 
investors in foreign jurisdictions.48 The second approach pursued the strengthening 
of environmental and labour provisions, in one instance, by advocating for legally 
enforceable standards based on the ILO core labour standards and existing 
multilateral environmental agreements.49 This dichotomy was outlined in the report 
summarising the submissions received.50 In response to the report’s conclusions, the 
USA Trade Representative, Ron Kirk acknowledged that ‘the report demonstrates 
the complex nature of the issues and their importance to a wide range of 
stakeholders’.51  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 'Notice of Bilateral Investment Treaty Program 
Review' 2009) <www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/blog/notice-bilateral-investment-treaty-program-
review> accessed 8 July 2013.  
46 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 'Public Meeting Regarding the U.S Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Review’ Press release, 29 July 2009' 2009) <www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2009/july/public-meeting-regarding-us-model-bilateral-investmen> 
accessed 8 July 2013. 
47 See LE Peterson, 'Advisory Committee Report offers some consensus, but many divergences, as to 
future of US Model investment treaty' 2009) <http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20091021_2> 
accessed 8 July 2013. 
48 Emergency Committee for American Trade, 'Written Statement of the Emergency Committee for 
American Trade Concerning the Administration’s Review of the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT)' 
<http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=0900006480a0247a> 
accessed 31 October 2010. 
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The economic and environmental and labour viewpoints indicate a division 
in perceptions by stakeholders regarding the function of international investment law 
that can loosely be classified into ‘private’ and ‘public’ interests respectively. The 
former focuses on investment protection while the latter consider the wider social 
impact of FDI. Although these approaches are not automatically incompatible, the 
strengthening of environmental and labour standards is often seen as reducing 
investment protection standards (and the economic viability of FDI).52 Conversely, 
stronger investment protection is often perceived to be at the expense of compliance 
with higher levels of environmental and labour protection.53 As a result, a tension 
exists within international investment law between those who favour the historical 
role of international investment law as a form of investor (and investment) 
protection, and those who favour a developmental focus. 
In part, the partition of international investment law in this manner may be 
due to the influence of individuals and non-state actors. Environmental and labour 
lobby groups initiated the introduction into international investment law of principles 
drawn from other lex specialis regimes, during the negotiation of NAFTA, 
evidencing the emerging influence that individuals and non-state actors have over 
the formulation of public international law. This trend is a continuing one, based on 
the number of public comments received during the re-drafting of the 2004 USA 
Model BIT. Given their potential influence over the final terms of the IIA, lobby 
groups from both ‘private’ and ‘public’ positions actively campaign to have their 
interests represented. 
States are placed in the position of having to be seen to be responding to 
these calls for reform, by simultaneously acknowledging both public and private 
arguments and balancing these opposing views. The results of states’ attempts to 
balance competing public and private interests are manifested within the provisions 
of IIAs. The final provisions adopted generally evidence a preference towards 
private perspectives of international investment law. Attempts to include public 
interests (such as environmental and labour standards and international human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See the statements of Canner S, Haworth McCandless J and Menghetti J; Donnelly S and Heather S 
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protection of the environment and labour standards, resulting in a ‘race to the bottom’. See C Oman, 
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law) through weaker provisions, mirror the increasing but not yet determinative 
demand for public interests to be reflected in IIAs. It is the private focus adopted, 
which emphasises investment protection standards above developmental 
considerations, which results in the current degree of fragmentation and regime 
conflict within IIAs.  
3.2.2 Preliminary Conclusion 
The terms of IIAs determine the scope and structure of the international investment 
law regime. At present, IIAs display disparity between international investment law 
and international human rights law, both in the manner in which non-investment law 
provisions are structured, and the lack of recourse to dispute resolution mechanisms 
permitted by IIAs for breaches of non-investment law standards. This creates a clear 
structural bias within IIAs towards international investment law, despite the use of 
various methods to try and incorporate international human rights law. The structural 
bias within IIAs may be in response to a tension within international investment law 
between ‘private’ interests, favouring the foreign investor, and ‘public’ interests that 
seek to include standards drawn from, amongst other regimes, international human 
rights law. The continued debate regarding the role of private and public interests 
can be attributed to the role of individuals and non-state actors in the international 
investment law regime that was initiated during the negotiation of NAFTA. States 
respond to this by attempting to satisfy the demands of all stakeholders, but currently 
favour private interests given the mandate generated by the demands of foreign 
investors. The result of this combination of factors is that international investment 
law and international human rights law are fragmented.  
From the perspective of a host state human rights defence, three implications 
flow from the analysis undertaken above. First, it is highly improbable that any host 
state human rights defence can be established by the inclusion of express provisions 
within IIAs. Although a model BIT has been drafted by an NGO that includes 
developmental considerations,54 its provisions are yet to be adopted by any state. 
Consequently, at this point in time, this avenue for establishing a host state human 
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rights defence will be disregarded. Second, the reasons for the exclusion of 
international human rights law from IIAs appears to be linked to varied conceptions 
of the purpose of international investment law. The role that international human 
rights law is likely to have in international investment law is dependent on whether 
international investment law can be characterised as ‘private’ or ‘public’, or a 
combination of both. If it is the latter, an appropriate balance between the two 
competing interests will need to be achieved. Finally, given the fragmented nature of 
IIAs, ICSID arbitration is unlikely to focus on international human rights law 
standards as part of the dispute resolution process by its own volition. Despite this, 
given that an express provision in IIAs is not a viable option, a host state human 
rights defence will need to be established as part of the practice of ICSID arbitration. 
How this might be achieved will be considered in the next section.  
3.3 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ICSID ARBITRATION  
Despite the fragmented nature of international investment law and international 
human rights law within IIAs discussed above, and the resulting specialised 
investment focus of ICSID arbitration that gives rise to structural bias,55 several 
ICSID arbitral awards have considered principles from international human rights 
law as part of their reasoning with varied outcomes.56 An analysis of these awards 
permits a greater understanding of the extent to which regime conflict arises, and 
how ICSID arbitral practice addresses this form of conflict. Specifically, the manner 
in which these ICSID arbitral tribunals have interpreted human rights based 
arguments is instructive for the formulation of a host state human rights defence 
given that the defence will have to be introduced into the practice of ICSID 
arbitration, rather than through the use of an express provision in an IIA. By 
referring to existing ICSID arbitral practice, it becomes possible to identify the 
limitations that prevent the full incorporation of international human rights law into 
ICSID arbitration, and to extrapolate how these factors are likely to impede the 
establishment of a host state human rights defence. 
 To evaluate ICSID arbitral practice in this regard, this section considers those 
ICSID awards stemming from Argentina’s financial crisis in 2001/2002, in which 
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56 As will be discussed, these primarily stem from the 2001/2002 Argentine financial crisis. 
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Argentina justified its conduct based on international human rights law primarily as 
a defence against claims made by foreign investors. An examination of these awards, 
given their common factual background, and the adoption of relatively consistent 
arguments by Argentina, provides the opportunity to consider the individual 
approaches taken by ICSID tribunals to host state initiated, human rights based 
arguments. The reasons behind the limitations imposed on the introduction of 
international human rights law in ICSID arbitral practice are identified and analysed, 
before provisional conclusions are drawn regarding the extent to which international 
investment law and international human rights law co-exist in ICSID arbitration. 
Discussion then turns to what characteristics are required of a host state human rights 
defence to enable it to become operative within ICSID arbitration. 
3.3.1 The Use of International Human Rights Law as a Host State Defence in 
ICSID Arbitration 
Host states seeking to establish a defence against claims made by foreign investors 
have occasionally sought to justify their argument by reference to obligations 
sourced in international human rights law.57 Of those ICSID arbitral tribunals that 
have considered human rights based defences, all have done so in the context of the 
Argentine financial crisis of 2001/2002.58 Argentina’s economic position worsened 
in the late 1990s59 as a result of the Asian financial crisis.60 To try and improve its 
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considerations. These are CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. 
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Republic; Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 
28 September 2007; Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. 
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58 Ibid. All nine ICSID awards that have considered host state arguments based on human rights 
considerations address claims made by foreign investors in response to the impact of the 2011/2002 
Argentine financial crisis. 
59 JE Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment (Hague 
Academy of International Law 2011) 247. 
60 ME Carranza, 'Poster Child or Victim of Imperialist Globalization? Explaining Argentina's 
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financial position, Argentina invoked austerity measures61 before taking a series of 
regulatory actions to try and secure its economic position.62 These regulatory 
measures included the termination of the ‘Convertability Law’ that pegged the 
Argentinian Peso against the US Dollar and the modification of public service 
contracts to the detriment of foreign investors.63 This resulted in a large number of 
claims from foreign investors against Argentina that were all founded on Argentina’s 
regulatory acts.64 In response to several claims, Argentina raised arguments 
justifying its conduct by reference to human rights law.65 The common factual 
background of these awards, and the employment of similar legal arguments in 
response to the claims made, makes it possible to identify general trends displayed 
by ICSID tribunals when they approach the issue of human rights defences.  
 Argentina presented two lines of argument as a defence against the claims 
pursued by foreign investors. The first was based on the constitutional status of 
human rights law within Argentinian law. The second argument was based on a state 
of necessity, sourced from both custom and treaty law.  
 The first of Argentina’s arguments was based on the constitutional 
supremacy of human rights law within Argentinian law following constitutional 
reforms that occurred in 1994.66 This position was adopted by Argentina in Siemens 
v Argentina.67 Argentina had tendered for investors to establish an immigration 
control and personal identification system, including the provision of national 
identity cards.68 Siemens, through a company incorporated in Argentina,69 was 
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62 Alvarez (n 59) 248. 
63 Ibid 248 - 250. 
64 Ibid 248. 
65 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (n 57); Azurix Corp v. The Argentine 
Republic (n 57); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic (n 57); Sempra Energy International v. 
Argentine Republic (n 57); Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic (n 57); Suez, 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. 
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66 Article 75(22) was introduced into the Argentinian Constitution in 1994. It confers ten international 
human rights law instruments with primacy over the Constitution including UDHR (n 11); ICESCR 
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Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?' (1999) 37 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 281. 
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successful with its bid.70 Various disputes arose between the parties regarding the 
implementation of the project,71 before it was terminated in response to the 
Argentine financial crisis.72 Siemens alleged that Argentina’s conduct amounted to 
expropriation, and breached the fair and equitable treatment and non-discrimination 
standards of the BIT.73 
 Argentina argued that the constitutionally entrenched human rights would be 
‘disregarded by recognizing the property rights asserted by the Claimant given the 
social and economic conditions of Argentina’.74 The Tribunal noted: 
This argument has not been developed by Argentina. The Tribunal 
considers that, without the benefit of further elaboration and 
substantiation by the parties, it is not an argument that, prima facie, bears 
any relationship to the merits of this case. 75 
Argentina’s failure to fully substantiate its human rights based claim also 
undermined the strength of its defence in Azurix v Argentina.76 The US investor 
company, Azurix,77 invested in a potable water supply and sewerage utility in 
Buenos Aires.78 Azurix alleged breaches by Argentina of, amongst other things, the 
standards of fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination and full protection and 
security in the US–Argentina BIT, in addition to arguing that the investment had 
been expropriated.79 In the context of the Argentine financial crisis, Argentina raised 
‘the issue of a conflict between the BIT and human rights treaties that protect 
consumers’ interests’.80 According to expert evidence adduced by Argentina, ‘a 
conflict between a BIT and human rights treaties must be resolved in favour of 
human rights because the consumers’ public interest must prevail over the private 
interest of the service provider’.81 When considering this point, the Tribunal 
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observed that ‘[t]he matter has not been fully argued and the Tribunal fails to 
understand the incompatibility in the specifics of the instant case’.82 
 Argentina’s failure to fully develop its defence in these disputes did not 
provide a sufficient basis for the ICSID tribunals to demonstrate the manner in which 
they address regime conflict. However, the decisions in Siemens v Argentina and 
Azurix v Argentina establish that ICSID arbitral tribunals dismiss arguments that do 
not have a clear legal formulation and are not fully substantiated. Without a clear 
foundation from which to proceed, an ICSID arbitral tribunal will be reluctant to 
consider any argument, regardless of whether it has a basis in international human 
rights law. This emphasises the need for any host state human rights defence to be 
fully articulated and supported, especially in the context of adversarial arbitral 
proceedings, which are party driven. Consequently, when a host state human rights 
defence is being established, which requires ICSID tribunals to consider law beyond 
international investment law (and to overcome the inherent structural bias of the 
investment law dispute resolution body) it will need to be fully supported and argued 
with precision.  
  The final award in which Argentina relied on the constitutional standing 
conferred upon human rights treaties to usurp the standards contained in the 
applicable BIT was in CMS v Argentina83.84 The tribunal did not recognise the 
existence of a conflict of norms that could give rise to human rights being considered 
as superior: 
First because the Constitution carefully protects the right to property, just 
as the treaties on human rights do, and secondly there is no question of 
affecting fundamental human rights when considering the issues 
contemplated by the parties.85 
The decision in CMS v Argentina, whilst not rejecting the argument for failing to be 
fully articulated, rejects the legal basis of Argentina’s constitutional argument in a 
cursory manner. In taking the approach cited, it has been stated that the ICSID 
arbitral tribunal: 
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seems to dismiss concerns raised as to the impact of the Argentine 
financial crisis on the human rights of the Argentine citizens by means of 
the following syllogism: property is a human right; investment treaties 
protect property; therefore, investment treaties are treaties which protect 
rather than harm human rights.86  
Whilst Argentina’s argument may not have succeeded in any event, the dismissive 
stance of the tribunal demonstrates the structural bias that can exist in specialist 
dispute resolution bodies. The limited consideration given to Argentina’s human 
rights defence results from the oversimplification by the ICSID arbitral tribunal of 
the potential conflict from an issue of regime conflict, between international 
investment law and international human rights law, to one of equating the two 
regimes. Thus, once the regimes were considered to be complementary, principles of 
international investment law were applied, given that the same result was 
purportedly to be achieved. The stance taken by this ICSID arbitral tribunal is 
indicative of the impact that a prevailing investment focus may have when 
addressing regime conflict. An approach, such as the one taken in CMS v Argentina, 
supports the wider proposition that international investment law and international 
human rights law are fragmented in ICSID arbitration. Fragmentation may lead to an 
indifferent attitude towards international human rights law by ICSID arbitral 
tribunals, which has the potential to inhibit the operation of a host state human rights 
defence. 
 The second line of argument taken by Argentina was to use human rights 
based considerations to establish a defence based on ‘necessity’. In Sempra v 
Argentina,87 Sempra, a US investor had invested in two natural gas distribution 
companies.88 Following the Argentine economic crisis, Sempra alleged that 
Argentina’s regulatory response resulted in the investment being expropriated in 
breach of the terms of the 1991 United States of America-Argentina BIT89.90 
Argentina argued that the customary international law ‘state of necessity’ defence 
was the relevant standard when applying Article XI of the BIT, which is a ‘non-
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precluded measures’ clause.91 This provision permits parties to the BIT to apply 
‘measures necessary’ for the maintenance of public order, maintenance or restoration 
of international peace and security or the protection of its own essential security 
interests and precludes the wrongfulness of its actions under the BIT. As part of its 
defence, Argentina raised the need to maintain its constitutional integrity by 
complying with its obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights92 
(ACHR).93 The tribunal stated: 
This debate raises the complex relationship between investment treaties, 
emergency and the human rights of both citizens and property owners. 
Yet, the real issue in the instant case is whether the constitutional order 
and the survival of the State were imperiled by the crisis, or instead 
whether the Government still had many tools at its disposal to cope with 
the situation. The Tribunal believes that the constitutional order was not 
on the verge of collapse, as evidenced by, among many examples, the 
orderly constitutional transition that carried the country through five 
different Presidencies in a few days’ time, followed by elections and the 
reestablishment of public order. Even if emergency legislation became 
necessary in this context, legitimately acquired rights could still have 
been accommodated by means of temporary measures and 
renegotiation.94 
By considering that Argentina’s constitution remained stable throughout the crisis, 
the tribunal was able to circumvent the issue of Argentina’s human rights 
obligations. Nonetheless, the tribunal recognised the complexity of the human rights 
implications of Argentina’s argument, and in so doing did not dismiss its legal basis 
outright. The approach of the ICSID arbitral tribunal in this instance signifies that 
should norms from differing lex specialis regimes simultaneously apply to an 
investment dispute ICSID arbitration may, in some instances, be capable of 
considering relevant principles from outside of the international investment law 
regime. This suggests a more unified approach to international investment law and 
international human rights law, and may be indicative of a wider trend by some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Ibid [333]. This decision went before an ICSID Annulment Committee where the analysis on the 
issue of necessity undertaken by the ICSID arbitral tribunal was held to involve the tribunal acting 
with a manifest excess of powers. This does not impact the current analysis, which focuses on the 
manner in which the ICSID arbitral tribunal addressed regime conflict in this context, rather than the 
legal interpretation of ‘necessary’. See Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic's Application for Annulment of the Award, 
29 June 2010. 
92 ACHR (n 11). 
93 Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic (n 57) [331]. 
94 Ibid [332]. 
 
	  
	   	   61 
ICSID arbitral tribunals to willingly consider the merits of human rights based 
arguments run by host states. 
 In Continental Casualty v Argentina,95 Argentina’s defence was again raised 
in the context of Article XI of the 1991 Argentina-United States BIT. The tribunal 
considered the economic and social impact of the financial crisis, including its 
impact on constitutional guarantees and fundamental liberties, and found Argentina’s 
conduct to be in compliance with the terms of Article XI.96 It further held that an 
‘objective assessment’ of necessity ‘must contain a significant margin of 
appreciation for the state’.97 This stance, although based on a different legal 
foundation to that used in Sempra v Argentina would further evidence a more 
inclusive approach regarding the introduction of international human rights law to 
ICSID arbitration, especially given the tribunal’s references to constitutional 
guarantees and fundamental liberties. The adoption of a similar approach to that 
taken in Sempra v Argentina,  alludes to the prospect of a host state human rights 
defence being accepted by at least some ICSID arbitral tribunals. 
 In the cases of Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.,and 
InterAgua Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v Argentina98 and Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentina99 the 
relationship between investment law and human rights was raised again in the 
context of the customary international law defence of state of necessity. These 
disputes related to investments in water concessions in Santa Fe and Buenos Aires 
respectively.100 The tribunals were composed of the same arbitrators resulting in 
awards that were phrased in similar terms. In both cases Argentina argued that ‘it 
adopted the measures in order to safeguard the human right to water of the 
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96 Ibid [180]. 
97 Ibid [181]. 
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S.A. v. Argentine Republic (n 57). 
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inhabitants of the country’.101 The tribunal in both awards considered the 
relationship between human rights and the BIT standards. 
Argentina is subject to both international obligations, i.e. human rights 
and treaty obligations, and must respect both of them. Under the 
circumstances of these cases, Argentina’s human rights obligations and 
its investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent, contradictory, or 
mutually exclusive. Thus, as discussed above, Argentina could have 
respected both types of obligations.102 
The approach taken by these ICSID arbitral tribunals, in which international human 
rights law obligations are seen as an independent legal obligation outside of the 
international investment law regime, reverts to a fragmented approach towards 
regime interaction. Similarly to the award in CMS v Argentina, the ICSID arbitral 
tribunal, so as to prioritise international investment law, simply discounts the 
relevance of potentially conflicting obligations sourced from international human 
rights law without further explanation. 
 Finally, Argentina has also raised international human rights law in the 
context of identifying the applicable law of the ICSID arbitral tribunal. Although this 
stance does not use international human rights law strictly as a defence, the 
applicable law of the ICSID arbitral tribunal may inform the outcome of its 
decision.103 In EDF v. Argentina,104 the tribunal considered the relationship between 
jus cogens obligations (including international human rights law) and the measures 
taken by Argentina during the economic crisis.105 The tribunal did not ‘call into 
question the potential significance or relevance of human rights in connection with 
international investment law’106 but found no evidential basis to link the claim made 
by the foreign investor to human rights.107 Similarly, in SAUR v. Argentina,108 the 
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tribunal recognised that the right to water found in international law formed part of 
the tribunal’s applicable law,109 before requiring it to be ‘counterbalanced’ with 
investment protection standards sourced from IIAs.110 Both of these recent decisions 
demonstrate increasing recognition of the role of international human rights law 
within international investment law disputes, but neither fully elaborate on the 
manner in which the two regimes interact. 
 From these awards, two trends become clear. First, a tribunal is highly likely 
to reject any host state argument that is not properly articulated. Consequently, any 
host state claim needs to be fully established, both with a clear legal foundation and 
evidence in support. This is especially so when international human rights law is 
brought before an international investment law panel with a pre-existing structural 
bias. Second, there is a divergence in the manner in which ICSID arbitral awards 
deal with human rights based arguments. The awards of Sempra v Argentina and 
Continental Casualty v Argentina are indicative of a degree of willingness from 
ICSID arbitral tribunals to consider human rights based arguments. In EDF v 
Argentina and SAUR v Argentina, the relevance of international human rights law to 
ICSID arbitration was not questioned. In this sense, there is proof of some unity 
between international human rights law and international investment law, and a 
resulting willingness by ICSID arbitral tribunals to consider the human rights 
implications that flow from FDI. In contrast, the award in CMS v Argentina and both 
Suez v Argentina awards suggest that human rights arguments do not form part of the 
remit of an ICSID arbitral tribunal, are irrelevant to the dispute at hand, and, as a 
consequence, support the notion that the two regimes are fragmented. Given these 
distinct approaches taken by ICSID arbitral tribunals, it is necessary to consider why 
these trends exist, and what the underlying reasons for these attitudes towards 
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3.3.2 Host State Reluctance to Argue International Human Rights Law 
Defences 
Disputing parties should be aware that all claims and defences need to be fully 
articulated and substantiated for a tribunal to consider and apply them. Yet, a trend 
illustrated in both the Siemens v Argentina and Azurix v Argentina awards was 
Argentina’s ‘halfhearted’111 attempt to develop its human rights based argument. To 
establish a host state human rights defence, any reticence on the part of host states 
regarding the invocation of international human rights law in ICSID arbitration will 
need to be overcome.  
 States may be reluctant to pursue human rights based arguments in 
international dispute resolution fora that are not human rights focused for several 
reasons. These include that states consider human rights to be an insignificant aspect 
of non-human rights specific claims.112 Further, human rights considerations may 
undermine the state’s litigation strategy.113 Additionally, evidence may be difficult to 
obtain,114 resulting in a claim not being able to be fully substantiated, or 
alternatively, states may not have the expertise to espouse the claim.115 Given the 
political overtones of human rights, their introduction may inflame the dispute 
further.116 Whilst all of these reasons are relevant to ICSID arbitration, it is posited 
that host states are fearful of admitting to violations of international human rights 
law in dispute resolution fora.  
 It is incumbent on the host state to comply with its international human rights 
law obligations. These obligations extend to protecting those individuals in the host 
state’s territory from acts that may result in human rights violations, including the 
acts of foreign investors.117 Consequently, by raising human rights violations within 
its own territory, as a defence in ICSID arbitration, a host state is highlighting its 
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potential liability under international human rights law.118 Given the inherent 
structural bias of ICSID arbitration towards international investment law, it is 
unlikely that host states will be able to resolve both international investment law and 
international human rights law claims simultaneously in this forum. Therefore, any 
admission by a host state of an international human rights violation may give rise to 
additional liability in a separate human rights dispute resolution forum. Equally, 
human rights dispute resolution fora exhibit structural bias that precludes a host state 
from addressing both claims in this forum. This was demonstrated in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights decision of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community 
v Paraguay where the Court rejected the use of an investment treaty to justify human 
rights violations in a cursory manner.119 As a result, a host state may be found liable 
under both regimes, which acts as a disincentive to raise an international human 
rights law defence in ICSID arbitration. Should international human rights law be 
raised in ICSID arbitration, the potential duplication of liability may give rise to two 
further difficulties for host states.  
 The first challenge is that human rights violations related to FDI are likely to 
affect a particular group of individuals to a larger extent. This may be by virtue of 
their physical location, or may be due to the specific impact of the investment 
project, for example, local indigenous communities being adversely affected by a 
mining project. Given this, raising a human rights defence presupposes that the ‘state 
is willing to take up the claims of individuals and social groups against the 
investor’.120 A host state may not wish to defend claims brought by a foreign 
investor on the basis of international human rights law when it has ‘authorized the 
investment against the wishes of special segments of the population’.121 By 
dismissing the human rights arguments of those who opposed the investment 
initially, and then expressly relying on them to preclude liability for a breach of the 
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IIA, the inconsistent acts of a host state would appear to be a cynical use of human 
rights to avoid liability in ICSID arbitrations. This is likely to ostracise those who 
have suffered human rights violations. The risk of claims being brought in human 
rights fora is exacerbated if sectors of the population had originally opposed the 
investment on the same human rights basis, view the use of a human rights defence 
by a host state in a cynical manner, and are seeking legal remedies for the violations 
that occurred. 
 The second consideration is that, should a host state be willing to pursue this 
course of action, and receive an adverse decision in a human rights dispute 
resolution forum, this would, in turn, strengthen the content of human rights 
obligations that currently do not have clearly defined boundaries.122 Whilst this may 
be beneficial for the development of the human rights regime more generally, it is 
not in the host state’s interest to pursue this goal at its own expense. Further, changes 
to the scope or interpretation of international human rights law may negatively 
impact the activities of other foreign investors, and could potentially result in more 
investment claims.  
 This combination of factors results in the absence of human rights based 
arguments in ICSID arbitration, or as demonstrated by the Argentina cases discussed 
above, the presentation of arguments that are not fully articulated by the host state. 
This outcome is symptomatic of the fragmentation of public international law. The 
inability of public international law to simultaneously address international 
investment law and international human rights law obligations, when they stem from 
a single factual scenario, without the potential duplication of liability, reveals the 
degree of structural bias evident in both regimes. A host state is unlikely to raise 
human rights in ICSID arbitration, even when it may be a justification for the breach 
of an IIA, and may be required by international human rights law. This is because 
neither ICSID arbitration nor human rights dispute resolution fora are able to 
adequately consider the impact or importance of the other legal regime. Nonetheless, 
the stance taken by host states, of avoiding a human rights defence in ICSID 
arbitration, is likely to further increase the fragmentation between the regimes. This 
is because when host state human rights defences are infrequently raised only on a 
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superficial level, ICSID arbitral tribunals are reluctant to address human rights 
arguments given their novelty and the structural bias of ICSID arbitration. 
Consequently, the conflict between the international investment law and 
international human rights law regimes within ICSID arbitration will continue to 
favour international investment law.  
 This level of regime conflict justifies the introduction of a host state human 
rights defence to ‘de-fragment’ these regimes. However, the proposed host state 
human rights defence will need to overcome the risks encountered by host states 
when invoking international human rights law in ICSID arbitration. Given the 
current degree of fragmentation between international investment law and 
international human rights law, these risks cannot be completely eliminated, but they 
are largely capable of being managed. This can be accomplished by limiting the 
circumstances in which the defence can operate, in conjunction with emphasising the 
host state’s best efforts to comply with international human rights law.  
 Host states should only be able to consider whether to bring a human rights 
defence in very limited circumstances. This avoids the initial concern regarding the 
duplication of a host state’s potential liability in multiple dispute resolution fora in 
the majority of cases. It is contended that a human rights defence should only operate 
in cases of either grave human rights breaches or persistent human rights breaches. 
By limiting the scope of the defence to these types of violations, host states only 
need to decide whether to raise the defence when the magnitude of the breach 
warrants it. This stance is justified by other forms of violations of international 
human rights law being dealt with under the domestic law of the host state, in 
accordance with established principles regarding the enforcement of international 
human rights law.123 As a result, only those claims that involve large-scale human 
rights violations caused by the investment project will raise the risk of dual liability.  
 In those instances where a host state human rights defence is being 
considered by a host state, the defence needs to be presented in such a way that 
avoids claims by its affected population that the host state is acting in a cynical 
manner. This too minimises the risk of liability in multiple dispute resolution fora as 
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the affected population are less likely to seek redress if their position is recognised 
by the host state. To counter initial opposition to the use of the host state human 
rights defence by sectors of its population, host states can argue that the conduct of 
the foreign investor is the cause of the breach of the human rights obligation, rather 
than the investment itself. It becomes more plausible to argue that the investment 
itself is not inherently breaching human rights, but rather, that the violations were 
caused by conduct of the foreign investor. On this basis, an unexpectedly grave 
human rights violation exceeds what the host states could have possibly expected 
from the normal operation of the investment. Alternatively, when the foreign 
investor commits persistent breaches, the human rights violation eventuates despite 
consistent warnings regarding the foreign investor’s conduct through domestic 
proceedings. When presented in either of these manners, the host state can be seen to 
have taken action against the foreign investor, in contrast to protecting its own 
position. This increases the credibility of the host state human rights defence.  
 This approach also potentially limits host state liability for a breach of the 
human rights standard as the host state will either not have had any warning about 
the unexpected grave breach, or will have taken action under their domestic law for 
persistent breaches, but to no avail. Both scenarios illustrate host state compliance 
with their international human rights obligations as they are protecting the human 
rights of their population. Should a human rights defence be successful, it would 
demonstrate that the host state acted in the best interests of the host state population 
in breaching the IIA, thereby preventing claims in human rights fora. Any claims 
made by individuals in human rights dispute resolution fora would arguably be 
considered in the light of this background, or at a minimum, evidence of host state 
conduct could be presented to the forum. If this stance cannot be taken due to some 
contributory liability on behalf of the host state, it will be for the host state to 
determine if ostracising a sector of their population, and their potential liability in 
human rights fora, outweigh the option of bringing the defence.  
 It is accepted that establishing a host state human rights defence remains a 
difficult argument for a host state to present to an ISCID arbitral tribunal. 
Notwithstanding, by limiting the use of the host state human rights defence to 
instances of grave or persistent human rights breaches, a host state’s exposure to 
dual liability is minimised. Host states can avoid ostracising the population affected 
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by the human rights violation by focusing on the conduct of the investor. However, 
host states would have to simultaneously determine the degree to which they may be 
culpable for failing to act in light of the given circumstances. Despite these 
difficulties, the factors giving rise to the reluctance of host states to argue 
international human rights law in ICSID arbitration can be managed. This results in 
the host state human rights defence retaining its potential to ‘de-fragment’ 
international investment law and international human rights law in ICSID arbitration.  
3.3.3 The Role of Arbitrators in Evaluating International Human Rights Law 
Defences  
A defence based on international human rights law not only needs to be fully argued, 
the arbitrators hearing the defence must also be receptive to human rights being 
introduced into ICSID arbitration. ICSID arbitral tribunals have diverged in the 
approach taken when considering the human rights based defences raised by 
Argentina in the ICSID arbitrations that flowed from its 2001/2002 economic crisis. 
Whilst some ICSID arbitral tribunals accepted the potential application of a human 
rights defence, others were dismissive of any interaction between the international 
investment law and international human rights law regimes. To evaluate the potential 
application of a host state human rights defence in ICSID arbitration, the possible 
reasons behind the reluctance of arbitrators to acknowledge human rights based 
claims in ICSID arbitration will be examined. 
 The reluctance of ICSID arbitrators to engage with a human rights defence 
may be attributed to their limited mandate. IIAs, together with the ICSID Arbitral 
Rules and the ICSID Convention, delimit the mandate of an ISCID arbitral 
tribunal.124 Given the lack of provisions addressing international human rights law in 
the vast majority of IIAs,125 there is little scope for arbitrators to fully embrace 
international human rights law within ICSID arbitration. Therefore, arbitrators may 
have concerns regarding the extent to which an ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction 
extends to human rights claims,126 and whether the consideration of human rights 
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law would exceed the limits of the applicable law.127 In the event that international 
human rights law is mistakenly applied in excess of the arbitrator’s powers, the 
award rendered may be annulled.128 The annulment of an award on this basis may 
affect an arbitrator’s professional reputation.  
 A further suggestion as to why investment tribunals avoid addressing human 
rights considerations is that tribunals attempt to avoid the controversial issues 
entailed in international human rights law.129 Given the political disagreements that 
accompanied the development of human rights, it may be that tribunals are keen to 
de-politicise investment tribunals and avoiding human rights issues maintains the 
apolitical nature of the dispute resolution forum.130 
In light of the opposition of numerous states to granting jurisdiction to 
international adjudicatory bodies in the human rights sphere arbitral 
investment tribunals … are cautious not to address directly human rights 
issues that are involved in investment disputes.131  
Despite the initial legitimacy of these two suggestions, it is suggested that neither 
fully explain why a body of arbitrators remain supportive of human rights claims 
within ICSID arbitration. It would seem obtuse that those arbitrators that consider 
international human rights law as part of ICSID arbitration would fail to take into 
account the risk of annulment proceedings, or allegations of politicising the ICSID 
arbitral system. Given this, it is posited that arbitrators’ concerns reflect a broader, 
underlying mentality regarding the role of ICSID, and more generally, ITA. This 
mentality may result from the historical development of ITA.   
 ITA merges substantive public international law principles with procedure 
drawn from ICA.132 This generates tensions given the differing approaches 
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historically taken to dispute resolution in these fields. Whilst public international law 
tribunals have traditionally focused on the systemic impact of their decisions, 
including the wider societal implications, ICA tribunals tend to focus on resolving 
the isolated dispute between the two parties taking into account the commercial 
sensitivities involved.133 The stark divergence134 in these approaches results in 
arbitrators in ITA facing a dilemma as to which methodology to favour,135 given that 
its operation combines both practices.136 
Many arbitrators come from commercial backgrounds, without a prior 
experience of dealing with disputes involving sovereign states. These 
arbitrators are prone to extend notions of commercial dispute resolution 
without adequate consideration of public law issues in the dispute.137 
The outcome may depend on the perceptions of the arbitrator in relation to the scope 
of their role, how they view the underlying purpose of ITA and even what they 
identify as the rationale of international investment law more generally. These views 
will be formed based on the background, training, experience and peer group of the 
arbitrator in question.138 It is submitted that the inclination of an arbitrator to prefer 
either ICA or public international law aspects of ITA may influence how easily 
international human rights law may be adopted within ICSID arbitration given its 
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of foreign investment' (2006) 6 International Environmental Agreements 329, 348. See G Van Harten, 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 128, C Thomas and M 
Ewing-Chow, 'The Maturation of Investment Treaty Arbitration' (2010) 25 ICSID Review - Foreign 
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public international law origins. This proposition will be considered by contrasting 
‘private’ and ‘public’ approaches to ITA.139  
 The ‘private’ approach to ITA is sourced from ICA. ICA was developed in 
response to the need for an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to state run 
courts for commercial matters.140 The need for a separate dispute resolution 
mechanism for commercial disputes was required: 
to allow merchants to choose their own judges, since the justice of feudal 
lords or incipient states, oblivious to merchant custom and practices and 
likely to interfere in commercial deals, was perceived as inappropriate 
for deciding on commercial matters.141 
Consequently, ICA addresses the specific dispute resolution needs of merchants and 
the manner in which ICA is structured, and is conducted, mirrors these specialist 
origins.  
 Substantively, ICA usually addresses disputes between private parties 
deriving from ‘private’ law obligations such as contractual duties.142 Therefore, ICA 
focuses on the respective civil liability of the disputing parties by reference to their 
mutually agreed terms. This arguably entails a distinct methodology that does not 
necessarily translate to disputes with public law elements, such as international 
human rights law, given the wider context and impact of human rights, which extend 
beyond the disputing parties.  
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 Procedurally, the consent of the disputing parties143 in the form of a 
contractual agreement to arbitrate144 is fundamental to ICA. Once the parties have 
given their consent, the principle of party autonomy145 confers the disputing parties 
with the freedom to determine both the procedural and substantive laws to be applied 
to their dispute and to select the individual (or individuals) who will comprise the 
arbitral tribunal that will make the final determination.146 Hence, once consented to, 
ICA can be tailored to the exact needs of the parties in the light of the particular 
dispute. Further, ICA ‘does not attempt to project solutions attained in one dispute to 
other disputes’147 and as such, does not operate a system of precedent. As a result, 
ICA tribunals are not required to pursue wider systemic or social needs taking into 
account ‘social or community interests’ in the same manner as state based justice,148 
thereby hampering the introduction of international human rights law into ITA, such 
as ICSID arbitration. In short, ICA merely determines the extent to which the parties 
may be legally liable without reference to external expectations or state based 
considerations that traditionally form the basis of human rights claims. 
The aspects of ICA that are indicative of a ‘private’ approach, have the 
potential to limit the extent to which ICSID arbitrators may be willing to address 
human rights based arguments. In particular, the limited references to international 
human rights law in IIAs, when combined with the lack of public accountability and 
the ‘issue specific’ focus of arbitral tribunals, present challenges for host states who 
seek to argue a defence to an investment claim based on the wider human rights 
implications of the investment giving rise to the dispute. These difficulties are 
exacerbated by the attitude of arbitrators who consider that ICSID arbitration should 
operate in the same manner as ICA. 
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 Arbitrators who view ICSID arbitration in a similar manner to ICA will 
approach their role in order to give effect to the aims of ICA. This ‘private’ law 
approach can be characterised by the arbitrator focusing on the equality of the 
parties.149 Consequently, they are unlikely to defer to, or make exceptions for, one 
party being a state,150 and may fail to account for the difficulties that states encounter 
balancing competing interests and legal obligations. In reaching their decision, the 
arbitrator usually takes a fact based approach to the dispute to reach a decision on the 
specific issues requested by the parties based primarily based on the arguments and 
documents that counsel present to the tribunal.151 Considerations such as consistency 
with similar decisions are likely to play a minimal part of the arbitrator’s role, as 
their function is to determine the specific dispute between the parties.152 All of these 
factors equate a state with a private individual and negate the complicating factors 
associated with statehood and sovereignty, such as protecting the population of the 
state and balancing obligations set out in a variety of legal regimes in public 
international law. 
 The adoption of a ‘private’ law approach within ITA evidences these 
commercial characteristics. Although this has not yet been expressly stated in ICSID 
arbitrations, it has arisen in the context of the UNCITRAL Rules when interpreting 
the investment provisions in Chapter 11 of NAFTA. When describing its role, the 
NAFTA tribunal in Glamis Gold v United States of America stated: 
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This Tribunal was constituted to address a particular dispute between 
Glamis and the United States of America. In this sense, the Tribunal sees 
it mandate under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA as similar to the case-
specific mandate ordinarily found in international commercial 
arbitration. In the normal contractual setting, a tribunal is a creature of 
contract, tasked with resolving a particular dispute arising under a 
particular contract.153 
The tribunal went on to recognise that a ‘case-specific mandate is not license to 
ignore systemic implications’154 but emphasised that it ‘in no way views its 
awareness of the context in which it operates as justifying (or indeed requiring) a 
departure from its duty to focus on the specific case before it’.155  
 A similar approach was taken in the award of Romak v Uzbekistan,156 which 
was also governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. When determining the 
applicable law, and the degree to which the tribunal could refer to a variety of 
sources, the tribunal stated that: 
Ultimately, the Arbitral Tribunal has not been entrusted, by the Parties or 
otherwise, with a mission to ensure the coherence or development of 
“arbitral jurisprudence.” The Arbitral Tribunal’s mission is more 
mundane, but no less important: to resolve the present dispute between 
the Parties in a reasoned and persuasive manner, irrespective of the 
unintended consequences that this Arbitral Tribunal’s analysis might 
have on future disputes in general. It is for the legal doctrine as reflected 
in articles and books, and not for arbitrators in their awards, to set forth, 
promote or criticize general views regarding trends in, and the desired 
evolution of, investment law. This is not to say that the Arbitral Tribunal 
will simply ignore awards rendered by distinguished arbitrators. The 
Arbitral Tribunal may and will examine them, not for the purposes of 
extracting from them rules of law, but as a means to provide context to 
the Parties’ allegations and arguments, and as to explain succinctly the 
Arbitral Tribunal’s own reasoning.157 
 
The recognition and adoption by a tribunal of a ‘private’ approach, usually 
associated with ICA, demonstrates how a stance much like the one taken in Glamis 
Gold v United States of America and Romak v Uzbekistan might inhibit the adoption 
of a human rights defence. By viewing the mandate of the tribunal as being case 
specific, and resolving the dispute by reference to the immediate concerns of the 
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disputing parties, the ability of the arbitral tribunal to draw upon wider 
considerations and to approach the dispute systemically is excluded. Given the lack 
of express reference to human rights in IIAs, a human rights defence relies on wider 
policy implications being adopted by an arbitral tribunal. The adoption of a ‘private’ 
approach within ICSID arbitrations would prevent the establishment of a host state 
human rights defence, resulting in the on-going fragmentation of international 
investment law and international human rights law. 
 This outcome can be contrasted to how a ‘public’ approach operates within 
ITA. The ‘public’ approach questions the appropriateness of a ‘private’ approach to 
ITA due to the sovereign attributes displayed by the host state. Although there are 
some similarities between ICA and ITA,158 unlike ICA, which is based on 
contractual consent between private parties, the ‘public’ approach to ITA is founded 
on a unilateral consent conferred by the host state, usually in the IIA.159 
 Host state consent to ITA is said to differ to party consent in ICA because it 
amounts to a sovereign act.160 This is by virtue of it being given when entering into 
the IIA in the international sphere.161 Further, consent is in a generalised form162 and 
is given to all investors and investments that qualify for protection under the terms of 
the IIA.163 Consent is also prospective164 in that the host state provides consent for 
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the duration of the treaty prior to any disputes having arisen. Consequently, the host 
state is unaware of the precise nature of any disputes that may arise165 and who the 
exact claimant will be.166 This precludes the operation of party autonomy, which 
forms the foundation of ICA, and removes any element of negotiation regarding the 
form of dispute resolution.167 Therefore, the form of ITA is predetermined168 and 
applies to all disputes that arise under the IIA. These characteristics of the ‘public’ 
approach to ITA transform, what in ICA is a private dispute between two equal 
parties, who have expressly agreed the terms under which the dispute resolution 
method will operate, into a fundamentally different type of dispute resolution. 
 The ‘public’ law conception of ITA, by taking into account that the 
respondent is a state, who also has competing obligations sourced from international 
law, potentially results in a wider conception of the purpose of ITA.169 State 
obligations from other regimes, such as international human rights law, may have 
more bearing as ITA becomes less ‘issue specific’ and party focused. By taking into 
account the wider implications of FDI, arbitrators are more likely to consider issues 
beyond the precise terms of the IIA. As a result, this ‘public’ view of ITA 
significantly changes the focus of ITA away from the considerations displayed in 
ICA, increasing the likelihood of the introduction of a human rights defence.   
 Arbitrators who follow a ‘public’ stance recognise that, despite the ICA 
procedure, the decision making process in ITA has a significant public function. 
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ITA, in this sense, creates a legal order to support investment treaties170 and may 
provide guidance for future arbitrations.171 Less focus is placed on party autonomy172 
with policies being targeted instead towards, for example, greater transparency and 
third party involvement, evidenced by amicus curiae procedures.173 Consistent 
decision making becomes of greater importance,174 given the contribution that the 
arbitral award will make towards the legal framework of international investment 
law.175 It is more probable that public interests will be factored into the decision 
making process as the arbitrator is likely to be aware that the consequences of the 
decision will extend beyond the parties to the dispute.176 This holistic approach is 
encouraging for the acceptance of a human rights defence.  
 Deference to the sovereign aspects of a host state acting as a disputing party 
has been exhibited in ICSID awards, mainly evidenced by the manner in which an 
arbitral tribunal may defer to host state policy when balancing the interests of the 
foreign investor with the host state. This is demonstrated by the approach of the 
arbitrators in Lemire v Ukraine.177 When interpreting the meaning of fair and 
equitable treatment, in light of the object and purpose of the treaty (as set out in the 
preamble to the BIT), the ICSID arbitral tribunal looked beyond the terms of the BIT 
and placed the preamble in a wider context, that of the economic development of the 
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Experiences and Examples' (n 136). 
175 Schill, 'Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public Function of Investment Treaty 
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parties to the BIT.178 When analysing the terms of the BIT in this wider context, the 
ICSID arbitral tribunal stated: 
Economic development is an objective which must benefit all, primarily 
national citizens and national companies, and secondarily foreign 
investors. Thus, the object and purpose of the Treaty is not to protect 
foreign investments per se, but as an aid to the development of the 
domestic economy. And local development requires that the preferential 
treatment of foreigners be balanced against the legitimate rights of 
Ukraine to pass legislation and adopt measures for the protection of what 
as a sovereign it perceives to be its public interest.179 
Based on Lemire v Ukraine, it can be seen that the ‘public’ approach is more 
amenable to entertaining public policy considerations within ITA, especially those 
that affect the population of the host state. This approach takes into account state 
sovereignty and the purpose of the investment law regime more broadly. It is 
sympathetic to the consequences of the judgments in the wider sphere of public 
international law and the implications of the final awards rendered. As a result, a 
human rights based defence is more likely to be accepted when an arbitrator takes a 
‘public’ outlook in relation to ITA. 
 When the Argentina decisions are viewed in light of the ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
approaches discussed above, it becomes clear that the approaches of the ICSID 
arbitral tribunals discussed, mirror the general positions set out above. Those awards 
that dismissed the relevance of human rights arguments reflect elements of a 
‘private’ approach, whilst those that were more accepting of human rights arguments 
took a more ‘public’ stance. This difference represents a manifestation of regime 
conflict and leads to an inconsistent approach to decision making in ICSID 
arbitration. A ‘private’ conception of ITA stresses the investment focused, 
commercial aspects of ICSID arbitration, whereas a ‘public’ approach emphasises 
the beneficial aspects of FDI for the host state. Therefore, the introduction of a host 
state human rights defence within the existing structure of ICSID arbitration can be 
justified as a means of reconciling both approaches. To minimise regime conflict, 
and to encourage the ‘de-fragmentation’ of international investment law and 
international human rights law, a ‘public’ approach is clearly preferable. This 
approach permits an arbitral tribunal to consider the wider purpose of ICSID 
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arbitration within international investment law, and more broadly, public 
international law. By identifying the intersections between international investment 
law and, for example, international human rights law, the arbitral panel can attempt 
to reconcile these regimes, subject to the structural bias that pre-exists in ICSID 
arbitration.  
 Whilst parties to ICSID Arbitration have the opportunity to select individual 
arbitrators,180 they are not in control of the manner in which the entire ICSID arbitral 
tribunal will approach its task. This conclusion does not assist in determining the 
desirable characteristics of a human rights defence per se. However, it does indicate 
that should a host state wish to run a human rights defence its legal basis will need to 
align as closely as possible with the ‘private’ approach to ITA, to prevent it from 
being precluded for being irrelevant by ICSID arbitral tribunals that favour this 
approach. Consequently, a host state human rights defence will need to be clearly 
established within the scope of the ICSID Arbitral Rules to strengthen its links to 
this conception of ITA. The alignment of the host state human rights defence with 
the ICSID Arbitral Rules also permits ICSID arbitral tribunals that prefer a ‘public’ 
stance to justify their approach by reference to ICSID arbitral practice. The specific 
foundation upon which the host state human rights defence will be based is 
considered in Part B of this thesis.  
 Even if the host state human rights defence can display ‘private’ 
characteristics by being based on the ICSID Arbitral Rules, there is no guarantee that 
individual arbitrators will accept a human rights defence. Despite this, if the defence 
is founded on a secure legal basis it is more likely to become mainstream within 
ICSID arbitration, which will help its cause in the long term.  
3.3.4 Preliminary Conclusion 
ICSID arbitral practice exhibits a reluctance, on behalf of both host states and some 
arbitrators, to engage with international human rights law. Host states are reluctant to 
raise defences based on international human rights law due to the risk of liability in 
both international investment law and international human rights law dispute 
resolution fora. The risk of potential liability in two fora is a direct result of systemic 
bias caused by the fragmentation of public international law. Arbitrators may be 
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reticent to consider host state defences based on international human rights law 
given their perception of ICSID arbitration as a variant of ICA, which tends to be 
party driven. As a result, it ignores the wider implications of investment disputes, 
such as international human rights law. Whilst a ‘public’ approach to ITA is more 
amenable to international human rights law, there is no guarantee that arbitrators will 
adopt this approach. Consequently, a host state human rights defence will need to 
display characteristics that overcome these challenges.   
 It is acknowledged that the difficulties discussed in this section cannot be 
entirely eliminated. Yet, the risks can be minimised by applying a host state human 
rights defence strategically. Hence, the defence should only be applied in instances 
where the foreign investor has committed grave or persistent human rights 
violations. This limits the risk of dual liability for host states. Further, if host states 
refrain from overusing the defence, arbitrators more likely to be receptive to 
arguments based on international human rights law. The defence should also be used 
by host states when they are not implicated in the human rights violations. Its use in 
instances where the host state may be culpable would appear cynical and inflame the 
dispute with the affected host state population, increasing the risk of liability in both 
ICSID arbitration and human rights dispute resolution fora. Finally, to encourage 
arbitrators to adopt the defence, it should have a solid legal foundation in the ICSID 
Arbitral Rules. This will reduce the chances of arbitrators dismissing the defence for 
being outside of the scope of ICSID arbitration. In short, the widespread acceptance 
of a host state human rights defence is dependent upon the adoption of recognised 
and justifiable procedures that permit the incorporation of public interests into ICSID 
arbitration.   
3.4 AMICUS CURIAE IN ICSID ARBITRATION 
The adoption of procedures within ICSID arbitration to enable consideration of 
subjects such as international human rights law is not entirely novel. This section 
considers the potential impact of amicus curiae procedures in unifying international 
investment law and international human rights law in ICSID arbitration, and how 
this may intersect with a host state human rights defence. 
 Amicus curiae procedures in ICSID arbitration are designed to permit the 
introduction of public policy considerations before an arbitral tribunal by non-
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disputing parties (amicus curiae).181 Amicus curiae can potentially influence ICSID 
arbitral proceedings by attending and making representations at oral hearings, filing 
written submissions and accessing documents on the arbitral file.182 Therefore, this 
procedure confers amicus curiae with the ability to highlight how international 
human rights law applies to an investment dispute. Consequently, amicus curiae 
procedures have the capacity to increase regime interaction, and as a result, ‘de-
fragment’ international investment law and international human rights law. Thus, the 
manner in which amicus curiae procedures function is instructive for the operation 
of a host state human rights defence.  
 This section reviews the use of amicus curiae procedures in ICSID 
arbitration to identify the extent to which they can ‘de-fragment’ international 
investment law and international human rights law. The section proceeds in two 
stages. First, the procedural basis for the involvement of amicus curiae in ICSID 
arbitration is considered in order to determine the nature and scope of the role of 
amicus curiae. The second stage proceeds to appraise the application of amicus 
curiae procedures by ICSID arbitral tribunals. Conclusions are then drawn regarding 
the effectiveness of amicus curiae procedures as a means of unifying international 
investment law and international human rights law in ICSID arbitration. Finally, the 
implications of these findings for the proposed host state human rights defence are 
considered. 
3.4.1 The Procedural Basis for Amicus Curiae in ICSID Arbitration 
Although the role of amicus curiae is difficult to define with precision,183 it can be 
described as: 
... a practice, rather than an enshrined right, whereby arguments on 
points of law, or information, can be presented before the tribunal, with 
its permission and often by its active invitation, which would otherwise 
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not be heard because they did not form part of the respective cases of the 
litigants represented.184 
In light of the strict party-driven nature of arbitration, ICSID arbitral tribunals were 
initially reluctant to permit the involvement of third parties in the guise of amicus 
curiae. Further, there was no clear procedural basis permitting the introduction of 
amicus curiae within the ICSID Arbitral Rules. However, as investment disputes 
differ to traditional ICA disputes due to the involvement of a host state as a disputing 
party, and as the host state population have an interest in the outcome of the award, a 
public interest element is present in ITA.185 Amicus curiae procedures provide a 
means by which this public interest can be raised in investment disputes. Therefore, 
an amicus curiae role created a tension between the ‘private’ commercial origins of 
ICSID arbitration and the potential need for amicus curiae to outline the ‘public’ 
interest that may arise in the context of investment disputes.  
 The first petition for amicus curiae status in Aguas Del Tunari S.A. v 
Republic of Bolivia186 was rejected as the ICSID arbitral tribunal focused on the 
party driven nature of ICSID arbitration.187 In a letter from the President of the 
Tribunal, it was explained that: 
The interplay of the two treaties involved (the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes and the 1992 Bilateral Agreement on 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and Bolivia) and the consensual nature of 
arbitration raise the control of the issue with the parties, not the Tribunal. 
In particular, it is manifestly clear to the Tribunal that it does not, absent 
the agreement of the Parties, have the power to join a non-party to the 
proceedings; to provide access to the hearings to non-parties and, a 
fortiori, to the public generally; or the make the documents of the 
proceedings public.188 
Yet, the ICSID arbitral tribunals in Aguas Argentinas S.A., Suez Sociedad General 
de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v the Argentine Republic 
and Aguas Provincales de Santa Fe S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v the Argentine 
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Republic identified a need for the public interest to be presented in ICSID 
arbitration189 and established amicus curiae procedures in response. To overcome the 
lack of any specific procedural rules addressing amicus curiae, the ICSID arbitral 
tribunals used the general power to govern arbitral procedure contained in Article 44 
of the ICSID Convention190.191 Therefore, after initial reluctance, the public interest 
was deemed to be significant enough to warrant the use of amicus curiae in ICSID 
arbitration.  
 In response to the lack of a clear mandate for amicus curiae, specific 
procedures governing amicus curiae were incorporated into the ICSID Arbitral 
Rules in 2006.192 This resulted in two amendments to the ICSID Arbitral Rules. The 
first related to the ability of amicus curiae to attend oral hearings. As a result, Article 
32(2) ICSID Arbitral Rules was amended to read: 
Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation with the 
Secretary-General, may allow other persons, besides the parties, their 
agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their 
testimony, and officers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of 
the hearings, subject to appropriate logistical arrangements. The Tribunal 
shall for such cases establish procedures for the protection of proprietary 
or privileged information. 
ICSID Arbitral Rule 37(2) was also introduced, which permits non-disputing parties 
to act as amicus curiae193 by filing written submissions. This provision reads: 
After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity 
that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the "non-disputing 
party") to file a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter 
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192 For further details of the 2006 amendments to the ICSID Arbitral Rules, see A Antonietti, 'The 
2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations and the Additional Facility Rules' (2007) 21 
ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 427. 
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within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to allow such a 
filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to 
which: 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by 
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different 
from that of the disputing parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the 
scope of the dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding. 
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does 
not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either 
party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to present their 
observations on the non-disputing party submission. 
The provisions remain silent regarding whether amicus curiae have access to 
documents on the arbitral file. 
 The 2006 amendments to the ICSID Arbitral Rules indicate that the ‘public’ 
interest should be represented by amicus curiae in ICSID arbitration. 
Simultaneously, the additional rules reflect the tension between ‘private’ and 
‘public’ interests in ICSID arbitration. Each provision requires that a balance be 
struck between the rights of the disputing parties and the amicus curiae. To achieve 
this balance, ICSID arbitral tribunals have emphasised that the role of an amicus 
curiae is to act ‘a volunteer, a friend of the court, not a party’.194 Hence, amicus 
curiae are to assist the tribunal in its work.195 As a result, amicus curiae should 
indirectly participate in ICSID arbitral proceedings to the extent that they represent 
an interest different to the parties196 and can provide information relating to a matter 
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in dispute.197 However, as amicus curiae still have the potential to significantly 
influence the manner in which ICSID arbitration is conducted,198 the role of the 
amicus curiae in ICSID arbitration has been restricted in practice to protect the rights 
of the disputing parties.  
 To maintain the balance between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ interests 
represented by amicus curiae and the disputing parties respectively, ICSID arbitral 
tribunals are required to weigh several policy considerations to ensure that amicus 
curiae do not encroach on the rights of the disputing parties. When evaluating each 
policy consideration, ICSID arbitral tribunals are therefore able to control the 
manner in which amicus curiae are able to perform their functions. The extent to 
which an ICSID arbitral tribunal permits amicus curiae to act is determinative of the 
degree to which they may be able to contribute to furthering regime interaction 
between international investment law and international human rights law. It is 
submitted that the balancing of these policy considerations is more than likely to 
inhibit the ability of amicus curiae to introduce international human rights law into 
ICSID arbitration to the extent required to ‘de-fragment’ international investment 
law and international human rights law. This is illustrated by reference to four policy 
considerations.  
 First, ICSID arbitral tribunals need to ensure that amicus curiae only provide 
additional information to support the ICSID arbitral tribunal. In the event that amicus 
curiae exceed this function they are likely to take on the characteristics of a 
disputing party and influence how the actual disputing parties manage the investment 
dispute. For example, should amicus curiae written submissions be too 
encompassing, they may negatively affect a disputing party’s entire litigation 
strategy. The potential influence of amicus curiae submissions on the parties’ 
litigation strategies would undermine the party driven aspects of this form of dispute 
resolution.199 Even the limited involvement of amicus curiae is likely to influence 
how disputing parties approach their submissions. For example, the disputing parties 
are likely to have to respond to amicus curiae submissions, which in turn, can affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ARB/10/25, Procedural Order No. 2, 26 June 2012 [49]. See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. 
United Republic of Tanzania ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008 [359]. 
197 Kawharu (n 195) 291; De Brabandere (n 195) 106 – 107. 
198  See the policy considerations listed below. 
199 Harrison (n 118) 405; T Ishikawa, 'Third Party Participation in Investment Treaty Arbitration' 
(2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 373, 391. 
 
	  
	   	   87 
the substance of their arguments.200 Thus, ICSID arbitral tribunals need to manage 
the conduct of the arbitration to make sure that amicus curiae do not usurp the role 
of the disputing parties by submitting novel arguments. Unless human rights based 
arguments have already been raised by the disputing parties there will be limited 
scope for amicus curiae to raise international human rights arguments within the 
ICSID arbitral proceedings.  
 Second, the introduction of amicus curiae submissions is likely to prolong 
the length and cost of ICSID arbitration.201 This is because the disputing parties will 
need to wait for any amicus curiae submissions to be filed and will then need to 
respond to them.202 ICSID arbitral tribunals can manage any delays by instituting 
clear procedures limiting the involvement of amicus curiae,203 such as ensuring that 
amicus curiae adhere to the arbitral timetable. However, as most amicus curiae 
submissions support the host state,204 the foreign investor is still likely to have higher 
costs opposing the introduction of amicus curiae and then responding to the 
claims.205 ICSID arbitral tribunals are aware of the potential burden that amicus 
curiae submissions have on the parties and try to accommodate this by limiting the 
length of amicus curiae submissions.206  
 Third, NGOs filing amicus curiae submissions may not be fully 
representative of civil society.207 In some instances, NGOs from the host state may 
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struggle to finance the production of amicus curiae briefs.208 As a result, NGOs from 
developed states who have the financial capacity and expertise may drive amicus 
curiae submissions, and in doing so, not adequately represent the interests of the 
population of the host state.209 NGOs may also use amicus curiae proceedings to 
raise their profile and their legitimacy.210 Although these risks are present, recent 
practice suggests that local NGOs actively participate in the formulation of amicus 
curiae briefs and have benefitted from collaborative efforts with NGOs from 
developed states.211 Nevertheless, ICSID arbitral tribunals need to take into account 
any external influence that may undermine the legitimacy of the amicus curiae 
submissions as an accurate reflection of the view of the host state population. Should 
too much weight be given to inaccurate amicus curiae submissions by an ICSID 
arbitral tribunal, this could unduly affect the outcome of the ICSID arbitration, 
undermining the rights of the disputing parties. This may result in the tribunal being 
wary of automatically accepting the contents of amicus curiae submissions.  
 Finally, the introduction of amicus curiae procedures has been argued to have 
the potential to politicise what was designed to be an apolitical form of dispute 
resolution through the introduction of public opinion.212  This is because amicus 
curiae submissions may advocate the particular cause of an NGO.213 This may give 
rise to claims of partiality,214 with the result being that the ICSID tribunal favours the 
host state’s perspective215 given that most submissions tend to support the host 
state’s position. ICSID arbitral tribunals need to ensure that amicus curiae 
submissions do not skew the focus of the tribunal away from the investment dispute 
initiated by the disputing parties. Any bias can be countered by accepting arguments 
from a variety of amici in order to inform the analysis of the tribunal.216 Even if a 
broad range of submissions are received, amicus curiae are always likely to have a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Delaney and Barstow Magraw (n 203) 783; Kawharu (n 195) 287; Fach Gómez (n 183) 551 – 552. 
209 Kawharu (n 195) 287; Fach Gómez (n 183) 551 – 552. 
210 JE Viñuales, 'Human Rights ad Investment Arbitration: the role of amici curiae' (2006) 8 Revista 
Colombiana de Derecho Internacional Bogota 231, 270; Ishikawa (n 199) 399. 
211 Tienhaara (n 202) 241; Delaney and Barstow Magraw (n 203) 783. 
212 N Blackaby and C Richard, 'Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment Arbitration?' 
in M Waibel and others (eds), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 
(Kluwer Law International 2010), 273; Levine (n 195) 220. C.f. Ishikawa (n 199) 399 ‘a dispute 
which involves important public issues, the risk of politicization always exists regardless of third 
party participation in the arbitration proceedings’. 
213 Tienhaara (n 202) 240; Triantafilou (n 200) 576. 
214 Triantafilou (n 200) 577. 
215 Fach Gómez (n 183) 551. 
216 Ishikawa (n 199) 400. 
 
	  
	   	   89 
vested interest in the outcome of the ICSID award and, as such, their submissions are 
likely to be reviewed closely.  
 In conclusion, ICSID tribunals must ensure that amicus curiae fulfil their 
specialist remit without adopting the attributes of a disputing party. This results in 
amicus curiae not being able to initiate novel arguments, only being able to make a 
limited contribution to the proceedings and being scrutinised for bias and ulterior 
motives. Consequently, amicus curiae are unlikely to be given the opportunity to 
present substantiated arguments demonstrating the unity between international 
investment law and international human rights law. In the instances when 
international human rights law is raised by amicus curiae, it is likely to be 
considered to be a biased perspective. These factors inhibit the ability of amicus 
curiae to ‘de-fragment’ international investment law and international human rights 
law. This view is further supported by reference to the approach taken by ICSID 
arbitral tribunals that have applied these considerations. 
3.4.2 The Application of Amicus Curiae Procedures in ICSID Arbitration 
Since the amendment of the ICSID Arbitral Rules to encompass the role of amicus 
curiae, petitions for amicus curiae status have been raised in five ICSID awards.217 
Three of these awards have implications for the interaction of international 
investment law and international human rights law. The manner in which these three 
awards have dealt with each element of the amicus curiae procedure will be 
considered to identify how tribunals have viewed the role of amicus curiae. Each 
award discussed below has taken a distinctive approach with regard to the 
appropriate balance to be struck between the rights of the disputing parties and the 
rights of the amicus curiae. Focus will be placed on how each approach influences 
the ability of amicus curiae to introduce international human rights law into ICSID 
arbitration.  
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 The first approach taken by ICSID arbitral tribunals towards amicus curiae 
submissions can be classified as a moderate approach. This approach is characterised 
by ICSID arbitral tribunals permitting the introduction of amicus curiae into the 
arbitration process, but moderating the extent of their influence. This stance is 
evidenced in the Biwater v Tanzania218 award. 
 In the Biwater v Tanzania award, a dispute arose between Biwater and 
Tanzania regarding a privatised water and sewerage infrastructure project in Dar es 
Salaam.219  The dispute centred on the foreign investor’s compliance with the terms 
of the investment contract,220 which had implications for their ability to provide 
affordable water to the local population.221 In November 2006, five petitioners 
applied for amicus curiae status.222 The submissions presented focused on the 
inability of the local population to access to water and, it was argued, raised 
international human rights concerns.223 The petitioners sought to attend the arbitral 
hearing, make written submissions regarding the international law human rights 
implications of the decision and to access documents on the arbitral file.224  
 The claimant objected to the petitioners attending the hearing.225 This 
precluded the attendance of non-disputing parties at the hearings in accordance with 
the amended form of Rule 32(2).226 However, the tribunal considered that it would 
benefit from written arguments submitted in accordance with Rule 37(2).227 This 
decision was justified by reference to the need to secure ‘wider confidence in the 
arbitral process itself’.228 The tribunal emphasised that no procedural order would be 
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made ‘which might unduly burden any party in their preparation for the forthcoming 
hearing, or indeed jeopardise the hearing itself’.229   
 When utilising Rule 37(2), the petitioners argued that the impact of a 
confidentiality order prohibiting the release of several categories of documents, 
prevented them from determining the precise scope of the legal submissions that 
they intended to submit.230  As a result, they sought a review of the terms of the 
confidentiality order, to enable them to draft tailored submissions based on 
documents on the arbitral file.231  The Tribunal considered that the role of the 
petitioners was to ‘address broad policy issues concerning sustainable development, 
environment, human rights and governmental policy’.232  As the dispute had been 
‘very public and widely reported’,233 the Tribunal decided that sufficient information 
was already in the public domain.234  
 In reaching these decisions, where possible, the Biwater tribunal took a 
balanced view with regard to the role of amicus curiae and the contribution that they 
should make to ICSID arbitration.  When considering whether amicus curiae are 
able to attend and present at oral hearings, an ICSID arbitral tribunal is not conferred 
with any discretion. Rule 32(2) ICSID Arbitral Rules, even as amended, permits 
parties to ICSID arbitration preventing amicus curiae from attending the hearing. As 
at least one disputing party’s interests will not align with that the amicus curiae, in 
most instances, amicus curiae will not be able to attend the oral hearings. Hence, the 
terms of Rule 32(2) favour a party driven perception of ICSID arbitration.  
 In contrast, the terms of Article 37(2) ICSID Arbitral Rules provide that the 
public and private aspects of ICSID arbitration are to be balanced by the ICSID 
arbitral tribunal. In achieving this balance in Biwater, the ICSID arbitral tribunal 
justified amicus curiae participation, in part, on the need for greater confidence in 
ICSID arbitration. Once the introduction of amicus curiae was established, the 
tribunal subsequently sought to protect the rights of the disputing parties by not 
placing excessive burdens on the disputing parties and maintaining the existing 
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confidentiality orders.235 The tribunal also sought to rely on the general expertise of 
the amicus curiae, rather than requiring them to respond to specific arguments or 
issues in dispute. This moderated approach accords with the limited role intended for 
amicus curiae in ICSID arbitration.  
 The final award in Biwater is indicative of the extent to which amicus curiae 
submissions influenced the outcome of the decision, especially with regard to the 
unification of the international investment law and international human rights law 
regimes.236 Briefly referring to the amicus submissions, the Biwater final award 
notes:  
the Arbitral Tribunal has found the Amici’s observations useful. Their 
submissions have informed the analysis of the claims set out below, and 
where relevant, specific points arising from the Amici’s submissions are 
returned to in that context.237 
Reference is made to the amicus submissions in paragraph 601, where the tribunal 
confirmed that it had: 
taken into account the submissions of the Petitioners, as summarised 
earlier, which emphasise counterveiling factors such as the responsibility 
of foreign investors, both in terms of prior due diligence as well as 
subsequent conduct; the limit to legitimate expectations in circumstances 
where an investor itself takes on risks in entering a particular investment 
environment; and the relevance of the parties’ respective rights and 
obligations as set out in any relevant investment agreement (here the 
Lease Contract). 
The only other reference to the amicus submissions is in footnote 208 explaining a 
discrepancy between the position taken by the amici and the position established by 
the parties before the tribunal. This was attributed to the amici not having access to 
the relevant documentation. 
 Given the limited extent to which the ICSID tribunal in Biwater refers to the 
amicus curiae submissions, it is easy to infer that little attention was paid to their 
arguments. No express reference is made to the specific points raised by the amicus 
curiae. However, it is probable that the amicus curiae submissions provided 
background information to the tribunal that informed their interpretation of the IIA. 
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The role of amicus curiae is not to present arguments in response to the disputing 
parties and, consequently, their arguments are unlikely to feature strongly within the 
award. The statements of the tribunal suggest that it considered the submissions of 
the amicus curiae in the manner intended by the ICSID Arbitral Rules. That is, they 
were taken into account, but were not highly influential. This stance reflects the 
moderated position with regard to the use of amicus curiae submissions taken in this 
award, and simultaneously highlights the limitations of amicus curiae. They do not 
present arguments, and at most, their influence on the ICSID arbitral tribunal is 
limited to providing a relevant context. In light of the Biwater award, amicus curiae 
are unable to unify international investment law and international human rights law 
to the degree required to counter the current extent of regime conflict. 
 A second approach to amicus curiae procedures is one that is inclusive and 
supportive of amicus curiae involvement in ICSID arbitration. This approach 
stresses the importance of the public interest in ITA and seeks to formulate a final 
award that reflects the broader context in which the decision is being made. By 
taking this stance, the tribunal in Piero Foresti v South Africa238 established a more 
conducive environment for the acceptance of amicus curiae.  
 The Piero Foresti v South Africa hearings arose when Italian and 
Luxembourger investors commenced ICSID arbitral proceedings against South 
Africa in relation to the alleged expropriation of mining rights, relying on ICSID’s 
Additional Arbitration Rules.239 Little documentation from the dispute was made 
public, but the foreign investors appear to have argued that South Africa’s 
requirement that mining licences be re-issued under the Mining and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) had resulted in breaches of South 
Africa’s BITs with Italy and Benelux.240 The re-issuing of licences was to comply 
with anti-discrimination policies, including South Africa’s Black Economic 
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Empowerment programme.241 Petitions were received from potential amicus curiae 
justifying their involvement on the basis of the foreign investor’s challenge to the 
MPRDA, which was intended to redress the racial inequalities resulting from 
apartheid.242 In this context, there was clear potential for the international human 
rights law raised by the amici to be of relevance to the ICSID tribunal, and for 
international human rights law to be considered as an integral part of the ICSID 
arbitration. However, the claim was settled before amicus curiae submissions were 
presented. Despite this, the manner in which the ICSID tribunal addressed the 
request is still instructive. 
 In a letter to the parties dated 5 October 2009, the ICSID Secretariat indicated 
the tribunal’s decision to accept the amicus curiae petitions.  The letter set out the 
Tribunal’s reasoning, which took into account two basic principles. The first was 
that the role of amicus curiae is ‘to give useful information and accompanying 
submissions to the Tribunal’243 rather than it being a ‘mechanism for enabling 
NDP’s to obtain information from the Parties’.244 Secondly, when amicus curiae are 
permitted to participate in ICSID arbitration ‘the Tribunal must ensure that it is both 
effective and compatible with the rights of the Parties and the fairness and efficiency 
of the arbitral process’.245 This approach reiterates both the limited role of the 
amicus curiae, and the potential impact upon disputing parties that may be caused 
once amicus curiae have been given permission to file written submissions as part of 
the ICSID arbitration. Yet, in contrast to Biwater, the Piero award took the view 
that: 
the NDP’s must be allowed access to those papers submitted to the 
Tribunal by the Parties that are necessary to enable the NDP’s to focus 
their submissions upon the issues arising in the case and to see what 
positions the Parties have taken on those issues.246   
This order was made despite the objections of the claimants to the release of 
documentation to third parties. The Tribunal further stated: 
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In view of the novelty of the NDP procedure, after all submissions, 
written and oral, have been made the Tribunal will invite the Parties and 
the NDPs to offer brief comments on the fairness and effectiveness of the 
procedures adopted for NDP participation in this case.  The Tribunal will 
then include a section in the award, recording views (both concordant 
and divergent) on the fairness and efficacy of NDP participation in this 
case and on any lessons learned from it.247 
The Tribunal in Piero did not anticipate that the amicus curiae would be able to 
attend the hearings, but a final decision did not need to be made by the disputing 
parties at that time. 248 
 The approach of the tribunal in Piero highlights an attitude that is more 
supportive of the active participation of amicus curiae in ICSID arbitration than that 
of the tribunal in the Biwater award. This conclusion is based on the tribunal seeking 
to determine the extent to which disclosing the arbitral file is both detrimental to the 
disputing parties, and beneficial to the formulation of amicus curiae submissions. 
Hence, the ICSID arbitral tribunal potentially foresaw a greater involvement for 
amicus curiae in ICSID arbitrations, subject to the outcome of the review process. 
As the claim settled, this review was never undertaken and the position of the 
tribunal on the matter remains unknown. Nonetheless, although not in the context of 
international human rights law, in Electrabel v Hungary,249 the European 
Commission, acting as amicus curiae, was given access to documents on the arbitral 
file.250 This may be indicative of a new approach by ICSID arbitral tribunals 
regarding the balance to be struck between protecting the rights of the disputing 
parties and amicus curiae. Should amicus curiae be given access to documents, this 
may increase the specificity of amicus curiae submissions, resulting in tribunals 
taking more account of their content. If this trend were to be established, it would 
indicate a more ‘public’ stance towards ITA, enabling greater integration between 
international investment law and international human rights law. 
 The final approach to amicus curiae procedures is one that seeks to favour 
the ‘private’ approach to ITA. It focuses on the party-driven nature of arbitration by 
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minimising the influence of amicus curiae in ICSID arbitration, as demonstrated by 
the Pezold v Zimbabwe251 and Border Timbers Ltd v Zimbabwe252 awards.  
 In Pezold v Zimbabwe and Border Timbers Ltd v Zimbabwe, Swiss and 
German investors initiated a joint arbitration under BITs with Zimbabwe. The claims 
were made in response to the Land Reform Programme undertaken by Zimbabwe.253 
The foreign investors sought unencumbered legal title and control over land that had 
allegedly been expropriated, known as the Border Properties.254 The German based 
European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights and four communities of the 
Chikukwa, Ngorima, Chinyai and Nyaruwa peoples who occupy the region of 
Chimanimani, where the Border Properties are located,255 sought permission to make 
written submissions, access documents on the arbitral file and attend oral hearings.256 
 When considering the operation of Arbitral Rule 37(2), the tribunal read into 
Arbitral Rule 37(2)(a) a requirement that petitioners should be independent of the 
disputing parties.257 In this instance, the lack of independence of the amici was 
established on two grounds. First, the interests being pursued by the amici ‘appear to 
be in conflict with the Claimants’ primary position in these proceedings’.258 Second, 
the involvement of an NGO in the creation of the petition, who had openly supported 
Zimbabwe’s land reform policies, was considered to ‘give rise to legitimate doubts’ 
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258 Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe (n 196) [51]; Border Timbers Limited, 
Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. (Private) Limited v. 
Republic of Zimbabwe (n 196) [51]. 
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regarding the independence of the petitioners.259 Whilst recognising that ‘it may 
therefore well be that the determination of the Arbitral Tribunals in these 
proceedings will have an impact on the interests of the indigenous communities’,260 
their lack of independence precluded representatives of these communities from 
being conferred with amicus curiae status.261  
 The tribunal also expressly considered the relationship between international 
investment law and international human rights law. They prefaced their analysis of 
this issue by stating that ‘the reference to “such rules of general international law as 
may be applicable” in the BITs does not incorporate the universe of international law 
into the BITs or into disputes arising under BITs’.262 On this basis, the ICSID 
arbitral tribunal dismissed the applicability of international human rights law, 
including international human rights law relating to indigenous peoples, as the 
parties had not raised these rights as part of the proceedings. The tribunal concluded 
that, as the petitioners had not established the interdependence of these regimes,263 
references to international human rights law exceeded the mandate of the tribunal 
both under the ICSID Convention and the applicable BIT.264  
 The reasoning of the tribunal gives rise to two complicating factors when 
addressing the intersection of international investment law with international human 
rights law within the context of amicus curiae submissions. First, this tribunal 
interprets the notion of independence in a very restrictive manner. All amicus curiae 
petitioners seek to pursue and develop a particular aspect of the dispute. 
Consequently, they are likely to have links to either the foreign investor or the host 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Bernhard von Pezold and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe (n 196) [56]; Border Timbers Limited, 
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state, by virtue of a vested interest. Whereas previous tribunals have addressed this 
bias as part of the submission process, in this decision, the tribunal denied all access 
to the petitioners from the outset. The ICSID arbitral tribunal failed to recognise the 
inherent bias that is present in all amicus curiae requests. Their subsequent denial of 
the request could inhibit the introduction of all amicus submissions and undermine 
Articles 32(2) and 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitral Rules.  
 Secondly, the attitude of the tribunal fails to take into account any 
intersection between international human rights law and the investment that forms 
the subject matter of the dispute. The connection between indigenous rights and the 
alleged violations of the IIA in this dispute, and the link between the human rights of 
the population in Biwater and the alleged violations of the IIA in that case, are 
directly comparable. In both instances, the impact of the investment directly affected 
the human rights of a sector of the host state population. In neither case did the host 
state raise human rights within its defence. As a result, there does not appear to be 
any basis on which to distinguish these decisions. The key factor that contributed to 
a distinction being drawn is the importance that is placed on the ‘private’ and 
commercial procedural origins of ITA in Pezold. 
 The Pezold award illustrates the influence of a ‘private’ approach to ITA. 
This stance results in tribunals taking a restrictive position and limiting their 
mandate accordingly. Such an approach inhibits the ability of amicus curiae 
procedures to effectively integrate international investment law and international 
human rights law, as they are denied any form of contribution to the ICSID arbitral 
proceedings. 
 When reviewed together, the awards discussed above establish the manner in 
which the ICSID provisions on amicus curiae procedures have been interpreted and 
applied by different ICSID arbitral tribunals. Despite applying identical terms set out 
in Rules 32(2) and 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitral Rules, by focusing on different 
aspects of the policy considerations, and the role of ICSID arbitration more 
generally, there is a significant difference in the approach of the tribunals. This 
variance highlights the difficulties faced by tribunals when trying to balance the 
nature of the amicus role with the rights of the disputing parties.  
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 ICSID Rule 32(2), by conferring upon the parties the ability to exclude 
amicus curiae from oral hearings, favours the conduct of arbitration over the ability 
of amicus curiae to participate in the proceedings. This reflects both respect for the 
rights of the parties to the dispute, and the limited nature of the role of an amicus 
curiae. This restriction is indicative of the balance required between the ‘private’ and 
‘public’ approaches to ICSID arbitration.  
 Article 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules indicates that tribunals are not 
generally opposed to admitting amicus curiae provided that they are sufficiently 
independent, and a public interest is involved that justifies the additional burden on 
the disputing parties. However, the decision in Pezold indicates that some tribunals 
will apply the provisions in a restrictive manner. As this is the first decision to deny 
amicus curiae status under the ICISD Arbitral Rules, it is unclear whether the 
position taken by the Pezold tribunal is indicative of a wider trend. Nonetheless, this 
stance evidences that the initial acceptance of amicus curiae may not be a 
widespread as initially thought.  
 In the event that amicus curiae establish a public interest that justifies their 
involvement in the ICSID arbitration, the additional burden on the disputing parties 
is factored into the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. This approach illustrates that 
when ICSID tribunals believe they have a clear mandate, they are generally willing 
to accept aspects of the public approach into ICSID arbitration. This has the potential 
to result in public policy based claims, such as international human rights law, into 
ICSID arbitration. Nonetheless, private conceptions of ITA become prioritised after 
the initial acceptance of amicus curiae.  
 Although tribunals were initially reluctant to provide access to the arbitral 
file to amicus curiae, the Piero Foresti decision, and its subsequent adoption in later 
awards, indicates that some tribunals may be willing to change this stance. Should 
this be the case, there may be greater scope for amicus to influence ICSID tribunals 
with international human rights law. Still, the ability of such an approach to achieve 
this is yet to be tested.  
 The application of the amicus curiae procedure differs between these 
tribunals. Whilst some are more open to the involvement of amicus curiae than 
others, all approaches are limited by the specialist nature of an amicus curiae’s role. 
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As a result of the limitations placed on their role, by both ICSID arbitral tribunals 
and the ICSID Arbitral Rules, amicus curiae do not possess the freedom of a 
disputing party within ICSID arbitration, which limits their ability to unify 
international investment law and international human rights law. In contrast, a host 
state human rights defence can fulfil this role. 
3.4.3 The Implications of Amicus Curiae Procedures for a Host State Human 
Rights Defence 
Amicus curiae procedures in ICSID arbitration have the potential to increase the 
unity between international investment law and international human rights law. This 
is because amicus may introduce international human rights law into ICSID 
arbitration. Several disputes to date have lent themselves to the submission of amicus 
curiae briefs. However, the potential to unify these regimes is curtailed by the 
specific nature of their role.  
 The role of amicus curiae is to advise the ICSID arbitral tribunal on general 
considerations that may have a bearing on the dispute. Amicus curiae are not parties 
to the proceedings, and as such cannot introduce new arguments or evidence. 
Further, the rights and interests of the parties who have selected ICSID arbitration as 
their preferred dispute resolution forum need to be protected. This results in policy 
considerations being applied to ensure that amicus curiae have a limited role and do 
not negatively influence either the rights of the parties or the credibility of ICSID 
arbitration. Consequently, the curtailed role of amicus curiae inhibits the full 
introduction of international human rights law in the manner that may be achievable 
with a host state human rights defence. 
 It is not suggested that the role of amicus curiae should not exist. Amicus 
curiae perform an important and legitimate function in ICSID arbitration. Without 
amicus curiae, public policy aspects of claims may not be brought to the attention of 
ICSID tribunals. This is vital when the local population of the host state is affected 
and the impact of the investment on their rights is not being voiced by the host state. 
However, given the existing framework of ICSID arbitration, amicus curiae can only 
achieve so much. As such, for the purposes of this thesis, amicus curiae are 
considered to perform an important, but supplementary role to that of the host state 
human rights defence. 
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 Therefore, it is submitted that to effectively unify international investment 
law and international human rights law, a party initiated host state human rights 
defence is the most appropriate mechanism. A host state human rights defence can 
be supplemented by amicus curiae submissions to ensure that ICSID tribunals are 
fully aware of the materials required to inform their decision, and in this manner, 
amicus curiae and host state human rights defence can interact to reduce the 
fragmentation of international investment law and international human rights law. 
3.5 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A HOST STATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
DEFENCE  
This chapter has identified regime conflict between international investment law and 
international human rights law in the instruments establishing the international 
investment law regime, within ICSID arbitral practice addressing human rights 
defences and in ICSID’s amicus curiae procedures. By undertaking this analysis, the 
barriers that prevent the full integration of international human rights law into ICSID 
arbitration have become evident. This has resulted in the dismissal of some potential 
avenues for resolving the conflict between international investment law and 
international human rights law. However, it has also illustrated what attributes are 
desirable in order to enable a host state human rights defence to function in ICSID 
arbitration. This section will conclude this chapter by referring to manifestations of 
the regime conflict between international investment law and international human 
rights law, how regime conflict justifies the introduction of a host state human rights 
defence into ICSID arbitration and what characteristics it should possess in order to 
operate effectively.  
 Regime conflict between international investment law and international 
human rights law is seen in a variety of contexts. This chapter has demonstrated the 
existence of regime conflict by reference to the inclusion of international human 
rights law provisions in IIAs, ICSID arbitral practice in response to human rights 
based arguments and the extent to which amicus curiae procedures enable the 
integration of these regimes through the introduction of international human rights 
law by third parties.  
 The broadest conception of regime conflict is that generated by the creation 
of lex specialis regimes. These regimes display a singular focus that excludes the 
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application of relevant principles that are externally sourced from other lex specialis 
regimes. This level of regime conflict is illustrated by the operation of international 
human rights law provisions contained in IIAs. Although a small minority of IIAs 
refer to international human rights law (when environmental and labour standards 
are included in this definition) this practice is not widespread. Further, when 
included, provisions addressing international human rights law do not have parity 
with international investment law, either in terms of their legal strength, or ability to 
be raised in formal dispute resolution proceedings. The structural bias inherent in 
international investment law at this level leads to fragmentation and regime conflict 
between international investment law and international human rights law. 
 A second level of regime conflict occurs when states attempt to 
simultaneously comply with competing obligations sourced in differing lex specialis 
regimes. When attempting to comply with both international investment law and 
international human rights law, host states are placed in the difficult situation of 
potentially admitting liability in human rights dispute resolution fora when relying 
on international human rights law to defend their conduct in ICSID arbitration. 
Consequently, the failure of international investment law to accommodate 
international human rights law, and to consider its wider social impact, may cause 
regime conflict on a secondary level.  
 Finally, procedural limitations within ICSID arbitration giving rise to regime 
conflict are evidenced both in relation to the distinction between ‘public’ and 
‘private’ styles of arbitration, and the limitations imposed as part of amicus curiae 
procedures. The division of ICSID arbitration into ‘private’ and ‘public’ approaches, 
determined by the arbitrators’ understanding of their function, can either permit or 
preclude the inclusion of international human rights law considerations in ICSID 
awards. Amicus curiae procedures reflect aspects of the division between ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ approaches to ICSID arbitration, in addition to limiting the 
involvement of amicus curiae to the essential aspects required so that they can 
perform their unique function. This denies amicus curiae the possibility of 
integrating international human rights law within ICSID arbitration to the degree 
required to counter the effects of fragmentation. These procedural limitations, whilst 
supporting international investment law, prevent international human rights law from 
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being comprehensively introduced into ICSID arbitration, potentially leading to 
regime conflict.  
 In each of these instances, the regime conflict encountered has been 
epitomised by broad conceptions of ‘public’ and ‘private’ interests in international 
investment law. In generalised terms, a ‘public’ approach is supportive of the 
inclusion of international human rights law within the international investment law 
regime given the wider social impacts of investment projects. In contrast, a ‘private’ 
approach seeks to solely consider the economic aspects of investment and prioritises 
the international investment law regime over other lex specialis regimes sourced 
from public international law. The management of regime conflict is currently 
achieved by trying to create equilibrium between these interests.  
 The use of such a vague approach to managing regime conflict justifies the 
introduction of a host state human rights defence into the ICSID arbitration process, 
primarily because the current role of international human rights law within ICSID 
arbitration remains unclear. Some arbitral tribunals appear to be receptive to ‘public’ 
interests such as international human rights law being introduced into ICSID 
arbitration, whilst others have rejected such an approach. This is illustrated by 
reference to how ICSID arbitral tribunals dealt with Argentina’s human rights based 
arguments following the 2001/2002 financial crisis. It is also evident in the distinct 
manner in which different tribunals have applied policy considerations when 
balancing the role of amicus curiae with disputing parties. As a result of the unclear 
role of international human rights law, ICSID arbitral tribunals are producing 
inconsistent results based on an arbitrary balancing of ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
considerations. Given a systemic understanding of public international law, both 
‘public’ and ‘private’ aspects of investment disputes are relevant and should be 
applied with equal merit. 
 On this basis, a formalised procedure governing the use of international 
human rights law within the international investment law regime is required. A host 
state human rights defence has the potential to provide a structured, formal means by 
which a host state can raise arguments based on international human rights law in 
ICSID arbitration. This approach would minimise the variable nature of balancing 
‘private’ and ‘public’ considerations by ICSID arbitral tribunals. In light of the 
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nature of the regime conflict outlined in this chapter, to function in this manner, a 
host state human rights defence will need to display specific characteristics.  
 In light of the political difficulties of balancing ‘public’ and ‘private’ aspects 
of international investment law within IIAs, and their current structural bias towards 
international investment law, the inclusion of an express provision in IIAs 
establishing a host state human rights defence is unlikely to be accepted.  Therefore, 
this approach will not be considered in this thesis. The consequence of taking this 
position is that a host state human rights defence will need to be established as part 
of ICSID arbitral practice.  
 A trend evident in ICSID arbitral practice is that a host state human rights 
defence can be more readily established when ICSID arbitrators adopt a ‘public‘ 
approach, rather than a ‘private’ approach to ICSID arbitration. However, more 
arbitrators tend to adopt a ‘private’ approach. Consequently, to encourage arbitrators 
to adopt a host state human rights defence, it must be tailored to a ‘private’ approach 
to readily permit its inclusion in ICSID arbitration. A ‘private’ approach will make it 
more difficult for arbitrators to dismiss its relevance. Further, the introduction of 
international human rights law by a party to the dispute, within a clearly defined 
structure, means that the regime conflict outlined above is more likely to be resolved 
in a logical and consistent manner. 
 A human rights defence must overcome problems of host state reluctance 
caused by the risk of dual liability. This requires that a host state human rights 
defence should only be used in limited instances and argued in a manner that is 
sensitive to those affected by the human rights violations. It is contended that a 
human rights defence should only operate in cases of either grave human rights 
breaches or persistent human rights breaches. This results in host states only needing 
to consider whether to bring a human rights defence in very limited circumstances. 
Further, host states can argue that the conduct of the foreign investor is the cause of 
the human rights obligation, rather than the investment itself. By taking the approach 
of attributing the breach to the foreign investor (if this is possible) this deflects 
attention away from potential claims that the host state is violating its human rights. 
If a human rights defence is successful, it demonstrates that the host state acted in 
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the best interests of the host state population in breaching the IIA, thereby preventing 
claims in human rights fora.  
 A human rights defence should augment existing amicus curiae procedures. 
Existing amicus curiae procedures, although unable to ‘de-fragment’ international 
investment law and international human rights law independently, do provide ICSID 
arbitral tribunals with the necessary context to enable arbitrators to apply the 
defence, and thereby support a host state human rights defence. 
 Should a host state human rights defence display these characteristics, it will 
be able to respond to the barriers that currently prevent regime interaction. In doing 
so, a host state human rights defence should be able to prevent regime conflict and 
successfully ‘de-fragment’ international investment law and international human 
rights law. Having established the characteristics required by a host state human 
rights defence; being (1) that the defence needs to be established beyond the terms of 
an IIA; (2) it must form part of ICSID arbitral practice; (3) it should avoid dual 
liability for host states; and (4) it should augment amicus curiae procedures; the next 
Part of this thesis considers the potential legal foundations for the defence that may 
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4. A PROCEDURAL HOST STATE HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENCE 
IN ICSID ARBITRATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A potential foundation for a host state human rights defence is to use procedural 
grounds to prevent a foreign investor from utilising ICSID arbitration. The 
jurisdictional limitations imposed upon ICSID arbitration provide a prospective 
framework upon which a procedural defence could be established. ICSID tribunals 
do not possess plenary jurisdiction.1 ICSID arbitration was established to provide an 
apolitical forum for the resolution of FDI disputes.2 Consequently, the jurisdictional 
limits of ICSID arbitration reflect this specialist remit and are designed to ensure that 
ICSID tribunals focus on investment disputes.3 Despite its international investment 
law focus, the jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal over international investment 
law matters is not absolute.4 The disputing parties must meet specified criteria before 
the jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal is established. 
This chapter considers the potential avenues by which arguments based on 
international human rights law could deny the jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral 
tribunal. It utilises the limited scope of an ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, and 
the pre-conditions for its exercise, to consider how a procedural host state human 
rights defence could be created. In taking this stance, this chapter emphasises the 
fundamental roles of party consent, international public policy and subject matter 
jurisdiction within ICSID arbitration. It assumes that all other jurisdictional elements 
required for ICSID arbitration to operate have been met. It is posited that, whilst a 
host state human rights defence could potentially be established in certain 
circumstances by excluding an ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction on procedural 
grounds, both legal hurdles and policy considerations limit the desirability of 
adopting this approach.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 C McLachlan, 'Investment Treaties and General International Law' (2008) 57 ICLQ 361, 370. 
2 ICSID, 'Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of other States' 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp> accessed 15 July 2013 (Report of 
Executive Directors) [11]. 
3 This structure contributes to the regime conflict considered in Chapter 2. 
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To consider this argument, this chapter initially considers the jurisdictional 
foundations of ICSID arbitration by reference to the terms of the ICSID Convention 
and party consent. These operate in tandem to limit the scope of originating claims 
that can be heard by an ICSID arbitral tribunal.5 This discussion outlines the 
jurisdictional limitations that form the basis of ICSID arbitration and acts as a 
reference point when subsequently evaluating the procedural options for a host state 
human rights defence. Initially, the operation of ‘in accordance with host state law’ 
clauses is considered as a means of denying the jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal. 
Recent ICSID jurisprudence regarding the operation of ‘in accordance with host state 
law’ clauses indicates that illegal conduct by a foreign investor may constrain an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.6 Therefore, these clauses could be effective in 
precluding an ICSID tribunal’s jurisdiction if the foreign investor has violated 
international human rights law that simultaneously breaches host state law. The role 
of international public policy is examined as a second means of denying jurisdiction. 
International public policy considerations can impact the admissibility of claims and 
can result in an ICSID tribunal electing not to hear a foreign investor’s claim, even 
though it has jurisdiction over the dispute.7 Should human rights violations be 
considered to amount to a breach of international public policy, ICSID tribunals 
could decide not to exercise their jurisdiction to hear the foreign investor’s claims. 
As both of these approaches would preclude a foreign investor access to a hearing on 
the merits before an ICSID arbitral tribunal,8 the policy implications of adopting a 
procedural host state human rights defence are examined before conclusions are 
drawn. Throughout this chapter, reference is made to the desirable characteristics of 
a host state human rights defence identified in Part A of this thesis. In particular, 
focus is placed on the legal foundation for the host state human rights defence given 
that it needs to comply with a positivist conception of public international law and 
demonstrate a credible legal basis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid. 
6 See for example, Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational 
State of Bolivia ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 September 2012 [255]; 
Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 December 2012 [317]. 
7 See J Paulsson, 'Jurisdiction and Admissibility' in G Aksen and R Briner (eds), Global Reflections 
on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution: Liber Amicorum in honour of Robert 
Briner (International Chameber of Commerce 2005). 
8 Douglas (n 4) 135. 
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4.2 LIMITATIONS ON THE JURISDICTION OF AN ICSID ARBITRAL 
TRIBUNAL  
Prior to considering the potential use of the jurisdictional limits of ICSID arbitration 
to establish a procedural host state human rights defence, this section considers the 
manner in which ICSID jurisdiction is established, and the features that limit its 
scope.  
The jurisdiction of a dispute resolution body commonly refers to its authority 
to adjudicate a claim.9 However, ICSID is not a dispute resolution body and only 
exercises administrative functions in support of ICSID arbitrations.10 The ICSID 
Convention does provide a framework in which ICSID arbitrations operate, but the 
criteria it sets out are to be applied by individually constituted arbitral tribunals, 
rather than ICSID itself.11 As a result, the use of the term ‘jurisdiction’ in the ICSID 
Convention refers to the pre-conditions that must be met before ICSID will provide 
any supporting functions to arbitral proceedings.12 Once a dispute is within the 
bounds of the ICSID Convention, the consent of the parties determines the precise 
scope of the subject matter of the dispute that will be dealt with by the appointed 
arbitral tribunal.13 Therefore, the jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal is dictated 
by both the terms of the ICSID Convention and the consent given by the disputing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A Redfern and others, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2004) 295; G Zeiler, 'Jurisdiction, Competence and Admissibility of Claims in ICSID 
Arbitral Proceedings' in C Binder and others (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st 
Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University Press 2009) 78; R Moloo and 
A Khachaturian, 'The Compliance wth the Law Requirement in International Investment Law' (2011) 
43 Fordham International Law Journal 1473, 1491. 
10 Article 1 ICSID Convention states ‘the purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for 
conciliation and arbitration’. See A Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID and Other Subjects 
of Public and Private International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 166;  Zeiler (n 9) 79 – 80; 
Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, 8 
December 2008 [70]; Abaclat and Others (Case formerly known as Giovanna a Beccara and Others) 
v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 
August 2011 [245]. 
11 ICSID, 'Background Information on the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID)' 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocu
ment&icsidOverview=true&language=English> accessed 15 July 2013 (Background). 
12 ICSID, (accessed 15 July 2013) (Report of Executive Directors) (n 2) 43. See Broches (n 10) 167; 
Zeiler (n 9) 80 – 81; U Grusic, 'The Evolving Jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes' (2009) 10 Journal of World Investment and Trade 69, 70. 
13 Grusic (n 12) 71; S Blanchard, 'State Consent, Temporal Jurisdiction, and the Importation of 
Continuing Circumstances Analysis into International Investment Arbitration' (2011) 10 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 419, 424. 
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parties.14 Although there is ‘dual consent’,15 in that both sets of jurisdictional 
requirements must be met, given that party consent is essential in order for 
arbitration to function, the ‘consent of the parties is the cornerstone of the 
jurisdiction of the Centre’.16 The manner in which both of these elements operate are 
considered in turn. 
4.2.1 ICSID Convention 
The ICSID Convention sets out the fundamental structure and purpose of ICSID as 
an administrative body for, amongst other things, the conduct of ICSID arbitration.17 
It also sets out the powers and functions of an ICSID arbitral tribunal.18 States may 
utilise the services of ICSID, and the functions offered by ICSID arbitrations, when 
they consent to be bound by the ICSID Convention.19 When consenting to the ICSID 
Convention, states become bound by the jurisdictional limitations of ICSID, which 
are set out in Article 25 ICSID Convention in the following terms: 
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any 
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to 
the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State… . 
When determining the subject matter jurisdiction of ICSID, focus is placed on the 
phrase ‘any legal dispute arising out of an investment’, which curtails the jurisdiction 
of ICSID to a limited class of disputes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Grusic (n 12) 71; Blanchard (n 13) 423 – 424. For discussion in arbitral practice, see for example, 
Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision of 
the ad hoc Committee, 14 June 2010 [40]; Malicorp Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt ICSID Case 
No. ARB/08/18, Award, 7 February 2011 [100] – [102]. 
15 Grusic (n 12) 71. 
16 ICSID, (accessed 15 July 2013) (Report of Executive Directors) (n 2) 43. This has been reiterated 
in Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005 [146]; Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/26, Award, 2 August 2006 [167]. 
17 ICSID, (accessed 15 July 2013) (Background) (n 11). 
18 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 
(adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 171 Articles 41 - 47. 
19 The use of ICSID is limited to member states. See ICSID, 'ICSID Dispute Settlement Facilities' 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=RightFrame&Fr
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First, ICSID’s subject matter jurisdiction is restricted to ‘legal’ disputes. This 
excludes disputes that are political in nature20 or ‘conflicts of interest’.21 As a result, 
the dispute must concern the scope of a legal right or obligation, or a remedy in 
relation to a legal right or obligation.22  
The phrase ‘arising directly out of an investment’ requires that the dispute 
displays a sufficient nexus with the investment.23 A dispute that arises directly out of 
an investment can be contrasted to disputes over rights and obligations of general 
application, for example, non-compliance with tax laws.24 Notwithstanding, if 
general rights or obligations specifically impact an investment, this criterion is 
fulfilled.25 Consequently, claims that are peripheral, or that indirectly relate to an 
investment, will be considered to fall outside of ICSID’s jurisdiction.26  
The third restriction on ICSID jurisdiction is the existence of an investment. 
The term ‘investment’ remains undefined by ICSID, as what constitutes an 
investment is for the parties to determine, and comprises an element of party consent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Fedax N.V. and The Republic of Venezuela ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997 [15]; Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, 17 June 
2005 [20]. See OE Garcia-Bolivar, 'Foreign Investment Disputes under ICSID: A Review of its 
Decisions on Jurisdiction' (2004) 5 Journal of World Investment and Trade 187, 190; Y Kryvoi, 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International 2010) 55. 
21 ICSID, (accessed 15 July 2013) (Report of Executive Directors) (n 2) 44. See, for example Lanco 
International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision: 
Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, 8 December 1998 [47]. 
22 ICSID, (accessed 15 July 2013) (Report of Executive Directors) (n 2) 44. See Fedax N.V. and The 
Republic of Venezuela (n 20) [15]; Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004 [106]; AES Corporation v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, 26 April 2005 [43] – [44]; M.C.I. Power Group, L.C. and New 
Turbine ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award, 31 July 2007 [63]; Abaclat and Others (Case formerly 
known as Giovanna a Beccara and Others) v. Argentine Republic (n 10) [255]; Broches (n 10) 168; 
Kryvoi (n 20) 55. 
23 This requirement does not refer to the direct nature of the investment but rather that the dispute 
stems directly from an investment. See Fedax N.V. and The Republic of Venezuela (n 20) [25] – [29]; 
Ceskoslovenska obchodní banka, a.s. v. Slovak Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999 [71] – [74]; Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004 [150]; Garcia-Bolivar (n 20) 
190; Kryvoi (n 20) 56. This is in contrast to general commercial disputes which fall outside of 
ICSID’s jurisdiction. See e.g. Fedax N.V. and The Republic of Venezuela (n 20) [28]. 
24 See Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 
Second Arbitral Award, 31 May 1990 available at 1 ICSID Reports 463. 
25 Kryvoi (n 20) 56. See, for example CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic of Argentina 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003 [27], 
[68]; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine 
Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2006 [31]; Total S.A. v. The 
Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, 25 August 2006 [62]. 
26 Garcia-Bolivar (n 20) 190; Grusic (n 12) 82. 
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to arbitration.27 The consequences of leaving the definition of investment to the 
parties are considered below. 
When a dispute meets these three criteria, ICSID has subject matter 
jurisdiction over the dispute. However, it might not have jurisdiction over all 
disputes of this nature, as party consent is still required.  
4.2.2 Party Consent 
State consent under the ICSID Convention is necessary to establish the jurisdiction 
of ICSID, but does not generate any legal relationship between the foreign investor 
and the host state. The establishment of this connection is dependent on the terms of 
the consent directly agreed between the disputing parties.28  
 Consent to ICSID arbitration between the disputing parties may arise in a 
variety of manners. The most common form of consent is by way of IIA,29 in which 
the host state makes a standing offer30 to all foreign investors covered by the IIA, to 
resolve disputes by way of ICSID arbitration.31 Should a foreign investor wish to 
accept this standing offer, they can register a claim against the host state at ICSID.32 
The means by which consent is generated will not impact the jurisdiction of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 ICSID, (accessed 15 July 2013) (Report of Executive Directors) (n 2) 44. See Broches (n 10) 168; 
Grusic (n 20) 82; Kryvoi (n 20) 57. 
28 C Reiner and C Schreuer, 'Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration' in P-M Dupuy, 
F Francioni and E-U Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and 
Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009) 83; U Kriebaum, 'Human Rights of the Population of the 
Host State in International Investment Arbitration' (2009) 10 Journal of World Investment and Trade 
653, 660. 
29 C Schreuer, 'The Future of Investment Arbitration' in MJ Arsanjani and others (eds), Looking to the 
Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2010) 790; C Schreuer, 'Consent to Arbitration' <http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/con_arbitr_89.pdf> 
accessed 15 July 2013 6. 
30 Schreuer, (accessed 15 July 2013) (n 29) 7; J Crawford, 'Treaty and Contract in Investment 
Arbitration' (2008) 24 Arbitration International 351, 360; PM Blyschak, 'State Consent, Investor 
Interests and the Future of Investment Arbitration: Reanalyzing the Jurisdiction of Investor-State 
Tribunals in Hard Cases' (2009) 9 Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law 99, 133; G 
Laborde, 'The Case for Host State Claims in Investment Arbitration' (2010) 1 Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement 97, 112; Y Kryvoi, 'Counterclaims in Investor-State Arbitration' (2012) 21 
Minnesota Journal of International Law 216, 226. 
31 Schreuer, (accessed 15 July 2013) (n 29) 7; Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005 [76]. 
32 Schreuer, 'The Future of Investment Arbitration'  (n 29) 790 – 791; Schreuer, (accessed 15 July 
2013) (n 29) 8; Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 
September 2003 [12.2] and [12.3]; CEMEX Caracas Investments B.V. and CEMEX Caracas II 
Investments B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela ICSID Case No. ARB/08/15, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 30 December 2010 [58]. 
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ICSID tribunal,33 however, the terms of the consent given will be definitive in 
relation to whether an ICSID tribunal has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular 
dispute. This is because party consent delimits what elements of the dispute an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal can hear.34 
The parties to the dispute cannot extend ICSID’s jurisdiction under the 
ICSID Convention (even by agreement).35 Yet, the consent of the disputing parties 
may further restrict subject matter jurisdiction within the existing limits of the ICSID 
Convention.36 Thus, the scope of the parties’ consent must either align with ICSID’s 
jurisdiction or take a narrower stance.  
The first opportunity for the parties to further limit ICSID’s jurisdiction is 
through the definition of an investment. Enabling the parties to define what 
constitutes an investment permits the exclusion of certain types of disputes from 
ICSID arbitration in advance,37 thereby limiting the jurisdiction of the ICSID arbitral 
tribunal. 
 In addition to defining what amounts to an investment, the parties determine 
the nature of investment disputes that they consent to bring before ICSID arbitration. 
States usually take one of four approaches when making an offer to arbitrate through 
the auspices of ICSID. The most common approach in IIAs is to for a state to agree 
to permit ‘all’ or ‘any’ investment disputes to ICSID arbitration.38 The second 
approach is more limited, and restricts claims to three sources, being the investment 
authorisation, the investment agreement or the IIA.39 The third approach limits 
subject matter jurisdiction to IIAs alone,40 whilst the final type of host state offer to 
arbitrate limits subject matter jurisdiction to disputes over the quantum of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Award on 
Jurisdiction, 16 July 2001 [31]; Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia (n 31) [75] – [76]. 
34 PSEG Global Inc., the North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve 
Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 4 
June 2004 [139]. 
35 Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on 
Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004 [50]; Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v. Government of Malaysia 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 17 May 2007 [55]; TSA Spectrum de Argentina 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award, 19 December 2008 [134]; Phoenix 
Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009 [74].  
36 Douglas (n 4) 234 – 235. 
37 Kryvoi, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (n 20) 57. 
38 Douglas (n 4) 234. 
39 Ibid 234 – 235. 
40 Ibid 235. 
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compensation following an expropriation.41 Consequently, party consent can further 
restrict the limited jurisdiction of ICSID set out in Article 25 ICSID Convention.  
4.2.3 Preliminary Conclusion 
The subject matter jurisdiction of ICSID arbitration is limited in scope by Article 25 
ICSID Convention. This determines whether ICSID is able to conduct the arbitral 
proceedings. It may be further limited by the parties, both by their definition of 
investment, and the scope of their consent to ICSID arbitration. Thus, should the 
parties take a restrictive approach when defining investment, or regarding what 
disputes they agree to arbitrate, the jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal will be 
limited accordingly.  
4.3 ‘IN ACCORDANCE WITH HOST STATE LAW’ CLAUSES 
A host state can try to exploit the limited scope of the ICSID arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction using a foreign investor’s breach of international human rights law to 
exclude the foreign investor’s claims. The first means by which this might be 
achieved is through the operation of ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses. 
To function as effectively as possible, ideally a host state human rights defence 
will need to be established independently of express provisions in IIAs but still be 
based on ICSID arbitral practice.42  ‘In accordance with host state law’ clauses 
merge these requirements. They are provisions contained in IIAs, but do not set out 
an explicit host state human rights defence in the IIA. Their effect is to expressly 
exclude investments that do not comply with the domestic law of the host state from 
the protection of the IIA on the basis of consent to arbitration, thereby denying the 
jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal.43 In effect, by denying the jurisdiction of 
an ICSID arbitral tribunal, ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses have the 
potential to operate as a procedural host state human rights defence.  
To date, ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses have primarily been 
applied to investments that are illegal in nature, or have been brought about through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid.  
42 See Part A, section 3.5. 
43 Moloo and Khachaturian (n 9) 1488; SW Schill, 'Illegal Investments in International Arbitration' 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979734 accessed 25 March 2012 5, 7. 
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illegal conduct, such as bribery and corruption.44 However, in principle, there is no 
reason to limit their application to this context, and they can equally apply to 
investments that involve violations of international human rights law that 
simultaneously breach host state law. Should this route be possible, this could 
provide an acceptable approach by which a host state can exclude ICSID jurisdiction 
over the foreign investor’s claims on the basis of their violations of international 
human rights law.  
‘In accordance with host state law’ clauses are express provisions requiring 
investments to be in conformity with the domestic law of the host state.45 The clause 
can be found in an IIA in either the definition of an investment,46 or as a stand-alone 
provision. An example of the definitional form of an ‘in accordance with host state 
law’ clause is Article I(2) of the Argentina – United States BIT which defines 
investment as follows: 
The term ‘investment’ shall mean every kind of asset, including property 
and rights of any kind acquired or effected in accordance with the laws 
of the receiving State, including, although not exclusively: …47 
Stand-alone clauses addressing the legality of investments often relate to the 
admission of investments48 and are usually combined with a limitation on the 
application of the IIA to existing investments that conform with host state law.49 
Therefore, a stand alone clause may relate to issues of jurisdiction such as Article 9 
of the 2005 German Model BIT which states: 
This Treaty shall also apply to investments made prior to its entry into 
force by investors of either Contracting State in the territory of the other 
Contracting State consistent with the latter’s legislation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See for example Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador (n 16); Fraport AG Frankfurt 
Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 16 
August 2007; Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational 
State of Bolivia (n 6). 
45 Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, 6 February 
2008 [104] - [105]. 
46 A Carlevaris, 'The Conformity of Investments with the Law of the Host State and the Jurisdiction of 
International Tribunals' (2008) 9 Journal of World Investment and Trade 35, 36. 
47 Emphasis added. See also Article 1(1) of the Italy- Morocco BIT, which provides ‘The term 
‘investment’ designates all categories of assets invested, after the coming into force of the present 
agreement, by a natural or legal person, including the Government of a Contracting Party, in 
accordance with the laws and regulations of the aforementioned party.’ 
48 Carlevaris (n 46) 37; Schill (n 43) 2. 
49 Schill (n 43) 2. 
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Despite differences in wording and location within the IIA, both forms of ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ clauses have been interpreted uniformly by arbitral 
tribunals.50 Consequently, should either form of an ‘in accordance with host state 
law’ clause be present in an IIA, it could be used as the basis for a host state human 
rights defence.  
To function as an effective procedural host state human rights defence, ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ clauses must preclude the claims made by a foreign 
investor. ‘In accordance with host state law’ clauses accomplish this by defining the 
scope of investments, or restricting the application of the IIA, to investments in 
compliance with host state law. Hence, these clauses deprive investments that do not 
fall within these terms from the protection of the IIA.51 In doing so, they also act as 
limitations on the terms of the host state’s consent to ICSID arbitration.52 By 
restricting the host state’s consent, the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal is limited to 
those situations in which an investment is in compliance with the host state’s 
domestic law.53 Given the fundamental role of consent in ICSID arbitration, this 
aspect of ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses complies with the requirement 
that a host state human rights defence be based on ICSID arbitral practice. It is 
important to note that ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses only affect the 
terms of the party consent and do not influence an ICSID tribunal’s jurisdiction by 
reference to Article 25 ICSID Convention.54 As a result, in the absence of an ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ clause, any issues of illegality are more likely to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Carlevaris (n 46) 37; Schill, (n 43) 3 – 4, 5.  
51 AJ Menaker, 'The Determinative Impact of Fraud and Corruption on Investment Arbitrations' 
(2010) 25 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 67, 69; Schill (n 43) 2. See Quiborax 
S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of Bolivia (n 6) [266]. 
52 Schill (n 43) 6. See for example Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador (n 16) [246]; 
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (n 44) [340]; 
Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. Georgia ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 July 
2007 [182]; Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen (n 45) [104]; Quiborax S.A., Non 
Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of Bolivia(n 6) [258]. 
53 Moloo and Khachaturian (n 9) 1488; Schill (n 43) 5, 7. For comparison, the dissent of Cremades in 
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Bernardo M. Cremades, 16 August 2007 did not view the 
definition of investment as a matter of jurisdiction based on the specific terms of the definition [10.2] 
– [14]. 
54 Carlevaris (n 46) 39; Schill (n 43) 6; Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/20, Award, 14 July 2010 [108].  
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considered as issues of admissibility or on the merits, as either a defence, or as 
contributing to the investor’s own loss.55  
In the absence of an ‘in accordance with host state law’ clause, the host state 
human rights defence would not be available to initially deny the jurisdiction of an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal. As not every IIA will contain an ‘in accordance with host 
state law’ clause, this may limit the widespread use of a host state human rights 
defence, unless these clauses are universally adopted in all future IIAs so as to 
enable a host state human rights defence to become operative when these IIAs enter 
into force. 
Should a host state human rights defence be based on ‘in accordance with 
host state law’ clauses, its application would require consideration of both 
international and domestic law. By requiring a determination of the validity of the 
investment with the host state’s domestic law, an ‘in accordance with host state law’ 
clause, despite being an international obligation, is reliant on principles of domestic 
law to function.56 In effect, the obligation in international law is measured by 
reference to the domestic law standards of the host state. This is in contrast to the 
usual approach taken to the term ‘investment’, which requires that its meaning is 
established by reference to international law alone.57 The Salini tribunal explained 
that the use of the term ‘investment’ in the context of an ‘in accordance with host 
state law’ clause: 
[R]efers to the validity of the investment and not its definition. More 
specifically, it seeks to prevent the Bilateral Investment Treaty from 
protecting investment that should not be protected, particularly because 
they would be illegal.58 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 GA Alvarez and S Montt, 'Investments, Fair and Equitable Treatment, and the Principle of "Respect 
for the Integrity of the Law of the Host State": Toward a Jurisprudence of "Modesty" in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration' in MJ Arsanjani and others (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International 
Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 589 – 590; Schill (n 43) 7. 
56 See Alasdair Ross Anderson et al v. Republic of Costa Rica ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, 
Award, 19 May 2010 [57]. 
57 See, for example Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, 21 March 2007 [82]. See 
also Republic of Italy v. Republic of Cuba Preliminary Award, 15 March 2005 [80]. 
58 Salini Costruttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 July 2001 [46]. 
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This approach has been adopted by subsequent tribunals faced with requirements of 
legality within the definition of investment.59 The use of domestic law to determine 
the legality of the investment is justified on the basis of renvoi. Judge Morelli, in his 
separate opinion in Barcelona Traction,60 explained the relationship between 
international and domestic law in the following terms: 
In reality, no subordination of international responsibility, as such, to the 
provisions of municipal law is involved; the point is rather that the very 
existence of the international obligation depends on a state of affairs 
created in municipal law, though this is not so by virtue of municipal law 
but, on the contrary, by virtue of the international rule itself, which to 
that end refers to the law of the State.61 
This stance has been adopted in ICSID arbitrations.62 As such, an ‘in accordance 
with host state law’ clause can only be invoked in ICSID arbitration if the foreign 
investor’s conduct breaches the host state’s municipal law. Therefore, an ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ clause can only give rise to a host state human rights 
defence if the host state has incorporated the terms of international human rights law 
into its domestic legal regime.  
International human rights law obligations sourced from customary 
international law are likely to bind states without the need for their transformation 
into domestic laws.63 Nonetheless, the likelihood of domestic laws supporting 
international human rights law obligations from non-customary sources may depend 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Schill (n 43) 3. See for example Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine [84]; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve 
Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 
November 2005 [109]; Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador (n 16) [187]; Railroad 
Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Second Decision 
on Objections to Jurisdiction, 18 May 2010 [140]. 
60 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Judgment) [1970] ICJ Rep 3. 
61 Ibid Separate Opinion of Judge Morelli 234.  
62 See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (n 44) [394] 
‘The BIT is, to be sure, an international instrument, but its Articles 1 and 2 and Article 2 of the 
Protocol, effect a renvoi to national law; a mechanism which is hardly unusual in treaties and, indeed, 
occurs in the Washington Convention. A failure to comply with the national law to which the refers 
will have an international legal effect.’ In contrast to this stance, the tribunal in Inceysa Vallisoletana 
S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador (n 16), after initially considering the application of domestic law, 
reverted back to international law as the appropriate standard on the basis that the applicable BIT 
formed part of the domestic law and therefore an international law standard should apply. The 
tribunal stated at [220] ‘the BIT, as valid law in El Salvador, is the primary and special legislation this 
Tribunal must analyse to determine whether Inceysa’s investment was made in accordance with the 
legal system of that Nation.’ The reference in the BIT to ‘generally recognized rules and principles of 
International Law’ meant that the tribunal could refer to principles of public policy, which it based its 
decision on. However, this approach is not strictly necessary in light of the terms of the ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ clause. 
63 MN Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 166; J Crawford, 
Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 67. 
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on a variety of factors, including the level of development of the host state,64 its 
constitutional structure,65 and whether the human right in question is sourced from 
the ICCPR or the ICESCR, and as such, needs to be implemented immediately or 
over a period of time.66 If the host state has failed to adopt certain non-customary 
international human rights law obligations into its domestic law, they will not be 
able to invoke a host state human rights defence on the basis of these obligations. 
Further, each host state is likely to have adopted different variations of non-
customary international human rights law obligations into its domestic law. 
Consequently, at least for non-customary international human rights law obligations, 
the implicit reliance on domestic law required by ‘in accordance with host state law’ 
clauses could act as limitation on the universality of a host state human rights 
defence. As the host state human rights defence is still capable of functioning, albeit 
not in a universal manner, this factor alone does not preclude ‘in accordance with 
host state law’ clauses from forming the foundation of a host state defence. 
Not only does the international human rights law obligation need to be 
sourced in the domestic law of the host state, the foreign investor must also have 
acted contrary to its terms. A foreign investor’s conduct may violate domestic law 
with differing degrees of seriousness. Not all breaches will be sufficient to give rise 
to the use of ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses. Therefore, the operation of 
a host state human rights defence based on ‘in accordance with host state law’ 
clauses is contingent on the extent to which the municipal provisions have been 
breached.  
The threshold to determine what forms of conduct might be classified as 
illegal for the purposes of an ‘in accordance with host state law clause’ is still being 
developed through jurisprudence. However, minor breaches of law are unlikely to 
amount to a determination of illegality sufficient enough to remove investments from 
the protection of IIAs.67 In Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine,68 the host state argued that 
minor defects in documentation establishing the investment precluded the tribunal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Icelandic Human Rights Centre, 'Implementation' <http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/humanrightsconceptsideasandfora/theconceptsofhumanrightsan
introduction/implementation/> accessed 21 July 2013. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine (n 59) [86]; Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen (n 45) [119]. 
68 Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine (n 59). 
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from exercising its jurisdiction over the investment dispute. It was not alleged by the 
host state that the investment activities were ‘illegal per se’,69 and the host state 
registered and permitted the investments to operate for a period of eight years.70 On 
this basis, the tribunal stated: 
Even if we were able to confirm the Respondent’s allegations, which 
would require a searching examination of minute details of 
administrative procedures in Ukrainian law, to exclude an investment on 
the basis of such minor error would be inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the Treaty.71 
Thus, minor defects giving rise to technical illegalities are not likely to be sufficient 
to give rise to a breach of an in accordance with host state law’ clause and prevent an 
ICSID tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction.72 As a result, minor violations of 
international human rights law by a foreign investor, for example, not providing a 
sufficient amount of paid leave for workers, are unlikely to result in subject matter 
jurisdiction being denied by an ICSID arbitral tribunal. To prevent host states 
arguing that minor defects should preclude ICSID jurisdiction, some tribunals have 
suggested that ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses should be interpreted in a 
liberal way to minimise the impact of errors made by a foreign investor in good 
faith.73  
 Conversely, a foreign investor’s deliberate avoidance of the host state’s legal 
requirements has led to ICSID arbitral tribunals to reach the conclusion that they do 
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. In Inceysa v El Salvador,74 the 
foreign investor fraudulently misrepresented its financial position, the identity and 
experience of a strategic partner, provided false information regarding an individual 
with key responsibilities and failed to disclose a connection with another company 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ibid [86]. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Carlevaris (n 46) 47; Menaker (n 51) 70; Moloo and Khachaturian (n 9) 1494 -1495; Schill (n 43)  
9. See also Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine (n 59) [97]; Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen (n 
45) [116] – [117], [119]; Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, 
Award, 8 November 2010 [297]. 
73 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (n 44) [396]; 
Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen (n 45) [116]. In contrast see Quiborax S.A., Non 
Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of Bolivia (n 6) [264] where a 
balanced interpretation is advocated. 
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during a public tender process.75 The ICSID arbitral tribunal considered whether it 
was possible to limit party consent to legal investments, and after deciding it was 
possible, interpreted the ‘in accordance with host state law’ clause to have this 
effect.76 Unusually, rather than examining the municipal law of El Salvador to 
determine the legality (or otherwise) of the act, the tribunal reviewed the foreign 
investor’s conduct against principles recognised under international law such as the 
principles of good faith, public policy, unlawful enrichment and the principle nemo 
auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans77.78 The tribunal found that because the 
investment had been procured in breach of these principles, it did not comply with 
the ‘in accordance with host state law’ clause in the El Salvador-Spain BIT.79 
Similarly, in Fraport v Philippines,80 the investor had fraudulently bid for the 
investment by secretly structuring its investment so that it exceeded the maximum 
shareholding permitted by a foreign investor according to the host state’s law.81 This 
approach was adopted by the foreign investor despite warnings from local advisors 
that the arrangements were in breach of Philippines law.82 Following the 
commencement of the investment, irregularities were discovered in the bid 
documents by the Philippines government and, on the basis of the irregularities, the 
Philippines Supreme Court set aside the investment agreement for being null and 
void on the grounds of public policy.83 The investment was expropriated and the 
Philippines paid compensation.84 Meanwhile, the foreign investor had filed an ICSID 
claim.85 Despite advocating for a cautious application of the ‘in accordance with host 
state law’ clause so as not to disfavour the foreign investor,86 the tribunal held that: 
[T]he violation could not be deemed inadvertent and irrelevant to the 
investment. It was central to the success of the project. The awareness 
that the arrangements were not in accordance with Philippine law was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ibid Chapter IV. 
76 Ibid [186] – [206]. See also Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. 
Plurinational State of Bolivia (n 6) [258]. 
77 This maxim translates as ‘nobody can be heard recording his own turpitude’.  
78 Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador (n 16) [230] – [264]. 
79 Ibid [264]. 
80 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (n 44). 
81 Ibid [120], [130], [132], [135]. 
82 Ibid [119], [120] [309]. 
83 Ibid [217]. 
84 Ibid [273]. 
85 Ibid [6]. 
86 Ibid [396]. 
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manifested by the decision to make the arrangements secretly, and to try 
and make them effective under foreign law.87 
Arbitrators found no evidence of state awareness (preventing an estoppel claim)88 
and concluded, by a majority, that the ICSID tribunal lacked jurisdiction.89 The lack 
of both transparency by the investor and respect for host law were deemed to be 
fundamental to the investment regime.90 The language of the BIT was unequivocal in 
this matter.91 This award has subsequently been annulled on the basis that the foreign 
investor was not given the opportunity to respond to evidence introduced after the 
conclusion of the hearing.92 In light of the reason for the annulment, and the 
rejection of claims that the award failed to state the reasons for its decision, it is 
suggested that the approach taken by this tribunal was correct. 
 Should ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses be used as a basis for a 
host state human rights defence, the violations of domestic human rights provisions 
must be serious enough to justify denying ICSID jurisdiction. The assumption that a 
host state human rights defence will only operate in relation to grave or persistent 
human rights violations by a foreign investor aligns with current ICSID 
jurisprudence on this point. These instances are the most egregious cases of human 
rights violations. Therefore, not only it is politically more acceptable to host states to 
take a limited approach to the host state human rights defence,93 ICSID tribunals are 
also more likely to support the application of the defence in this manner. This factor 
would support the use of an ‘in accordance with host state law’ clause as the basis of 
the host state human rights defence. 
A host state human rights defence centres on the conduct of the foreign 
investor. Despite this, the host state could be implicated in the human rights 
violations. This is likely to influence the success of a host state human rights defence 
based on an ‘in accordance with host state law’ clause. This is because host state 
awareness of, or involvement in the illegality itself, will preclude it from being able 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Ibid [398]. 
88 Ibid [346] – [347]. 
89 Ibid [398] – [401], [404]. 
90 Ibid [398]. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application for Annulment of Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services 
Worldwide, 23 December 2010. 
93 See section 3.3.2 above on host state reluctance. 
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to rely on the ‘in accordance with host state law’ clause. In Kardassopoulos v 
Georgia,94 it was held that given that the state owned enterprises had exceeded their 
powers, the ‘in accordance with host state law’ clause would not be applicable. It 
was explained that illegality: 
Relates to the investor’s actions in making the investment. It does not 
allow a state to preclude an investor from seeking protection under the 
BIT on the ground that its own actions are illegal under its own laws. In 
other words, a host State cannot avoid jurisdiction under the BIT by 
invoking its own failure to comply with domestic law.95 
Further, state knowledge and acceptance of illegality may give rise to an argument of 
estoppel.96 In Kardassopolous, Georgia approved the investments, and in doing so 
gave assurance to the foreign investor that the investment was in compliance with 
domestic law.97 The Tribunal held that legitimate expectations can arise from the 
statements and conduct of the host state.98  
 This aspect of ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses creates more 
challenges in the context of a host state human rights defence. Host states will be 
aware of human rights violations within their territory, as they need to act in 
response to violations in order to comply with their international human rights law 
obligations.99 However, the assumption that a host state human rights defence would 
only apply in situations of grave or persistent human rights violations would align 
with this requirement. In instances of unexpected grave human rights violations, host 
states would not have awareness of any breaches until the violations have taken 
place. As a result, the host state is acting in accordance with its international human 
rights obligations and it’s own actions are not illegal (unless it chooses not to take 
action in response). If persistent breaches are involved, that have been consistently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. Georgia (n 52).  
95 Ibid [182] (emphasis in the original). 
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prosecuted by the host state, no argument as to acceptance, or the creation of 
legitimate expectations can be raised as the host state has indicated the unacceptable 
nature of the human rights violations. In contrast, actions by the host state indicating 
their acceptance of human rights violations may preclude them from raising a host 
state human rights defence. Therefore, the conduct of the host state becomes 
paramount when considering whether the defence remains available under an ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ clause, and host states will need to be aware of the 
degree to which they might have contributed to the violation of international human 
rights law. This approach accords with the characterisation of the host state human 
rights defence discussed in section 3.3.2, which requires that a host state take into 
account those affected by the human rights violation and consider the extent of their 
own contribution to the breach of international human rights law to avoid the risk of 
dual liability. 
A further consideration for the development of a host state human rights 
defence is that the operation of ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses has been 
limited to violations of domestic law that directly relate to the investment in 
question. This mirrors the subject matter jurisdiction set out in Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention.100 The tribunal in Saba Fakes v Turkey set out its justifications 
for this limitation: 
The Tribunal also considers that it would run counter to the object and 
purpose of investment protection treaties to deny substantive protection 
to those investments that would violate domestic laws that are unrelated 
to the very nature of investment regulation. In the event that an investor 
breaches a requirement of domestic law, a host State can take appropriate 
action against such investor within the framework of its domestic 
legislation. However, unless specifically stated in the investment treaty 
under consideration, a host State should not be in a position to rely on its 
domestic legislation beyond the sphere of investment regime to escape 
its international undertakings vis-à-vis investments made in its 
territory.101 
Whilst it is a generally accepted principle that a state cannot rely on its domestic law 
to escape its international obligations,102 in the case of international human rights 
law, slightly different considerations apply. The invocation of domestic law forms 
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101 Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey (n 54) [119]. 
102 J Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press 2002) Article 3. See Shaw (n 63) 782. 
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part of a state’s international obligations under international human rights law to 
ensure compliance with the human rights obligations in question,103 including 
progressive rights such as those sourced from the ICESCR.104 Failure to apply 
domestic provisions would violate international human rights law. Thus, the direct 
link between the international and the national obligation distinguishes human rights 
obligations from other domestic laws. Hence, the use of domestic law in this manner 
is not an issue of escaping liability. The issue becomes one of regime conflict 
between an international obligation that must be manifested as a municipal law 
(international human rights law) and international investment law. Whilst ‘[l]egal 
action will also be possible in competent domestic tribunals’,105 which may avoid 
this conflict in ICSID arbitration, this course of action is pre-emptive in cases of 
unexpected gross violations, and has been ineffective in cases of persistent breaches. 
Consequently, ICSID arbitration provides the most appropriate forum to consider 
these matters. On this basis, a similar approach to that used in Saba Fakes should not 
be employed in relation to a host state human rights defence, as the purpose of the 
host state human rights defence is to address this type regime conflict. Provided that 
a proximate link exists between the conduct of the foreign investor and the violation 
of international human rights law, this should be sufficient. This can be determined 
on a case-by-case basis by examining the factual and causal relationship between the 
acts of the foreign investor and the specific human rights violations. 
The timing of the foreign investor’s violation of human rights can also 
impact the operation of a host state human rights defence founded upon an ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ clause. Relevant breaches of domestic law for the 
purposes of ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses have been limited to those 
that affect the admission of the investment, and not its continued operation once 
admitted.106 As a result, the foreign investor’s illegal conduct must have occurred 
prior to the commencement of the investment. This was not initially an express 
requirement. In Salini v Morocco, the tribunal stated that ‘whether one looks to the 
pre-contractual stage or that corresponding to the performance of the contract for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'International Human Rights Law' 
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104 O De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 461. 
105 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines Cremades dissent 
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services, it has never been shown that Italian companies infringed the laws and 
regulations of the Kingdom of Morocco’.107 These terms would appear to permit on-
going breaches of domestic law throughout the operation of the investment.  
Although the Salini v Morocco tribunal did not close the door to illegality 
after the commencement of the investment, this option has subsequently been 
denied. In relation to the ‘in accordance with host state law’ clause in Fraport v 
Philippines, the tribunal limited the application to legality at the time the investment 
was initiated:  
Although this contention is not relevant to the analysis of the problem 
which the Tribunal has before it, namely the entry of the investment and 
not the way it was subsequently conducted, the Tribunal would note that 
this part of the Respondent’s interpretation appears to be a forced 
construction of the pertinent provisions in the context of the entire 
Treaty. The language of both Articles 1 and 2 of the BIT emphasizes the 
initiation of the investment. Moreover the effective operation of the BIT 
regime would appear to require that jurisdictional compliance be limited 
to the initiation of the investment. If, at the time of the initiation of the 
investment, there has been compliance with the law of the host state, 
allegations by the host state of the violation of its law in the course of the 
investment, as a justification for state action with respect to the 
investment, might be a defense to claimed substantive violations of the 
BIT, but could not deprive a tribunal acting under the authority of the 
BIT of its jurisdiction.108 
This position was endorsed in Hamester v Ghana where the tribunal stated that, 
under the provision in question, ‘the legality of the creation of the investment is a 
jurisdictional issue; the legality of the investor’s conduct during the life of the 
investment is a merits issue’.109 A similar interpretation was given to the ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ clause in Saba Fakes v Turkey.110 Most recently in 
the Teinver v Argentina and Quiborax v Bolivia awards, the temporal limits of the 
terms of the ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses were re-emphasised, limiting 
their application to pre-establishment illegality.111  
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 The assumptions employed for the purposes of this thesis limit the scope of 
the host state human rights defence to situations in which investments are already in 
existence. Therefore, the temporal limitations raised in these awards precludes the 
application of ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses as a basis for a host state 
human rights defence. This requirement does not automatically prevent human rights 
violations from being deemed to be illegal conduct for the purposes of such a clause. 
However, the human rights violations will need to be associated with the 
introduction of the investment. Given the reduced role of the investor in the 
jurisdiction of the host state at this point of time, there are only limited situations in 
which this may be applicable. In light of this limitation, the use of ‘in accordance 
with host state law’ clauses is not an appropriate basis for a host state human rights 
defence in the terms being considered in this thesis.  
4.3.1 Preliminary Conclusion 
‘In accordance with host state law’ clauses provide a hybrid form of the key 
attributes sought in a host state human rights defence. Whilst being express 
provisions of an IIA, they rely on clearly established ICSID arbitral practice 
regarding the significance of party consent. Their effect is to deny the jurisdiction of 
an ICSID arbitral tribunal, thereby offering an avenue for the establishment of 
procedural host state human rights defence.  
 The application of ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses demonstrate 
some potential for their translation into a host state human rights defence. Most host 
states will have domestic legal provisions that reflect the majority of international 
human rights law obligations. Variance in provisions between different jurisdictions 
could undermine the universality of the defence, but this does not prevent this 
procedural basis from being adopted. The use of ‘in accordance with host state law’ 
clauses is particularly suited to large scale human rights violations. These are 
envisaged as being the most appropriate violations for the invocation of a host state 
human rights defence. Further, host state involvement in the human rights violation 
may preclude the desirability of claiming the defence, which aligns with the political 
considerations that host states should consider when arguing the defence before an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal. Notwithstanding, the operation of ‘in accordance with host 
state law’ clauses does not fit easily with the requirement that general domestic law 
 
	  
	   	   128 
cannot be invoked to deny jurisdiction. Whilst this limitation can be overcome, the 
need for the human rights violation to have occurred prior to the establishment of the 
investment undermines the desirability of ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses 
as the basis of the host state human rights defence. The potential factual scenarios 
that a host state human rights defence is seeking to address encompasses post-
establishment breaches of international human rights law. Although initially 
extending to include such conduct, ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses have 
subsequently been precluded from operating in these instances. This factor 
significantly detracts from the suitability of ‘in accordance with host state law’ 
clauses forming the legal basis of a host state human rights defence.  
Although this reasoning may seem unduly restrictive, the need for a solid 
foundation for the defence is paramount if a host state human rights defence is to be 
accepted as a legitimate defence in ICSID arbitration. Attempting to establish a host 
state human rights on a basis that has been expressly excluded by a series of ICSID 
arbitral tribunals would undermine the credibility of the host state human rights 
defence.  Further, an approach that ignored established legal principles in favour of 
an idealised understanding of the law would be contrary to positivist theory. Both of 
these aspects are fundamental to the future success of a host state human rights 
defence. Consequently, ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses will not be used 
as the foundation of the host state human rights defence in this thesis. 
4.4 ADMISSIBILITY 
A second procedural basis for a host state human rights is to rely on the same 
violations of international human rights law, but having established jurisdiction, to 
declare the foreign investor’s claim as inadmissible. Similarly to ‘in accordance with 
host state law’ clauses, the situations in which this outcome might be achieved are 
circumscribed. Nevertheless, the nature of admissibility may overcome the 
difficulties encountered with ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses.  
A human rights host state defence based on ‘in accordance with host state 
law’ clauses would directly impact the scope of the host state’s consent to arbitrate, 
and as a result delimit the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal. In contrast, should a host 
state human rights defence be founded on admissibility, it would focus not on 
whether an ICSID tribunal can hear the claim, but instead, whether it should hear the 
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claim.112 This is because, whilst jurisdiction relates to the attributes of the tribunal 
and its powers, admissibility focuses on the attributes of the claim.113 Thus, a host 
state human rights defence based on admissibility would relate to the appropriateness 
of an ICSID tribunal hearing a claim after the jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal has 
been established.114  
Should a claim be deemed to be inadmissible, despite the existence of 
jurisdiction, the claim will be dismissed115 and it will not proceed to the merits 
stage.116 The distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility is often blurred, and 
occasionally misunderstood by tribunals,117 but there are implications that flow from 
whether a decision is based on jurisdiction or admissibility. Decisions based on 
jurisdictional grounds may be the subject of review, whereas decisions based on 
admissibility are final and non-reviewable.118 Therefore, by relying on admissibility 
as the basis of a host state human rights defence a host state could potentially dismiss 
a foreign investor’s claim without any further review. This provides a possible 
formulation for a second form of procedural host state human rights defence. 
To encourage ICSID tribunals to apply a host state human rights defence, it is 
desirable for it to be established by reference to accepted ICSID arbitral practice. 
Admissibility is not expressly catered for within ICSID arbitration.119 Neither the 
ICSID Convention nor the ICSID Arbitral Rules provide for the possibility for, or 
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the consequences of, admissibility.120 As a result, the legal basis for deeming claims 
to be inadmissible is found solely in ICSID arbitral practice. Given the lack of clear 
mandate for such an approach within the documents establishing ICSID arbitration, 
its acceptability as a suitable basis for the defence will depend on the criteria against 
which admissibility decisions are made. ICSID tribunals habitually consider the 
admissibility of claims by drawing from international public policy 
considerations.121 Hence, it is necessary to consider the framework in which this 
decision making process functions. 
 International (or transnational) public policy refers to public policy grounds 
that are applicable in all jurisdictions.122 In 1963, Judge Lagergren, rather 
controversially, made use of international public policy to deny jurisdiction as, in his 
view, the contract that formed the subject of the dispute involved corruption.123 He 
deemed the contract in question to be ‘contrary to good morals and to an 
international public policy common to the community of nations.’124 On this basis, 
he declined to exercise jurisdiction, as parties involved in ‘gross violations of good 
morals and international public policy’ forfeit their right to ask for assistance from 
courts and tribunals when seeking to settle disputes.125 Although this decision 
remains controversial given Judge Lagergren’s decision to decline to hear the matter 
on the basis of jurisdiction rather than admissibility,126 the general approach taken is 
reflected in current ICSID arbitral practice. At present, ICSID tribunals have 
considered admissibility in the context of illegal conduct, and more specifically, 
corruption.127 However, the Phoenix Action tribunal recognised that international 
public policy considerations were not restricted to corruption or bribery:   
To take an extreme example, nobody would suggest that ICSID 
protection should be granted to investments made in violation of the 
most fundamental rules of protection of human rights, like investments 
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made in pursuance of torture or genocide or in support of slavery or 
trafficking of human organs.128 
Therefore, there is no restriction that excludes admissibility decisions based on 
international public policy from being utilised as a host state human rights defence. 
In addition to having no basis in ICSID documentation, a host state human 
rights defence based on admissibility and international public policy also functions 
independently from IIAs.129 The justifications for the independent operation of 
international public policy vary, but are generally based on the need for foreign 
investors to evidence good faith and not take unfair advantage of host state offers of 
ICSID arbitration as a form of dispute resolution.130 Hence, it could be argued that 
international public policy reflects moral aspects of how parties should act in 
international dispute resolution, and as such, is based on a naturalist conception of 
public international law. Thus, the key justification for the use of international public 
policy runs the risk of undermining the positivist theoretical framework selected for 
the host state human rights defence. 
International public policy is intended to minimise the impact of ‘bad faith’ 
in public international law, and can be viewed as a means of asserting what conduct 
is acceptable based on naturalist thinking. Yet, the concept of good faith in public 
international law may also be found in law based on positivist sources. The notion of 
good faith is prevalent in the VCLT and its parallel customary international law 
obligations. For example, the idea of states acting in good faith has been accepted in 
the proposition of pacta sunt servanda, which requires good faith when complying 
with international obligations sourced from treaties.131 Further, Article 31(1) VCLT 
on treaty interpretation requires that interpretation be undertaken in good faith. 
Consequently, despite the moral undertones of good faith as found in international 
public policy, it has consensual origins in treaties designed to achieve a similar 
purpose. Given that the notion of good faith in both instances discussed above is to 
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avoid the abuse of public international law, and that states have consented to this 
principle in the VCLT, it is posited that good faith, as applied to international public 
policy, is also based on a positivist, consensual foundation. Therefore, the operation 
of international public policy could be used to establish a host state human rights 
defence. 
Having established the potential application of admissibility to issues relating 
to international human rights law, the manner in which international public policy is 
applied will be determinative of its effectiveness as the basis of a host state human 
rights defence. There have been several instances where international public policy 
has been applied in relation to the admissibility of claims in ICSID arbitration. The 
tribunal in Inceysa, when considering an ‘in accordance with host state law’ clause, 
rather than evaluating the foreign investor’s conduct against the domestic law of El 
Salvador, made a determination of illegality based on four ‘general principles of law’ 
(good faith, nemo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans, public policy and 
unlawful enrichment).132 In doing so, the tribunal cited a general principle of ‘good 
faith’ to be respected by investors when making investments,133 and additionally 
referred to principles ‘based on justice’.134 The tribunal in Fraport, also recognised 
the role of good faith,135 and justified its finding on the basis of the foreign investor’s 
conduct being a conscious violation of the local laws.136 As a result, investors are 
required to ‘conduct their relations with foreign investors in a transparent fashion’137 
including ‘respect for the integrity of the law of the host state’.138 In Plama, the 
tribunal relied on Inceysa with respect to the good faith element, which 
‘encompasses, inter alia, the obligation for the investor to provide the host State with 
relevant and material information concerning the investor and the investment.’139 
This position was justified by reference to the role of the Energy Charter Treaty, the 
applicable IIA in this instance, which was intended to ‘strengthen the rule of law on 
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energy issues’.140 In Phoenix Action, the tribunal additionally classified international 
public policy as a means of protecting the purpose of ICSID arbitration.141 The 
tribunal stressed that the investment needed to be made in good faith, and understood 
as a principle of public international law: 
[T]o prevent an abuse of the system of international investment 
protection under the ICSID Convention, in ensuring that only 
investments that are made in compliance with the international principle 
of good faith and do not attempt to misuse the system are protected.142 
While it is clear that the abuse of ICSID arbitration will not be tolerated based on 
principles of international public policy, the precise scope of these principles 
remains unclear. Each ICSID arbitral tribunal discussed above took a differing 
interpretation of what international public policy required. Consequently, a host state 
human rights defence relying on admissibility for its validity is subject to the 
imprecise nature of good faith in international public policy. This could undermine 
the ability of admissibility to provide a clear foundation for a host state human rights 
defence. As considered in Chapter 3, a host state human rights defence needs to 
utilise established ICSID arbitral practice to overcome difficulties with its rejection 
by those arbitrators that seek to minimise wider policy considerations. It is not clear 
whether arbitrators who adopt a ‘private’ approach to ICSID arbitration would 
readily endorse and apply a host state human rights defence established on such 
imprecise, policy driven grounds. In addition to the lack of clarity regarding the 
content of the standard, there is no clear basis in ICSID for pursuing such an 
approach. By linking international human rights law to international public policy in 
this manner, the challenges associated with its acceptance are likely to be 
compounded. Until a consistent body of well accepted practice develops, the use of 
international public policy as a basis for a host state human rights defence appears to 
be questionable, which could undermine the general acceptability and credibility of a 
host state human rights defence.  
 A further restriction on the use of admissibility as the basis of a host sate 
human rights defence might be the timing of the illegality. Similarly to ‘in 
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accordance with host state law’ clauses, it appears to be limited to the time that the 
investment is created. For example, the tribunals in Fraport and Hamester, both 
confirmed that any post-establishment breach of host state law was a matter for the 
merits of the dispute.143 However, these statements were made in the context of ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ clauses whose terminology was limited to illegality 
during the initiations of investments. Thus, it is not clear whether international 
public policy can be used as a basis to declare a claim as inadmissible in cases of 
post-establishment illegality. The decision of World Duty Free, whose jurisdiction 
was based on an investment agreement rather than IIA, indicates that international 
public policy may be constrained by the same limits as ‘in accordance with host state 
law’ clauses. When considering the payment of a bribe by the foreign investor to 
secure the investment, the tribunal stated that ‘Mr. Ali retained a free choice whether 
or not to invest in Kenya and whether or not to conclude the Agreement.’144 It has 
been suggested that ‘the latter statement suggests that one can draw a distinction 
between initial illegal conduct to obtain an investment and conduct engaged in 
subsequently to maintain an initially legal investment’145 given its focus on Mr Ali’s 
pre-investment conduct.146 If it cannot be clearly established that a host state human 
rights defence can apply in instances of post-establishment human rights violations, 
its scope of application will not be sufficiently wide for the purposes of this thesis. 
4.4.1 Preliminary Conclusion 
Admissibility, based on considerations of international public policy provides a 
framework on which a second form of procedural host state human rights defence 
could be established. Admissibility has the potential to apply to a foreign investor’s 
conduct that breaches international human rights law. This stance could be justified 
by reference to the foreign investor’s bad faith in commencing ICSID arbitration 
given their violation of international human rights law. Further, international public 
policy conforms to positivist theories. Irrespective, its terms are imprecise, in part 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (n 44) [345]; 
Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana (n 109) [128]. See Moloo and 
Khachaturian (n 9) 1486 – 1487; Yackee (n 123) 741. 
144 World Duty Free Co. Ltd v Republic of Kenya ICSID Case No ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006 
[178]. 
145 Schill (n 43) 27. 
146 A similar distinction was drawn in Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses 
Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. Argentine Republic (n 6) [330] – [331]. 
 
	  
	   	   135 
due to the lack of any clear basis in the documents that establish ICSID arbitration. 
As a host state human rights defence will need a strong foundation for it to be 
accepted and applied by ICSID arbitral tribunals, including those that adopt a 
‘private’ approach, basing the defence on admissibility contains an element of risk. 
When combined with the temporal aspect of when illegality must take place, this risk 
is enhanced. Therefore, this thesis does not seek to rely on admissibility as the 
framework for a host state human rights defence.  
 Rejecting a host state human rights defence on both procedural grounds may 
appear to be excessively cautious. Notwithstanding, given that a host state human 
rights defence is a novel addition to ICSID arbitration, and in light of the dominant 
‘private’ approach to ITA, a solid legal basis for the defence is necessary. It is 
further submitted that restraint should be exercised when denying a foreign investor 
a hearing on the merits, as the general desirability of taking this stance remains 
contested for a variety of policy reasons. 
4.5 POLICY CONCERNS REGARDING DENIAL OF JURISDICTION 
Both forms of procedural host state human rights defence raised in this chapter can 
be addressed prior to a full hearing on the merits of the foreign investor’s claim.147 
This provides a strategic advantage for the host state as their conduct will not be 
examined until these issues have been determined.148 However, it also has the 
potential to damage the credibility of the host state human rights defence and to 
undermine the legitimacy of ICSID arbitration more generally. In some cases, 
admissibility decisions may be considered together with arguments relating to the 
merits of the claim. However, admissibility remains a separate legal consideration to 
the merits149 and has the effect of denying the ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction 
without any form of review. Given these implications, this section considers some of 
the policy considerations that underlie the use of a procedural host state human rights 
defence. It is posited that these policy considerations further militate against the use 
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of ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses and admissibility as the foundation of 
a host state human rights defence. 
 The first policy concern relates to the nature of ICSID arbitral decisions on 
jurisdiction. Decisions over jurisdiction tend to be ‘binary’, in that either jurisdiction 
is established or denied.150 There is little scope for an ICSID arbitral award to 
generate a nuanced outcome. As a result, the jurisdictional stage of ICSID arbitral 
proceedings is not well suited to considering complex matters, like allegations of 
violations of international human rights law, which may need further investigation 
by the tribunal to determine their full impact on the proceedings.151 This may give 
rise to claims that a host state human rights defence based on ICSID jurisdiction 
does not exhibit procedural fairness.  
 Further, relying on illegality under an ‘in accordance with host state law’ 
clause at the jurisdictional stage of ICSID arbitration leads to an inequitable 
allocation of rights between the parties. As illegality features in the terms of host 
state consent, issues regarding the legality of the foreign investor’s conduct are 
matters of jurisdiction. In contrast, questions regarding host state illegal conduct 
remain to be determined on the merits,152 given that any illegality by the host state 
does not affect the terms of either party’s consent. Consequently, denying a foreign 
investor’s claim on a jurisdictional basis for reasons of illegality may have a 
‘draconian’ impact.153 Complex claims of illegality cannot be fully addressed at the 
jurisdictional stage of ICSID arbitration. If arbitrary decisions were to be 
consistently made when a host state human rights defence was argued on a 
procedural basis, ICSID arbitral tribunals are likely to be criticised and will 
potentially be reluctant to fully consider procedural human rights defences in the 
future. Therefore, the limitations of jurisdictional decisions could quickly undermine 
the continued operation of the defence. 
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 Policy concerns are also present in decisions relating to admissibility. Given 
that there are no procedural routes for challenging a decision on admissibility,154 
decisions with regard to violations of international human rights law heard at either a 
preliminary or merits stage of the ICSID proceedings should not be undertaken 
lightly. A means of managing the consequences of a decision on admissibility at a 
preliminary or jurisdictional stage of the hearing is to limit decisions on this ground 
to to ‘manifest’ or ‘egregious’ cases.155 The tribunal in the Phoenix Action award 
adopted this approach. The Tribunal stated: 
[T]here is no doubt that the requirement of conformity with law is 
important in respect of the access to the substantive provisions on the 
protection of the investor under the BIT. This access can be denied 
through a decision on the merits. However, if it is manifest that the 
investment has been performed in violation of the law, it is in line with 
judicial economy not to assert jurisdiction.156 
Whilst this approach is a possibility, determining the admissibility of a claim at a 
preliminary stage requires a tribunal to analyse the merits of the claim (albeit 
superficially).157 Given the repercussions of an incorrect decision on admissibility, it 
may be advisable to reserve this consideration until the merits phase of the 
arbitration, when full attention can be paid to the substantive arguments presented by 
the parties. This is especially so given the vague content of international public 
policy.158 Again, should errors be made by ICSID arbitral tribunals, this would 
undermine the credibility of the host state human rights defence in the longer term. 
 Some commentators support the use of admissibility to consider illegality 
founded on violations of international human rights law.159 They justify this position 
on the grounds that, should human rights violations directly relate to an investment, 
the very existence of the investment means that ICSID jurisdiction is already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Newcombe (n 114) 199. 
155 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines Cremades dissent 
(n 53) where it was suggested that gross illegality may bar a claim [40.2]; Alvarez and Montt (n 55) 
589. 
156 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic (n 35) [104]. The approach of this tribunal confuses the 
purpose of jurisdiction with admissibility. It is only in cases of ‘in accordance with host state law’ 
clauses that denial of jurisdiction is a possibility. Therefore, manifest illegality can only affect the 
admissibility of the claim. This interpretation is supported by the reference to judicial economy, 
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(Schill (n 43) 24 – 25). 
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established.160 In light of the illegal conduct of the investor, and utilising the doctrine 
of ‘clean hands’, they see no reason to distinguish between fraudulent or corrupt 
behaviour and that of human rights violations.161 As discussed above, in principle, 
there is no reason to distinguish these concepts, and tribunals have not drawn this 
distinction based on considerations of international public policy.162 Still, even if this 
approach was taken at the merits stage of the ICSID proceedings, given the 
significance of a decision on admissibility due to its lack of review procedure, this is 
a large risk to take. Incorrect decisions would damage the long-term viability of the 
defence. This author is not willing to risk the future operation of the host state 
human rights defence on this basis.  
 The second policy consideration relates to the timing of the foreign investor’s 
illegal conduct. ICSID tribunals have consistently limited the operation of 
jurisdiction and admissibility decisions to illegality that affects the initiation of the 
investment and not its subsequent operation. In relation to ‘in accordance with host 
state law’ clauses, this is partially based on the language of the specific IIA 
provisions that limit party consent. However, other justifications for distinguishing 
timing in this manner have been mooted. First, when illegal conduct by a foreign 
investor affects the establishment of the investment, it affects the consent of the 
parties to submit their dispute to ICSID arbitration.163 As party consent is ‘the 
cornerstone’ of ICSID arbitration, the illegal nature of the investment undermines 
the basis on which the whole process of dispute resolution is to proceed. Second, 
illegality at the stage when an investment is being established taints the entire 
investment and its subsequent operation.164 Given that all aspects of the investment 
are affected by the illegality, the investment can be considered to fall outside of the 
jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal, or it can be deemed to be inadmissible. This can 
be contrasted to instances where subsequent illegal conduct can be attributed to the 
investor.165 In cases of post-establishment human rights violations, the illegal 
conduct may not impact every aspect of the investment. Consequently, certain claims 
would not be affected by illegal conduct, resulting in the ICSID tribunal having 
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jurisdiction over particular elements of the claim. A determination as to which 
aspects of the claim are to be denied jurisdiction requires a detailed consideration of 
the dispute, which is more appropriate at the merits stage of the arbitration. For these 
reasons, it is argued that subsequent illegal conduct by an investor should only be 
addressed as a merits based argument within ICSID arbitration.  
 Therefore, considering any violations of international human rights law at the 
merits stage of ICSID arbitration has the benefit of not requiring tribunals to 
distinguish between whether illegality affected the initiation or subsequent operation 
of an investment, or determining the severity of the illegal conduct against standards 
of ‘manifest’ or ‘egregious’.166 It permits a tribunal to undertake a full and detailed 
consideration of all of the relevant factors at play,167 including evaluating ‘the proof 
and consequences of illegality.’168 This position is also supported by the, albeit 
limited, but still present, potential avenues for an investor to challenge a decision 
made at the merits stage of proceedings.169 In summary, the consideration of the 
effect of international human rights law violations at either the jurisdictional stage, 
or based on admissibility does not provide the strong legal foundation for a host state 
human rights defence, identified as being desirable in Chapter 3. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
Host states may seek to deny an ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction on the basis of 
international human rights violations law committed by the foreign investor. Such an 
approach is available in limited circumstances by virtue of both ‘in accordance with 
host state law’ clauses and through the application of international public policy. 
However, ‘in accordance with host state law’ clauses and, to date, international 
public policy, are temporally limited to pre-establishment illegality. Further, the lack 
of express legal basis for admissibility in the instruments guiding ICSID arbitration 
would leave a host state human rights defence subject to criticism. Although these 
conclusions illustrate a conservative approach, this is preferable to ensure the 
potential long-term viability of the defence. Therefore, it is submitted that neither 
procedural basis provides a solid basis for a host state human rights defence in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Alvarez and Montt (n 55) 591. 
167 Ibid 590. 
168 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines Cremades 
Dissent (n 53) [39]. 
169 As set out in ICSID Convention, Article 52. 
 
	  
	   	   140 
instances of post-establishment human rights violations. Further, policy 
considerations militate against a complete denial of jurisdiction in disputes that have 
the potential to be finely balanced and require an ICSID arbitral tribunal to review 
complex facts and legal arguments. Hence, the approach that will form the 
framework of this study is that a host state human rights defence should be 
substantive in nature and considered at the merits stage of ICSID arbitration. The 
next chapter addresses whether a host state can introduce counterclaims to provide a 
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5. THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF A SUBSTANTIVE HOST 
STATE HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENCE IN ICSID ARBITRATION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The potential legal foundations for a procedural host state human rights defence do 
not display the attributes that would result in a credible and widely accepted defence 
in ICSID arbitration. Consequently, it is necessary to consider how a substantive 
host state human rights defence might operate. A substantive host state human rights 
defence has a different purpose to a procedural defence. Rather than attempting to 
prevent a hearing on the merits of the dispute, a substantive defence enables a host 
state to argue at the merits stage of ICSID arbitration that their conduct does not give 
rise to international liability for breaching the IIA, or alternatively, counters the 
merits of the foreign investor’s claim. The justification for the host state’s position 
would be established by reference to substantive obligations sourced from 
international human rights law.  
 Given that a substantive host state human rights defence requires a host state 
to introduce international human rights law at the merits stage of ICSID proceedings, 
the structure of this defence is more complex than a procedural defence. This is 
because, in effect, a substantive host state human rights defence seeks to expand the 
jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal from its traditional focus on international 
investment law to encompass arguments based on international human rights law. As 
a result, for a host state to introduce a human rights argument before an ICSID 
arbitral tribunal, a suitable procedural basis for the human rights claim must be 
identified. Additionally, the ICSID arbitral tribunal must then be able to apply 
international human rights law to the dispute. It is only if both of these components 
can be established that a substantive host state human rights defence has a legal 
foundation in ICSID arbitration. 
 This chapter argues that counterclaims procedures in ICSID arbitration are 
the best mechanism to establish the legal foundations of a substantive host state 
human rights defence in specific circumstances. To determine how a substantive host 
state human rights defence can be established, this chapter initially outlines the 
shortcomings of substantive defences traditionally used in public international law 
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and ICSID arbitration. The chapter then proceeds to justify the use of counterclaims 
as the basis of the host state human rights defence before examining the application 
of counterclaim procedures in ICSID arbitration. In particular, it sets out the pre-
requisites for the invocation of a counterclaim by a host state and identifies how a 
host state would need to present their argument to comply with these requirements. 
Finally, the role of applicable law in ICSID arbitration is discussed, together with the 
ability of an ICSID arbitral tribunal to apply international human rights law as part 
of an investment dispute. Based on each of these considerations, conclusions are 
then drawn regarding the viability of the use of counterclaims as the legal basis for a 
host state human rights defence. 
5.2 THE FAILINGS OF EXISTING DEFENCES IN ICSID ARBITRATION  
To establish the most viable means of introducing a substantive host state human 
rights defence into ICSID arbitration, it is necessary to review the potential methods 
by which international human rights law can be brought before an ICSID arbitral 
tribunal. This section outlines why existing forms of substantive defence available to 
host states in ICSID arbitration are unable to provide a tenable foundation for a host 
state human rights defence before proposing counterclaims as an alternative 
procedural basis. This analysis is undertaken by reference to three potential means 
by which a host state human rights defence might operate. These are, firstly, by 
precluding liability for a wrongful act of a state; secondly, through a host state 
seeking to negate a foreign investor’s claim on its merits by justifying its conduct on 
public policy grounds; and finally, via a host state responding to a foreign investor’s 
claim by initiating a claim against the foreign investor in response. Whilst the latter 
two options do not act as a true defence by precluding liability for the wrongful act 
of the host state, they do permit a host state to challenge the foreign investor’s claims 
and, as such, are considered to operate as a form of defence. Each of these 
alternatives will be discussed in turn so as to identify the legal basis on which the 
host state human rights defence can best function within the existing framework of 
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5.2.1 Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness 
When states breach obligations in international law, their conduct is deemed to be 
internationally wrongful1 and state responsibility for the violation ensues.2 However, 
justifications or excuses3 may preclude the wrongfulness of the state’s act that gave 
rise to the violation and thereby preclude the responsibility of the state.4 The 
circumstances in which a state will not be deemed to be responsible for a breach of 
public international law (known as circumstances precluding wrongfulness) are set 
out in the ILC Articles for the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (ARSIWA) and encompass consent, self-defence, countermeasures, force 
majeure, distress and necessity.5  
 Should a state successfully invoke a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, it 
will not be held internationally responsible for the period of time during which the 
circumstance exists.6 As the obligation resumes once the circumstances ceases to 
apply,7 it is implicit that circumstances precluding wrongfulness only limit a state’s 
liability and do not have the effect of terminating the obligation that has been 
violated.8 As the circumstances precluding wrongfulness are formulated as 
secondary rules of public international law9 (only addressing the consequences of 
violations of public international law) they are structured so as to apply to breaches 
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and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press 2002) Article 2; J Crawford, State Responsibility: 
The General Part (Cambridge University Press 2013) 275. 
2 Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries (n 1) Article 1; Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 1) 275. See I 
Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility Part I (Clarendon Press 1983) 26 - 31. 
3 As to the distinctions between these terms see V Lowe, 'Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: 
A Plea for Excuses' (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 405; Crawford, State 
Responsibility: The General Part 278 – 280. 
4 Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 1) 275. 
5 ILC Articles for on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Articles 20 – 26 in 
Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries (n 1) 163 – 188. 
6 Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 1) 281. 
7 Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries (n 1) Article 27(a). 
8 Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 1) 281. See Case Concerning Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 63. 
9 Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries (n 1) 75. For further discussion regarding the distinction between primary and 
secondary rules in this context, see J Combacau and D Alland, '"Primary" and "Secondary" Rules in 
the Law of State Responsibility: Categorizing International Obligations' (1985) 16 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 81 and U Linderfalk, 'State Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary 
Rules Terminology - The Role of Language for an Understanding of the International Legal System' 
(2009) 78 Nordic Journal of International Law 53. 
 
	  
	   	   144 
of obligations sourced from any regime within public international law (subject to 
their exclusion by a lex specialis regime).10  
 If a host state human rights defence could be based on a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness, it has the potential to result in a host state being excused 
for breaching investment protection standards in an IIA for the duration of the 
foreign investor’s violation of international human rights law. This would give full 
effect to the intentions behind the establishment of the host state human rights 
defence. However, whether this can be achieved is contingent on the manner in 
which the circumstances precluding wrongfulness are implemented within the 
international investment law regime (and ICSID arbitration more generally) and how 
this application can be translated to the operation of a host state human rights 
defence. This section addresses whether each circumstance is capable of fulfilling 
this purpose. Brief consideration is also given to the notion of the exceptio 
inadimpleti contractus to see if this may provide an alternative basis to preclude 
liability. 
  The circumstance of force majeure is set out in Article 23 ARSIWA. Force 
majeure refers to situations in which the state’s act is as a result of ‘an irresistible 
force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially 
impossible in the circumstance to perform the obligation’.11 The commentary to 
Article 23 ARSIWA stresses the need for state to be ‘compelled’ to act in a manner 
contrary to the obligation imposed upon it by public international law.12 In this 
sense, the state is acting involuntarily.13 This threshold would be very difficult to 
establish in the context of the host state human rights defence. In the circumstances 
considered in this thesis, the host state is bound by obligations sourced in both the 
international investment law and international human rights law regimes. When 
these obligations conflict, the decision as to which obligation should be prioritised is 
left to the host state. They are not compelled to act in a particular manner and, as 
such, the conduct that gives rise to the violation of the IIA would be deemed to be 
voluntary. Further, the additional elements of force majeure are unlikely to be met 
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including that the State has not voluntarily undertaken the risk of an event 
occurring14 or that the breach is not caused by the conduct of the state in question.15 
The risk of international human rights law violations is present in relation to FDI 
within a host state’s jurisdiction and the conduct of the foreign investor is under the 
control of the host state by virtue of the host state’s domestic law. Given the 
combination of these factors, it is highly unlikely that the host state will be able to 
establish that force majeure would preclude the wrongfulness of its act. 
 Similarly, given the nature of the host state human rights defence, distress 
would also be very difficult to prove. What amounts to distress is set out in Article 
24 ARSIWA. Circumstances involving distress relate to the saving of human life that 
is entrusted to the care of the author of the act.16  Whilst violations of international 
human rights law can give rise to danger to human life,17 the scope of Article 24 
ARSIWA is intended to be limited to life-threatening situations where there are ‘no 
other reasonable’ means of saving lives.18 Although not limited in factual scope,19 
distress has traditionally been applied to situations involving aircraft or ships 
entering the territories of other States in order to save human life.20  
 When considered in the context of the host state human rights defence, 
distress is unlikely to apply. Even if gross violations of international human rights 
law have occurred, it would be difficult for a host state to successfully argue that a 
violation of the applicable IIA is the only reasonable means of saving human life. 
This is because the effect of violating the terms of the IIA by itself, without 
additional action to directly counter the breach of international human rights law, 
would not to save human life. Unless the requirements of Article 24 ARSIWA 
directly apply to the individual instances in question, it is improbable that either 
distress could form the basis of the host state human rights defence in order to 
preclude liability in public international law. 
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17 For example, a violation of the prohibition on torture could endanger life depending on the form of 
torture used.  
18 Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries (n 1) 174; Szurek, 'Distress' (n 12) 483. 
19 Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries (n 1) 175. 
20 Ibid; Szurek, 'Distress' (n 12) 485. 
 
	  
	   	   146 
 It is doubtful whether self-defence, as set out in Article 21 ARSIWA has the 
capacity to enable the host state human rights defence to preclude liability in public 
international law. Article 21 ARSIWA links the notion of self-defence to that set out 
in Article 51 of the UN Charter.21 Through this reference, this circumstance has 
limited applicability to a host state human rights defence given Article 21 
ARSIWA’s focus on instances involving the use of force under Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter and breaches of international obligations ‘related to the breach of that 
provision’.22 As armed conflict (and other similar conduct) falls outside of the scope 
of the proposed operation of the host state human rights defence, self-defence under 
Article 21 ARSIWA will not be considered in any further detail for the current 
purposes. 
 The role of consent in establishing a host state human rights defence that 
precludes liability in international law is also dubious. Article 20 ARSIWA 
precludes liability when consent is granted provided the act in question falls within 
the scope of the consent.23 For an analogous principle to apply with regard to a host 
state human rights defence, the foreign investor would have to agree that a host state 
may violate the applicable IIA in instances where the foreign investor, or the 
investment, has caused large scale or persistent violations of international human 
rights law. This consent is highly unlikely to be given. At present, there are no 
clauses, either express or implied, within IIAs that fully address international human 
rights law (discussed in Chapter 3), let alone, confer this consent. It would be in 
extremely rare circumstances that a foreign investor would give consent in the 
manner required so as to provide a host state human rights defence with the ability to 
preclude liability in public international law. 
 Article 22 ARSIWA provides that countermeasures may preclude state 
liability for wrongful acts. The conditions imposed on countermeasures are set out in 
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chapter II of Part Three of ARSIWA. Countermeasures permit a state to undertake 
an internationally wrongful act to induce another state to comply with their 
obligations, to cease the violation or make reparation for the damage suffered.24 The 
use of countermeasures is subject to several limitations, including that they should 
not affect third parties.25 At first glance, countermeasures appear to provide a 
potential foundation for a host state human rights defence in these instances. The 
host state is responding to a violation of international human rights law committed 
by the foreign investor, and, by breaching the terms of the IIA, are encouraging the 
foreign investor to comply with its obligations. However, the nature of the 
relationship between the foreign investor, the host state and the home state in 
international investment law complicates the initial simplicity that underlies this 
approach. 
 In accordance with the conception of public international law adopted in this 
thesis, foreign investors are only conferred rights through state consent. In the 
context of an IIA, this means that the parties to the IIA (both with full international 
legal personality) are the host state and the home state. Foreign investors are only 
conferred with the ability to commence legal proceedings against the host state in the 
circumstances set out in the IIA.26 Therefore, in the context of countermeasures, the 
primary obligations remain focused on the legal relationship between the host state 
and the home state.27 Should the host state take countermeasures against the foreign 
investor, it is arguable that the countermeasure is impacting a third party, which 
would render the countermeasure in breach of the conditions set out in ARSIWA.28 
Although this is only one interpretation of how countermeasures might operate in the 
context of international investment law,29 it raises doubts as to the stability of 
adopting countermeasures as the basis of the host state human rights defence in the 
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long term. As set out in Chapter 3, a clear and accepted legal foundation for the host 
state human rights defence is necessary for its widespread adoption. 
 It is unclear whether necessity under Article 25 ARSIWA,30 or within an IIA, 
can form a credible legal foundation for a host state human rights defence. As can be 
seen from Chapter 3, Argentina’s human rights defences based on both customary 
and treaty based necessity defences were applied inconsistently by ICSID arbitral 
tribunals despite the similar factual scenarios in each dispute. The varied outcomes 
in these decisions suggests that a state of necessity defence can not be applied 
systematically, reducing the potential credibility of a host state human rights 
defence. Further, to evidence a state of necessity, a host state has to meet a very high 
threshold.31 The financial crisis in Argentina in 2001/2 was on a nation wide scale.32 
Despite the extent of the economic collapse, very few arguments based on necessity 
succeeded.33 Most violations of international human rights law by a foreign investor 
will not place the existence of the host state in peril to the same degree as 
Argentina’s financial crisis, thereby precluding the operation of a state of necessity 
in almost all cases. Therefore, a state of necessity is discounted from forming the 
legal foundation for a host state human rights defence.  
 The general application of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness in 
ARSIWA means that variations arise regarding the manner in which the 
circumstances translate into different regimes in public international law. 
Consequently, not all of the circumstances will consistently apply to the international 
investment law regime. In particular, this is true in relation to force majeure, distress 
and self-defence. Further, the scope of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
such as consent, countermeasures and necessity, even if they apply to the 
international investment law regime, suffer deficiencies as the basis for a host state 
human rights defence. Therefore, it does not appear possible for a host state human 
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rights defence to preclude liability in international law in relation to the host state’s 
violation of the IIA under ARSIWA. 
 A further option outside the scope of ARSIWA is the exceptio inadimpleti 
contractus. This principle permits an exception of non-performance based on the 
other party failing to perform a mutual obligation.34 The exceptio functions similarly 
in this manner to countermeasures, however, as it is based on the notion of 
reciprocity, the non-performance must be of the same or a closely related 
obligation.35 Therefore, to function in relation to a host state human rights defence, 
the conduct of the host state in violating the IIA would have to align with the foreign 
investors’ obligation to comply with international human rights law. Given the 
asymmetrical nature of IIAs, that obligations are owed between the host state and the 
home state (rather than directly with the foreign investor) and the lack of any 
enforceable obligations based on international human rights law being set out in 
IIAs, it is improbable that the exceptio is capable of providing the foundation of the 
host state human rights defence. This conclusion is exacerbated by its unclear legal 
basis.36  
  Although the exceptio was considered by the ILC for inclusion in the 
ARSIWA, it was rejected on the basis that it was most closely linked to the 
performance of treaty obligations.37 That is, according to the broad interpretation of 
the exceptio, the performance of one state’s obligations under a treaty is conditional 
on similar compliance by the other states party.38 Therefore, failure to comply is a 
breach of treaty, rather than a matter of state responsibility. However, the VCLT 
only addresses the permissible responses to material breach of treaties in Article 60 
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and does not include the exceptio.39 Therefore, having been excluded from both 
treaty interpretation and state responsibility, the relevance of the exceptio in public 
international law remains contentious.40  
 The ICJ in Interim Accord41 was given the opportunity to consider the legal 
standing of the exceptio but the majority did not elaborate on its legal foundation as 
this was not required to reach its decision.42 Judges Simma and Bennouna were 
critical of this approach.43 In his separate opinion, Judge Simma focused on the 
similarity of the exceptio to Article 60 VCLT, considering it akin to an issue of 
treaty performance, which had been fully addressed in Article 60 VCLT as a primary 
rule of public international law.44 In contrast, Judge ad hoc Roucounas considered 
that the exceptio could exist outside the operation of Article 60 VCLT, which only 
focuses on material breaches of treaty obligations.45 Given the ICJ’s failure to 
endorse the exceptio in public international law, combined with Judge Simma’s 
denouncement and the ILC’s categorisation of the principle as a matter of treaty 
performance rather than state responsibility, it does not provide a clear basis for the 
preclusion of liability in public international. Consequently, it is not desirable that th 
exceptio is adopted as the foundation for a working host state human rights defence 
in light of the need for it to have a clear and well-accepted legal foundation. 
 In light of the failure of both ARSIWA and the exceptio to provide the 
foundation for a host state human rights defence, there is little chance that the host 
state human rights defence will be able to function by precluding the liability of host 
states for their acts that violate the applicable IIA (despite the acts being undertaken 
in compliance with international human rights law). Therefore, alternative means by 
which the host state human rights defence might minimise the liability of the host 
state need to be addressed. 
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5.2.2 Justifications for Host State Conduct Based on Public Policy Grounds 
Most defences to claims brought by foreign investors in ICSID arbitration have 
involved host states justifying their conduct based on public policy considerations. 
This is because disputes in relation to the international investment law regime focus 
on whether state conduct that seeks to achieve a public purpose has breached an 
investment protection standard.46 Therefore, host states tend to seek to justify their 
position by reference to the public policy that they sought to achieve. Host state 
arguments based on public policy may be made in general terms or relate to the 
specific terminology of the investment protection standard set out in the IIA. For 
example, regulatory powers may be raised in relation to an allegation of a breach of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard,47 or may refer to a precise element of a 
standard, such as the need for an expropriation to be conducted for a public 
purpose.48 As a result, arguments based on public policy considerations do not have 
a clear legal basis in the ICSID Convention or the ICSID Arbitral Rules. This 
attribute was identified in Chapter 3 as a desirable characteristic in a host state 
human rights defence. Therefore, the attractiveness of adopting this approach is 
lessened.  
 Additionally, ICSID arbitral tribunals have displayed a propensity to dismiss 
public policy considerations. For example, as previously stated in Chapter 3, 
Argentina sought to justify violations of the USA-Argentina BIT by reference to the 
constitutional character of international human rights law under Argentinian law. 
This defence was unsuccessful in both the Siemens v Argentina and Azurix v 
Argentina awards as the defence was not fully established. As set out in Chapter 3, 
this is likely to be due to host state reluctance to argue international human rights 
law before an ICSID arbitral tribunal for fear of dual liability. Whilst states have 
been reluctant to argue some public policy defences, ICSID arbitral tribunals have 
also been reluctant to consider their defences. In Tecmed v Mexico,49 Mexico’s 
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failure to re-new a licence for the operation of a hazardous waste landfill site was 
deemed to amount to an expropriation50 despite Mexico seeking to justify its conduct 
by reference to the foreign investor’s violations of environmental law.51 The ICSID 
arbitral tribunal applied proportionality analysis and reasoned that Mexico had acted 
disproportionately in response to the minimal violations of environmental law.52 
Finally, in Santa Elena v Costa Rica,53 the issue before the ICSID arbitral tribunal 
was the amount of compensation payable by Costa Rica for the expropriation of the 
foreign investor’s land.54 Costa Rica expropriated the land to establish a nature 
reserve.55 When discussing the impact of the environmental justification, the ICSID 
arbitral tribunal stated: 
Expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how laudable and 
beneficial to society as a whole – are, in this respect, similar to any other 
expropriatory measures that a State may take in order to implement its 
policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental 
purposes, whether domestic or international, the State’s obligation to pay 
compensation remains.56 
In light of the lack of a clear legal basis for public policy considerations in ICSID 
arbitration, and the dismissal of these arguments by ICSID arbitral tribunals, a host 
state human rights defence based solely on public policy grounds does not appear to 
be a plausible option. 
5.2.3 Establishing a Host State Claim Against the Foreign Investor 
A final option that may provide a foundation upon which a host state human rights 
defence can operate is by the host state arguing that the foreign investor’s claim 
should be balanced against the foreign investor’s violations of international human 
rights law. This could be achieved by two means, either by way of a set-off or by a 
counterclaim. Although both concepts are very similar, there are fundamental 
differences in the manner in which they operate. 
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 A set-off provides a true defence against a claim.57 It is premised on the 
defending party seeking a reduction in compensation based on a pre-existing 
obligation.58 The set-off is linked to the originating claim and can only reduce the 
amount of compensation that may be payable.59 The amount of the set-off cannot 
exceed the amount of the originating claim.60 If the originating claim is unsuccessful, 
the set-off falls away and nothing will be awarded to the defending party on the basis 
of the set-off.61 
 In contrast, a counterclaim can be applied to counteract any originating 
claim.62 It is an independent claim rather than acting as a defence.63 The tribunal 
hearing the claim is able to balance the amounts owed by each disputing party.64 
Therefore, if the amount of award under the original claim is less than a successful 
counterclaim, the party with the originating claim would owe the defending party the 
amount required to make up the value of the counterclaim. As the claims are distinct, 
even if the originating claim is unsuccessful, a successful counterclaim would still 
stand and compensation would be owed to the defending party.65  
 Counterclaims appear to provide more flexibility and adaptability for the 
operation of a host state human rights defence. The independent nature of the claim 
would permit a host state to establish a claim against the foreign investor based on 
violations of international human rights law that would not be constrained by the 
value of the foreign investor’s claims. In instances where a grave violation of 
international human rights law has resulted, the costs of remedying this violation 
may exceed the value of the loss to the foreign investor. A counterclaim would 
‘facilitate the assessment of damages and the calculation of countervailing 
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damages’66 in turn, permitting a host state to receive a full remedy for its loss. This 
would also be the situation if the foreign investor’s claim fails because the host state 
would be permitted to continue with its claim. Conversely, if set-off was relied upon 
as the basis of the defence, the host state may not receive a full remedy. Given that 
the liability of the host state cannot be precluded in accordance with public 
international law, this would be the most beneficial option for the host state to fully 
defend their conduct.  
 This approach to the host state human rights defence means that the host 
state’s liability in public international law will not be precluded. However, by using 
counterclaims as the basis of the host state human rights defence, the host state can 
potentially seek redress for the foreign investor’s conduct that is in breach of 
international human rights law through the award of compensation. Counterclaims 
permit the host state to be fully compensated for their loss without reference to the 
amount being claimed by the foreign investor. These factors make counterclaims 
more attractive for host states than a defence based on set-off and will be used as the 
foundation for the host state human rights defence. 
5.2.4 Preliminary Conclusion 
Establishing a host state human rights defence in ICSID arbitration requires the host 
state to either preclude liability for its violation of the applicable IIA, use policy 
justifications to support its breach, or claim against the foreign investor. Preventing 
the liability of the host state in accordance with the circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness set out in ARSIWA or the exceptio do not provide viable foundations 
for a host state human rights defence given their tenuous connections to both 
international investment law and the envisaged operation of the host state human 
rights defence. Policy based defences have consistently been rejected by ICSID 
arbitral tribunals. Therefore, counterclaims provide the most viable option as they 
provide the host state with the most flexibility and protection. However, the manner 
in which counterclaims operate needs to be translated into the framework of ICSID 
arbitration.  
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5.3 THE APPLICATION OF ICSID COUNTERCLAIM PROCEDURES 
This section examines how ICSID counterclaims may overcome the difficulties 
evidenced by both circumstances precluding wrongfulness and policy based defences 
and how they provide a mechanism by which a functional host state human rights 
defence can be formulated. To establish the viability of counterclaims as the 
foundation for a host state human rights defence, this section initially describes 
counterclaim procedures in ICSID arbitration and justifies their use as the procedural 
basis for a host state human rights defence. The section then proceeds to outline the 
elements that a host state will need to establish to argue a counterclaim based on 
international human rights law.  
5.3.1 Justifications for the Use of ICSID Counterclaim Procedures 
Counterclaim procedures permit a host state to commence a claim against the foreign 
investor for violations of obligations owed by the foreign investor to the host state.67 
The introduction of counterclaims was intended to provide balance to ICSID 
arbitration by ensuring equality between the disputing parties with regard to the 
ability to initiate claims.68 It was recognised in SGS v Pakistan that: 
It would be inequitable, if, by reason of the invocation of ICSID 
jurisdiction, the [foreign investor] could on the one hand elevate its side 
of the dispute to international adjudication and, on the other, preclude the 
[host state] from pursuing its own claim for damages […].69 
This approach reflects the views of the drafters of the ICSID Convention who 
intended its provisions to permit claims from both host states and foreign investors. 
This is made clear in the Report of the Executive Directors, which states: 
While the broad objective of the Convention is to encourage a larger 
flow of private international investment, the provisions of the 
Convention maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors 
and those of host States. Moreover, the Convention permits the 
institution of proceedings by host States as well as by investors and the 
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Executive Directors have constantly had in mind that the provisions of 
the Convention should be equally adapted to the requirements of both 
cases.70 
The introduction into ICSID arbitration of a counterclaim mechanism was also 
intended to increase the efficiency of dispute resolution between foreign investors 
and host states.71 By addressing all investment related claims in one forum 
simultaneously, the need for the host state to commence proceedings in alternative 
dispute resolution fora, such as domestic courts, could be minimised.72 This in turn 
reduces the time and cost involved in duplicitous proceedings.73 
 The intentions behind counterclaims were given effect in Article 46 of the 
ICSID Convention, which permits counterclaims in the following circumstances: 
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by 
a party, determine any incidental or additional claims or counterclaims 
arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute provided that they 
are within the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre. 
Rule 40(1) of the ICSID Arbitral Rules reinforces this provision in identical terms.74  
 As counterclaim procedures are sourced from the ICSID Arbitral Rules, they 
have been accepted by states as forming part of ICSID arbitral practice and have a 
clear legal foundation. This meets a key criterion of the attributes sought in a host 
state human rights defence identified in Chapter 3. Given their origins in the ICSID 
Arbitral Rules, the risk of an ICSID arbitral tribunal dismissing a counterclaim for 
not falling within its powers is reduced. This satisfies the requirement that arbitrators 
that prefer a ‘private’ approach to ITA will be amenable to the use of the host state 
human rights defence. By seeking to avoid the duplication of proceedings in multiple 
fora, counterclaims also support the ‘de-fragmentation’ of public international law. 
Although initially intended to avoid domestic proceedings, this policy basis can 
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equally be applied to other specialist dispute resolution bodies, thereby reducing the 
risk of dual liability for host states in human rights dispute resolution fora. When 
compared to the characteristics of the investment law driven and public international 
law defences set out above, counterclaim procedures in ICSID arbitration are a more 
desirable option as they possess the attributes sought in a host state human rights 
defence. These attributes are that the defence should be established outside of the 
terms of the IIA, that it exists in ICSID arbitral practice, minimises the risk of dual 
liability for host states and that it can be augmented by amicus curiae procedures. 
Given these attributes, counterclaims will be adopted as the procedure by which 
international human rights law is introduced into ICSID arbitration. However, it is 
necessary to examine the application of counterclaims to ensure that host states can 
utilise this procedural basis in the manner envisaged.  
5.3.2 The Application of ICSID Counterclaim Procedures  
The terms of Article 46 ICSID Convention and Rule 40(1) of the ICSID Arbitral 
Rules dictate how a host state would be able to rely on this mechanism to establish a 
host state human rights defence. These provisions set out three elements that a host 
state must address to argue a counterclaim. First, the arbitral tribunal needs to have 
jurisdiction over the counterclaim. Second, the consent given by both the host state 
and foreign investor must encompass the possibility of counterclaims. Finally, there 
has to be a sufficient degree of proximity between the foreign investor’s claim and 
the counterclaim. In addressing how these elements apply to a host state human 
rights defence, initial focus will be placed on the element of party consent. The 
nexus between international investment law and international human rights law will 
then be discussed by reference to the ICSID arbitral tribunal’s subject matter 
jurisdiction over the counterclaim.  
 Additionally, implicit within these provisions is that the foreign investor must 
owe legal obligations to the host state to form the substantive basis of the 
counterclaim. Therefore, the specific circumstances in which a foreign investor may 
owe obligations to a host state in the context of international human rights law are 
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5.3.2.1 Party Consent to Counterclaims 
Prior to the invocation of counterclaim procedures, the disputing parties must 
consent to their use. Although the ICSID Convention and ICSID Arbitral Rules 
permit counterclaims, whether they can be applied by an ICSID arbitral tribunal in a 
given dispute is dictated by party consent. This requirement of Article 46 ICSID 
Convention reflects the need for dual consent when establishing jurisdiction in 
ICSID arbitration as established in Chapter 4. Whether counterclaims will be 
permitted depends on the terms of the mutual consent of the foreign investor and the 
host state that establishes the initial jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal.  
  The consent of the parties will usually extend to counterclaims unless 
expressly excluded.75 Whether this is the case is a matter of interpretation.76 When 
interpreting the scope of the consent of both parties, tribunals have attempted to 
undertake this task in a manner that is neither too restrictive nor too broad.77 
However, some tribunals have interpreted consent liberally.78 Lalive and Halonen 
suggest that tribunals should ‘scrutinise’ the terms of party consent,79 to ensure that 
consent is definitively established.80 As a result, it is difficult to declare with 
certainty whether particular forms of consent will permit counterclaims. Hence, in 
this discussion, generalisations will be made to illustrate the potential outcomes 
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See also B Larschan and G Mirfendereski, 'The Status of Counterclaims in International Law, with 
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15 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 11; PA Karrer, 'Jurisdiction on Set-off Defences 
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based on descriptions of the prevalent forms of party consent outlined in Chapter 4. 
The common forms of party consent are for the parties to agree to ‘all’ or ‘any’ 
investment disputes being heard by way of ICSID arbitration,81 to limit consent to 
disputes regarding the investment authorisation, the investment agreement or the 
IIA,82 to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal to disputes 
over IIAs alone,83 or to limit consent to disputes over the quantum of compensation 
following an expropriation.84  
 The starting premise is that, the wider the terms of the consent given, the 
more likely it is that an ICSID arbitral tribunal will extend jurisdiction to host state 
counterclaims. Consequently, consent phrased in terms such as ‘any’ or ‘all’ disputes 
are likely to extend jurisdiction to counterclaims.85 The UNCITRAL tribunal in 
Saluka v Czech Republic86 considered party consent in these terms. Although 
proceeding under the UNCITRAL Rules as opposed to the ICSID Arbitral Rules, as 
this tribunal was the first award to fully review jurisdiction over counterclaims, the 
tribunal proceeded to establish how this was customarily achieved by reference to 
the UNCITRAL and ICSID Arbitration Rules.87 The tribunal was required to decide 
whether the consent of the parties, based on Article 8 of the Netherlands/Czech 
Republic BIT, was sufficient to permit a host state counterclaim. The provision 
conferred jurisdiction over ‘any legal dispute between a Contracting Party and an 
investor of the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of the latter’. In 
deciding that the tribunal’s jurisdiction extended to host state counterclaims, the 
arbitral tribunal reasoned that: 
The language of Article 8, in referring to “All disputes,” is wide enough 
to include disputes giving rise to counterclaims, so long, of course, as 
other relevant requirements are also met. The need for a dispute, if it is to 
fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, to be “between a Contracting Party 
and an investor of the other Contracting Party” carries with it no 
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implication that Article 8 applies only to disputes in which it is an 
investor which initiates the claims.88 
Therefore, consent in terms that refer to ‘all’ or ‘any’ disputes is likely to encompass 
counterclaims. This gives rise to the possibility of a host state human rights defence 
being established when party consent is conferred in this manner. 
 Second, consent that limits an ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to legal 
actions that relate to ‘an investment authorization, an investment agreement or an 
alleged breach of any right conferred’ by an investment treaty, may limit the scope 
of counterclaims.89 The impact of this type of clause was examined in Goetz v 
Burundi.90 Article 8 of the Belgium-Luxembourg-Burundi BIT limited the 
jurisdiction of the ICSID arbitral tribunal to disputes concerning the interpretation 
and application of investment agreements, investment authorisations and alleged 
violations of rights under the BIT with regards to investments. However, rather than 
interpreting the specific terms of the consent agreed between the disputing parties as 
set out in this provision of the IIA, the tribunal focused on the initial consent given 
by the foreign investor to ICSID arbitration, evidenced by its initiation of ICSID 
arbitration.91 Thus, the ICSID arbitral tribunal identified a different source of party 
consent to that found in Article 8 of the applicable BIT. It was the tribunal’s view 
that the foreign investor’s acceptance of the host state’s standing offer of ICSID 
arbitration was sufficient to include the powers of ICSID arbitral tribunals to hear 
counterclaims in the absence of any express exclusion.92 By circumventing the need 
to rely upon the more limited terms of Article 8, the tribunal held that it could hear 
the counterclaim.93 This outcome differs to the position that would likely be taken if 
the terms of Article 8 had been applied. By virtue of the parties limiting the scope of 
jurisdiction to the particular legal instruments listed, the ICSID tribunal would not 
have been able extend jurisdiction beyond the specific terms of those instruments.  
 The focus of this tribunal on the foreign investor’s acceptance of a standing 
offer to proceed to ICSID arbitration is significant for the introduction of a host state 
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human rights defence. When party consent is limited to particular instruments, any 
host state counterclaim must relate to the obligations set out in one of those 
instruments.94 Given the general lack of references to international human rights law 
in investment agreements, investment authorisations or IIAs, provisions such as 
Article 8 are likely to exclude the operation of a host state human rights defence 
based on counterclaims. Conversely, if these instruments do not form the limit of an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over counterclaims, a host state human rights 
defence becomes a tenable option. This conclusion is dependent on the credibility of 
the ICSID arbitral tribunal’s reasoning in Goetz v Burundi. 
 The reasoning of the tribunal in Goetz v Burundi emphasises the desirability 
of limiting the potential for disputes to be heard by multiple fora.95 Whilst this stance 
is in the interests of justice, it simultaneously undermines the significance of the role 
of party consent in determining an ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over 
counterclaims. The dual nature of consent is a key attribute of ICSID arbitration and 
is reflected in Article 46 ICSID Convention by the phrase ‘within the scope of the 
consent of the parties’. Given the positivist conception adopted in this thesis, which 
prioritises the role of consent, it is posited the approach taken in Goetz v Burundi 
should not be followed to establish a host state human rights defence. 
 Third, consent in even more limited terms further reduces the probability that 
a host state human rights defence can be established. Provisions that limit the 
jurisdiction of an investment tribunal to alleged violations of the IIA only, such as 
Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty, or Articles 1116 and 1117 of NAFTA, are 
more likely to prevent counterclaims being permitted.96 This is because rights are not 
conferred upon host states in IIAs.97 The significance of this distinction was 
highlighted in Aguas & Vivendi v Argentina.98 The tribunal contrasted Article 8 of 
the France Argentina BIT (which provided for ‘[a]ny dispute relating to 
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investments’) with the operation of Article 11 of the same BIT where consent that 
was limited to violations of the IIA.  The Tribunal stated: 
Read literally, the requirements for arbitral jurisdiction in Article 8 do 
not necessitate that the Claimant allege a breach of the BIT itself: it is 
sufficient that the dispute relates to an investment made under the BIT. 
This may be contrasted, for example, with Article 11 of the BIT which 
refers to disputes ‘concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Agreement’, or with Article 1116 of the NAFTA, which provides that an 
investor may submit to arbitration under Chapter 11 ‘a claim that another 
Party has breached an obligation under’ specified provisions of that 
Chapter.99 
A similar internal inconsistency arose in Hamester v Ghana.100 Article 12(1) of the 
Federal Republic of Germany/Ghana BIT enabled the ICSID tribunal to consider 
disputes ‘concerning an obligation of [one Contracting Party] under this Treaty in 
relation to an investment of [a national or company of the other Contracting Party]’. 
The tribunal noted the ‘restricted scope’ of the consent given, but also took into 
account that Articles 12(3) and (4) of the BIT recognised ‘that the State party may be 
“aggrieved” and “shall have the right to refer the dispute to” arbitration’.101 The need 
to consider the precise scope of consent based on the BIT’s provisions was 
circumvented102 as the counterclaim had not been fully developed by way of 
submissions. Nonetheless, these decisions demonstrate the importance of the manner 
in which consent is interpreted, and the potential ambiguity that may result from the 
consent given. 
 The decision in Roussalis v Romania103 evidences the potential limiting scope 
of consent that only confers jurisdiction over disputes regarding the terms of IIAs. At 
issue was whether Article 9 of the Romania/Greece BIT permitted counterclaims. 
The terms of Article 9 limited consent to ‘[d]isputes between an investor of a 
Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the 
latter under this Agreement, in relation to an investment of the former’. Relying on 
the general rule of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 VCLT, the majority of 
the tribunal held that ‘the references made in the text of Article 9(1) of the BIT to 
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“disputes …concerning an obligation of the latter” undoubtedly limit jurisdiction to 
claims brought by investors about obligations of the host State’.104 On the basis that 
the ‘BIT imposes no obligations on investors, only on contracting States’,105 the 
counterclaim was rejected.106 
 Although the majority of the Roussalis arbitral panel denied the 
counterclaim, the declaration of the minority arbitrator in Roussalis,107 Reisman, 
attacked the approach taken by the majority. Reisman’s understanding of the 
operation of consent under ICSID was that ‘when the State Parties to a BIT 
contingently consent, inter alia, to ICSID jurisdiction, the consent component of 
Article 46 of the Washington Convention is ipso facto imported into any ICSID 
arbitration which an investor then elects to pursue’.108 Reisman supported his 
position by reference to policy considerations. He stressed that if the majority view 
was taken, there would be the need for the host state to pursue its claims in a 
domestic forum (which the investor had elected to avoid by selecting ICSID 
arbitration and pursuing a counterclaim).109 This approach would give rise to 
duplication, inefficiency and the additional costs.110 He described the majority 
decision as ‘an ironic, if not absurd, outcome, at odds … with the objectives of 
international investment law.’111 Reisman’s view informed the position taken by the 
tribunal in Goetz v Burundi. As outlined above, by prioritising policy considerations 
regarding the need to resolve all aspects of investment disputes by way of ICSID 
arbitration, the role of consent is minimised, which is contrary to a positivist 
understanding of public international law. This does not form a suitable basis for a 
host state human rights defence. 
 Finally, consent that is limited to issues of the quantum of compensation 
following an expropriation is the least common and most restrictive form of consent. 
These provisions were usually included in IIAs in former socialist states.112 For 
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example, the China-Hungary BIT 1991 provides sets out consent in Article 10(1) in 
the following terms: 
Any dispute between either Contracting State and the investor of the 
other Contracting State concerning the amount of compensation for 
expropriation may be submitted to an arbitral tribunal. 
This stance precludes the operation of counterclaims as consent is not given for an 
ICSID tribunal to review substantive rights and obligations. It is unlikely that a host 
state human rights defence would be raised in this context, given that it would 
usually be employed to counter the alleged breach of the investment protection 
standards, and in this instance, the violation of the investment protection standard 
has already been established. 
 These four examples are based on the terms of the consent set out in the host 
state’s standing offer to arbitrate. When accepting the host state’s standing offer to 
resolve disputes through ICSID arbitration, the foreign investor could potentially 
limit their consent to the ICSID arbitral tribunal only hearing originating claims. 
This would mean that the parties had not consented to the ICSID arbitral tribunal 
having jurisdiction over counterclaims. Whether a foreign investor may limit the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal at the commencement of proceedings, and if so, 
the degree to which this is permissible is not clear.113 It has been suggested that the 
offer to arbitrate in the BIT must be accepted on its own terms and that a foreign 
investor cannot exclude counterclaims in its acceptance of the standing offer.114 This 
position corresponds with the more pragmatic policy view that:  
if the parties subsequently are in arbitration or litigation, the jurisdiction 
of that arbitral tribunal or state court should extend to the counterclaim 
all the same … The claimant must be presumed to prefer arbitration 
before the arbitral tribunal that is already in place, and the respondent 
must be presumed to prefer that jurisdiction as well, or the respondent 
would not have brought the counterclaim before that jurisdiction in the 
first place but would have initiated arbitration or litigation elsewhere.115 
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Therefore, both the manner in which an ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is 
generated, and policy considerations would appear to support the view that a foreign 
investor cannot limit ICSID arbitration solely to its originating claim when the host 
state’s standing offer is not in those terms. This would prevent a foreign investor 
from cynically denying the operation of a host state human rights defence by limiting 
its consent when filing a claim with ICSID. 
 To establish a host state human rights defence on the basis of counterclaim 
procedures in ICSID arbitration, party consent should be phrased as widely as 
possible. Ideally, the jurisdiction of an ICSID arbitral tribunal should extend to ‘all’ 
or ‘any’ disputes relating to the investment. This removes any ambiguity regarding 
whether a counterclaim based on international human rights law is within the terms 
of the party consent. As consent is offered in an IIA and exists prior the dispute, 
foreign investors are deemed to have accepted consent in these terms when initiating 
ICSID arbitration. Hence, they are unlikely to be able to modify the terms of the 
consent when filing their claim to avoid the operation of a host state human rights 
defence. The risk for host states is that by offering consent to arbitrate in wide terms, 
host states are potentially open to foreign investors initiating more claims against 
them.  
 Some arbitrators have extended, or sought to extend, the jurisdiction of an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal to include all counterclaims despite the terms of party 
consent within the IIA being phrased in more limited terms. The reasoning 
underlying this approach has not yet been widely accepted.116 A host state should not 
rely on all ICSID arbitral tribunals adopting this stance.  Given the fundamental 
nature of party consent to ICSID arbitration, utilising this position would form a 
questionable foundation for a host state human rights defence. Further, this approach 
does not align with the positivist viewpoint used in this thesis.  
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5.3.2.2 Nexus between International Investment Law and International Human 
Rights Law 
Even if consent to counterclaims can be established, the failure of states to include 
international human rights law in IIAs might make it difficult to extend the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to include a host state human rights defence. This 
is because there is still a requirement that the counterclaim must ‘arise directly out of 
the subject-matter of the dispute’. 
Attempting to extend the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal to encompass a 
substantive host state human rights defence requires that an ICSID arbitral tribunal 
has subject matter jurisdiction over arguments based on international human rights 
law. When seeking to extend the subject matter jurisdiction of ICSID arbitral 
tribunals to include international human rights law:  
The party to a dispute invoking a human rights argument – be it the state 
or the investor – must demonstrate substantively that the human rights at 
issue effectively impact on the implementation of the investment at 
stake. This constraint is explained by the fact that the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction is specifically limited to the settlement of disputes arising out 
of a given international investment.117 
Consequently, any attempt to extend the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal must align 
with the international investment law focus that is inherent within the ICSID dispute 
resolution system. Thus, to determine if an ICSID arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over 
counterclaims extends to international human rights law, this section examines 
whether a sufficient nexus can be established between the investment dispute and the 
host state human rights defence under both Article 25 and Article 46 ICSID 
Convention. Article 25 ICSID Convention refers to the ICSID arbitral tribunal’s 
originating jurisdiction whereas Article 46 ICSID Convention deals specifically with 
the subject matter of counterclaims. Both provisions need to be considered as Article 
46 ICSID Convention requires that the counterclaim fall within ICSID’s originating 
jurisdiction (which is governed by Article 25 ICSID Convention) and additionally 
relates to the subject matter of the dispute. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 P-M Dupuy, 'Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of 
International Investment Law and Human Rights Law' in P-M Dupuy, F Francioni and E-U 
Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University 
Press 2009) 61 – 62. 
 
	  
	   	   167 
 Article 25 ICSID Convention only confers originating jurisdiction to an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal in relation to a ‘legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment’. As discussed in Chapter 4, principles of law that are generally 
applicable to investments, such as tax laws, fall outside of ICSID’s jurisdiction. 
However, when these laws are applied directly to the investment, they are capable of 
falling within ICSID’s jurisdiction. Therefore, international human rights law (as a 
law of general application) will not fall within ICSID’s jurisdiction unless it is used 
by a host state specifically in relation to an investment. It is submitted that in the 
limited circumstances addressed in this thesis, that is, instances of IIAs being 
violated by host states to ensure compliance with international human rights law, 
general principles such as international human rights law will be applied directly to 
an investment, or to the conduct of the foreign investor, thereby meeting the 
requirements of Article 25 ICSID Convention.  
 In addition to the jurisdictional requirement in Article 25 ICSID Convention, 
in accordance with Article 46 ICSID Convention, an ICSID tribunal’s jurisdiction 
over counterclaims must arise ‘directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute’. 
Rather than focusing on the relationship between the counterclaim and the 
investment, this provision requires a direct relationship between the counterclaim 
and the object of the dispute.118 Based on the term ‘subject-matter’, the nexus 
required between the counterclaim and the originating claim would appear to be 
factual in nature.119 This view is supported by the ‘Notes to the ICSID Arbitral 
Rules’.120 
 Despite this, the Saluka v Czech Republic award considered that a ‘close 
connexion’ between a counterclaim and the originating claim should be a common 
legal foundation.121  Rather than focusing specifically on the ICSID Arbitral Rules, 
this UNCITRAL tribunal attempted to determine the rules that ‘customarily govern 
the relationship between a counterclaim and the primary claim to which it is a 
response’.122 In reaching its decision, this award reviewed the UNCITRAL Rules, 
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the ICSID Arbitral Rules and the provisions establishing the US-Iran Claims 
Tribunal. Consequently, the award has potential implications for counterclaims 
governed by the ICSID Arbitral Rules. 
 In determining what amounted to a close connection, the Saluka tribunal 
discussed the ICSID award Klöckner v Cameroon.123 In Klöckner, the legal 
relationship between the parties was established by a series of contracts. When 
reviewing the relationship between the contracts to determine the nexus between the 
originating claim and the counterclaim, the tribunal referred to the contractual 
relationships as ‘an indivisible whole’ and ‘interdependent’.124 When relying on 
Klöckner, the Saluka tribunal emphasised the indivisibility of the legal sources and 
determined that counterclaims must arise from the same legal source as the 
originating claim.125  
 The Saluka tribunal supported this stance by reference to the common legal 
basis of originating claims and counterclaims in the US-Iran Claims tribunal 
jurisprudence.126 However, jurisdiction over counterclaims in the US-Iran Claims 
Tribunal is limited to ‘any counterclaim that arises out of the same contract, 
transaction or occurrence that constitutes the same subject matter of [the] national’s 
claims’.127 Therefore, the Saluka tribunal sought to establish a general principle 
based on specific instances where the facts gave rise to, or the jurisdictional basis 
required, a common legal origin. These factors do not relate the specific language 
used in Article 46 ICSID Convention. 
 The requirement created by Saluka would be very difficult to establish in 
practice in investment disputes given the asymmetrical nature of IIAs. The need to 
demonstrate a common legal origin for the counterclaim and the originating claim is 
likely to exclude the operation of counterclaims in investment disputes over IIAs 
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entirely, as foreign investors are not under any legal obligations in the IIA.128 This is 
contrary to the intentions behind the introduction of Article 46 ICSID Convention.  
 The Saluka tribunal continued its analysis by rejecting counterclaims that 
were based on obligations sourced from ‘general obligations’ found in the municipal 
law of the host state.129 The basis for this conclusion was the Amco v Indonesia 
award which establishes the proposition that, for the purposes of Article 25 ICSID 
Convention: 
[I]t is correct to distinguish between rights and obligations that are 
applicable to legal or natural persons who are within the reach of a host 
State’s jurisdiction, as a matter of general law; and rights and obligations 
that are applicable to an investor as a consequence of an investment 
agreement entered into with that host state. Legal disputes relating to the 
latter will fall under Article 25(1) of the Convention. Legal disputes 
concerning the former in principle fall to be decided by the appropriate 
procedures in the relevant jurisdiction unless the general law generates 
an investment dispute under the Convention.130 
Yet, the Saluka award did not fully consider the Amco decision. The Amco award 
permits investment disputes based on general law to fall within ICSID’s jurisdiction 
if it ‘generates an investment dispute under the Convention’.131  
 Given the deficiencies in the approach taken by the Saluka tribunal, and the 
specific terms of Article 46 ICSID Convention, it is submitted that a factual basis, 
rather than a legal connection is required to establish that the counterclaim arises 
‘directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute’. Further, provided that 
counterclaims meet this requirement, they can be based on general obligations that 
specifically impact upon an investment.  
 Based on this analysis, a counterclaim based on international human rights 
law can arise ‘directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute’. When a host state 
violates an IIA to comply with its international human rights law obligations, a 
foreign investor will bring a claim in ICSID arbitration against the host state. The 
subject matter of the dispute will be comprised of the foreign investor’s violations of 
international human rights law and the host state’s violations of the IIA in response. 
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As these considerations form the factual matrix of the dispute, it is likely that there 
will be a sufficient nexus to allow the host state to commence a counterclaim based 
on obligations sourced in international human rights law. As international human 
rights law has been applied specifically to the investment, the general nature of the 
obligations will not preclude ICSID’s jurisdiction. 
 In conclusion, the jurisdictional requirements set out in Article 25 ICSID 
Convention can extend to international human rights law in specific circumstances. 
In relation to the phrase ‘directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute’ found in 
Article 46 ICSID Convention, a factual nexus is implied. The legal nexus advocated 
by the Saluka tribunal undermines the potential use of a host state human rights 
defence. However, the justifications provided in the tribunal’s reasoning are flawed 
given that they do not fully take into account the terms of the ICSID Convention. 
Consequently, it is posited that if a sufficient factual nexus can be established 
between the claims made by the foreign investor and the alleged international human 
rights violations claimed by the host state to justify its conduct, the jurisdiction of an 
ICSID tribunal encompasses a counterclaim based on international human rights law.  
5.3.2.3 Sourcing International Human Rights Law Obligations that Bind Foreign 
Investors  
For a host state to utilise counterclaim procedures, foreign investors must owe legal 
obligations to the host state.132 For the purposes of a host state human rights defence, 
the obligations will need to be sourced from the international human rights law 
regime. This is due to the lack of references to international human rights law in the 
instruments giving rise to a foreign investor’s obligations in international investment 
law. The ability of the foreign investor to owe obligations to the host state in the 
international arena is limited by the extent to which they possess international legal 
personality.  
As set out in Chapter 2, this thesis adopts a positivist stance, which affects 
the manner in which international legal personality is established.133 Given its focus 
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on consent, positivism requires that states confer international legal personality upon 
non-state actors, including foreign investors. They may do this expressly, such as 
through treaty terms, or act in a manner that implies that international legal 
personality is conferred upon non-state actors.134 If a state fails to confer 
international legal personality on a non-state actor, the non-state actor cannot possess 
rights or obligations in public international law. Hence, it is necessary to determine 
whether state consent, or conduct indicating consent, has been conferred upon 
foreign investors so that they owe obligations sourced in international human rights 
law to host states.  
In light of these issues, this section outlines examples of how international 
human rights law obligations from a variety of sources may bind foreign investors 
and thereby form the basis of a host state human rights defence.  
5.3.2.3.1 Treaty Law 
One of the principal sources of international human rights law is treaty law.135 Key 
international human rights law obligations are found in both international and 
regional treaties.136 Although treaties such as the ICCPR and ICESCR refer in their 
preambles to individuals ‘having duties to other individuals’, international human 
rights law treaties direct their legal obligations to the state parties. For example, 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any 
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kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.137 
This structure reflects the initial conception of human rights obligations as being a 
remedy against the abuse of power by the state.138  
The obligations imposed on states under international human rights law treaties 
are to respect, protect and fulfil the substantive rights set out in the treaty.139 To 
comply with the duty to protect, states must take measures to ensure that activities 
conducted on their territory do not lead to human rights violations.140 In particular, 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee has noted in relation to non-state 
actors in the context of Article 2(1) ICCPR:  
[t]he article 2, paragraph 1, obligations are binding on States [Parties] 
and do not, as such, have direct horizontal effect as a matter of 
international law. The Covenant cannot be viewed as a substitute for 
domestic criminal or civil law. However the positive obligations on 
States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if 
individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of 
Covenant rights by its against, but also against acts committed by private 
persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in 
so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or 
entities.141 
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The conduct of non-state actors can be controlled in a variety of ways, but is 
primarily regulated by the domestic law of the state.142 Foreign investors, when 
entering the territory of the host state, submit to its jurisdiction and, as a result, are 
governed by its domestic law. Therefore, it is the duty of the foreign investor to 
comply with the host state’s domestic law.143 Consequently, unlike states that are 
directly bound by international human rights law, foreign investors are only 
indirectly bound through the translation of international human rights law into 
domestic obligations.144 Thus, if a human rights violation is caused by a non-state 
actor, the conduct of the non-state actor is not attributed to the state.145 Rather, it is 
the state’s failure to protect that gives rise to its international responsibility.146  
In the case of international human rights law treaties, it is unlikely that a 
foreign investor will be directly bound by its terms as the prevailing structure found 
in the international human rights treaties considered in this thesis favours the 
imposition of indirect obligations on foreign investors.147 In light of this structure, 
states have not expressly or implicitly conferred foreign investors with international 
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legal personality under international human rights law treaties.148 As a result, it may 
be difficult for a host state to base the host state human rights defence on specific 
provisions drawn from these sources.  
Although international human rights law treaties are inapplicable, international 
criminal law treaties have created binding obligations on individuals for serious 
violations of both international humanitarian law and international human rights 
law.149 In the context of FDI, genocide and apartheid are two particularly pertinent 
examples. In Piero Foresti, discussed in Chapter 3, the impact of measures to 
counter apartheid were addressed. Claims relating to genocide have yet to be raised, 
however, the impact of investment projects on indigenous populations has the 
potential to give rise to such claims in the future, specifically in relation to 
investment projects that endanger the indigenous population’s way of life.  
The prohibition on genocide, sourced from both custom150 and with its 
component elements set out various treaty obligations,151 has been criminalised by 
Article 4 of the Genocide Convention,152 which provides: 
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible 
rulers, public officials or private individuals. 
Similarly, the human rights prohibition on racial discrimination153 corresponds with 
criminal responsibility for individuals set out in Article 3 of the 1973 Apartheid 
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Convention.154 As violations of some international human rights law violations 
simultaneously give rise to individual responsibility under international criminal law, 
it may be possible for host states to argue that foreign investors owe obligations to 
host states under international criminal law provisions for corresponding 
international human rights law violations.155 This is feasible as in these instances 
host states have conferred international legal responsibility, which allows individuals 
to be prosecuted for international crimes. 
 An initial difficulty with this proposal is that international criminal law 
usually only applies to natural persons rather than corporate bodies.156 For example, 
the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) only has jurisdiction to prosecute 
natural persons.157 This is sufficient for individual investors. However, as many 
foreign investors utilise a corporate form, for the purposes of a host state human 
rights defence, individual liability in international criminal law will need to be 
extended to encompass corporate bodies. This may be achieved in two ways. 
 The first is by recognising the criminal liability of corporate bodies. For 
example, in the I.G. Farben158 decision, the Nuremburg tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction over the corporate entities and could not find that they were criminal 
organisations.159 However, the corporations were imputed with criminal intentions 
based on the guilt of the individuals directing the act of the companies.160 This 
imputation prevented corporate bodies from being used to avoid criminal liability in 
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international law.161 By adopting a similar approach in light of the growing 
movement for corporate criminal liability in the form of corporate manslaughter,162 
the potential remains for the generation of corporate criminal responsibility.163 
Nonetheless, when establishing the jurisdiction of the ICC, states rejected the 
possibility of jurisdiction over corporate bodies due to the lack of consistent state 
practice in this field.164 Yet, this position was taken in relation to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC, rather than in relation to corporate criminal liability more generally in 
public international law.165 
 Alternatively, the corporate veil could be pierced to confer liability on the 
individuals behind the corporate entity. The ICJ in Barcelona Traction rejected this 
position in the context of diplomatic protection, on the basis that the company was a 
separate entity to its shareholders for the purposes of determining its nationality.166 
However, the possibility of piercing the corporate veil in other situations was left 
available, specifically when it is required to achieve justice in the case.167 Piercing 
the corporate veil in ICSID arbitration has primarily been argued as a means of 
determining the nationality of the foreign investor to identify whether the foreign 
investor is protected by a specific IIA.168 In this context, the principle has been 
considered in order to prevent corporate structures being used as a means of avoiding 
liability.169 The use of the principle in this way seeks to prevent injustice. Despite the 
limited use of this principle in both ICSID arbitration and public international law 
more generally, piercing the corporate veil in instances where individuals have used 
a corporate structure to avoid liability could amount to a general principle of 
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international law based on the general acceptance of this procedure to achieve justice 
in domestic legal systems.170 Given the seriousness of large scale or persistent 
breaches of international human rights law that simultaneously give rise to criminal 
liability in international law, it is arguable that if such an approach were a general 
principle of international law, this type of conduct would justify piercing the 
corporate veil in most jurisdictions.171  
 Should it be possible to bind the corporate foreign investor, or proceed 
against the individuals running the corporate body, it is posited that a host state 
human rights defence remains feasible against corporate foreign investors. By way 
of illustration, a corporate foreign investor persistently breaches international human 
rights law. The breaches amount to crimes in domestic law (either in relation to the 
individuals or the corporate body, depending on whether jurisdiction has corporate 
criminal liability). The host state has utilised its domestic law provisions to try and 
prevent further breaches, but the foreign investor persists despite the domestic law 
sanctions. The host state needs to stop the foreign investor from continuing to act in 
this manner. As the ICC does not have jurisdiction to hear the case regarding the 
international crimes being committed as corporate investors are not natural persons, 
the only means available to the host state is to evict the foreign investor and to 
breach the IIA. This action could then be justified by reference to the host state 
acting in accordance with international human rights law. The obligation owed to the 
host state by the foreign investor under international human rights law is governed 
by international criminal law (addressing the same conduct) thereby giving rise to 
the ability of the host state to present a counterclaim. The systemic nature of public 
international law permits the use of principles from different regimes and the use of 
these provisions fall within the remit of the ICSID Arbitral Rules based on the host 
state human rights defence proposed in this thesis.  
In summary, at present, such an approach could be applied to foreign 
investors acting in the capacity of natural persons, rather than through corporate 
structures. Should the corporate veil also be pierced, or criminal liability be 
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attributed to corporations, the application of the defence can be extended to 
corporate investors.  
5.3.2.3.2 Customary International Law 
International human rights law can also be sourced from customary international 
law, but the precise manner in which this can be achieved is not clear.172 This is 
because the formation of custom requires both consistent state practice, evidencing 
state compliance with the obligation, and opinio juris, demonstrating a psychological 
intention of the state to be bound by the obligation.173 Most state practice in relation 
to human rights principles evidences their violation by states, detracting from the 
requirement of consistent state compliance.174 Given this difficulty, various 
suggestions have been made to modify how custom operates to give rise to 
customary international human rights standards.175 However, to ensure the credibility 
of the host state human rights defence, it is submitted that both of the elements 
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required to form customary international law should be established.176 Therefore, 
accepted principles of customary international human rights law, where both these 
elements have been satisfied, will be examined to determine if they confer foreign 
investors with international legal personality. 
A number of provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 (UDHR) are widely considered to provide a clear basis for customary 
international human rights law obligations.177 Whilst this is a non-binding 
instrument, its content forms the basis of most treaty based human rights 
obligations.178 Even if these principles may not have amounted to customary 
international law at the time the ICCPR and the ICESCR were drafted,179 the 
widespread ratification and entry into force of these treaties would indicate that 
states deem themselves legally bound by the principles contained within these 
treaties, whose genesis was the UDHR.180 
The ICJ has declared principles from the UDHR to be customary in nature.181 
Although the ICJ rejected the overall claim in the South West Africa cases, which 
drew heavily on the UDHR, Judge Tanaka’s dissenting opinion clarified the role of 
the UDHR in the formation of customary international law by stating that it 
‘constitute[s] evidence of the interpretation and application of the relevant Charter 
provisions’.182 The ability of the UDHR to form custom was set out in Vice-
President Ammoun’s Separate Opinion in Namibia (South West Africa) where he 
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identified that the right to equality was a binding customary norm.183 Further, in the 
Tehran Hostages decision, the ICJ inferred the binding nature of principles drawn 
from the UDHR when it stated that: 
Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject 
them to physical restraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly 
incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as 
well as with the fundamental principles enumerated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.184 
Whilst the formation of customary international law under the UDHR is a necessary 
pre-requisite for a host state human rights defence that is based on customary 
international human rights law, it is also a requirement that obligations be imposed 
upon foreign investors.  
The application of binding obligations of customary international human 
rights law on non-state actors is often premised on the opening paragraph of the 
UDHR.185 This refers to the role of ‘every individual and every organ of society’ in 
promoting respect for human rights to ensure their ‘universal and effective 
recognition and observance’. However, the significance of this terminology is 
unclear as the obligations set out in its operative paragraphs are clearly directed at 
states.186 Further, Article 29(1) has been suggested as forming the basis for the 
UDHR’s universally binding nature.187 It refers to everyone having ‘duties to the 
community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
possible’. Yet, despite the reference to the role of individuals, much like the 
preamble of the ICCPR and ICESCR, Article 29(1) UDHR fails to set out specific 
obligations for non-state actors.188 These provisions do not clearly establish that the 
customary obligations contained in the UDHR are binding on individuals such as 
foreign investors. This position is supported by a lack of agreement between states 
on this point. Various interpretations of these terms are evidenced in the travaux 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Advisory Opinion (Advisory 
Opinion) [1971] ICJ Reports 16, 76. 
184 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
(Judgment) [1980] ICJ Rep 3 42. 
185 Paust, 'The Other Side of Right: Private Duties under Human Rights Law' (n 134) 53; Vázquez  (n 
143) 942; JA Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and 
Opportunities in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2006) 77; McBeth (n 133) 60. 
186 Hessbruegge (n 138) 35. 
187 Zerk (n 185) 77; McBeth (n 133) 60. 
188 Hessbruegge (n 138) 35. 
 
	  
	   	   181 
preparatoires to the UDHR, which have not been reconciled by subsequent 
practice.189 Consequently, although some substantive principles of the UDHR can be 
considered to be obligations sourced from customary international law, they only 
bind states.  
This position is unlikely to differ in relation other instruments that may give 
rise to customary international human rights law.  The UDHR has formed the 
foundation of most international human rights law documents.190 International 
human rights law treaties, as discussed above, only indirectly bind foreign investors. 
State practice is yet to consistently evidence direct responsibility for human rights 
violations being conferred upon non-state actors.191 Without state consent, non-state 
actors, including foreign investors, are not conferred with international legal 
personality, and hence, cannot be held to be responsible in the international arena. 
Therefore, it does not appear that international human rights law obligations sourced 
from customary international law are capable of forming the binding obligation on 
foreign investors that is required to establish a host state human rights defence. 
Despite this conclusion, similarly to international human rights law treaties, 
should a principle of customary international human rights law have a corresponding 
obligation in international criminal law, this would establish a binding obligation on 
a foreign investor.  
5.3.2.3.3 Jus Cogens 
International human rights law can also be sourced from principles deemed to be jus 
cogens in nature.192 Jus cogens are peremptory norms, and as such, are deemed to 
take priority over other conflicting norms in public international law.193 Given their 
perceived supremacy, they may give rise to binding obligations on foreign investors. 
However, they also need to align with a positivist approach to public international 
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law. This requires evidence that states have consented to these principles possessing 
their peremptory status. 
Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT provide that jus cogens obligations prevail 
over inconsistent treaty obligations. Thus, these articles clearly evidence state 
consent to the increased standing of jus cogens obligations given their treaty basis 
and can be established by reference to positivist theory.194 Still, the increased 
standing of jus cogens obligations outside of the scope of the VCLT undermines 
their positivist foundation.  
Outside the remit of the VCLT, jus cogens obligations override all contrary 
international and domestic law regardless of state consent or persistent objector 
status.195 Their application in this manner directly contradicts a positivist conception 
of public international law. As a result, jus cogens have been described as displaying 
‘enhanced normativity’.196 The exact foundation for jus cogens operating in this way 
is unclear, and has been variably sourced from natural law, necessity, international 
public order, and the development of constitutional principles.197 For example, jus 
cogens obligations have been referred to as consisting of general principles or 
morality common to all civilised states198 that are necessary for a state to retain its 
status as a state.199  
Despite attempts to justify the conception of jus cogens norms, the lack of 
state consent undermines their legitimacy within positivist theory.200 As states have 
not conferred jus cogens norms with this higher status, positivism does not deem 
them to be bound by their enhanced characteristics.201 Further, given the peremptory 
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nature of jus cogens norms, states are unable to avoid their application, minimising 
the role of state consent. As such, the role of jus cogens in public international law is 
unclear: 
The theory of jus cogens or peremptory norms posits the existence of 
rules of international law that admit of no derogation and that can be 
amended only by a new general norm of international law of the same 
value. It is a concept that lacks both an agreed content and consensus in 
state practice. In most instances it is also an unnecessary concept because 
… the derogating act violates treaty or custom and thus contravenes 
international law without the need to label the norm peremptory.202 
The lack of a clear foundation for jus cogens norms in a positivist conception of 
public international law (apart from under the VCLT) undermines their utility as a 
source of obligations that bind foreign investors. On this basis, they will not be 
discussed in further detail for this purpose. 
5.3.2.3.4 Soft Law 
A further source of potential obligations in international law is soft law. Soft law is 
playing an increasing role in addressing the scope of human rights obligations of 
foreign investors, most specifically those utilising a corporate form.203 The term ‘soft 
law’, as used in this thesis, refers to principles of law that are not legally binding due 
to a lack of recognition as a formal source of law,204 usually due to a lack of state 
consent.205 Although not legally binding, ‘soft law’ may influence the development 
of binding legal standards and consequently, may be indicative of future legal 
standards.206 On this basis, soft law will be examined to determine if binding legal 
standards might form a basis for a host state human rights defence in the near future.  
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 Current soft law initiatives207 that have the potential to, or actually address 
the human rights obligations of foreign investors, focus on the corporate social 
responsibility of multinational corporations. These tend to be voluntary initiatives 
such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises208 or the UN Global 
Compact,209 both of which encourage corporate bodies to act consistently with 
international human rights law.210 These instruments do not attempt to generate any 
legal obligation on corporate bodies that may include foreign investors.211 Further, 
there is no indication that obligations of this type are likely to become legally 
binding on foreign investors in the near future as these initiatives stress that 
upholding human rights standards is primarily the responsibility of states.212 This is 
because prior attempts to initiate legally binding obligation for corporate bodies have 
been met with strong resistance from corporate bodies.  
 The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (UN Norms) were drafted 
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as a set of binding obligations that required corporate bodies to comply with 
international human rights law.213 The legal foundation for the UN Norms was set 
out in its General Obligation in the following terms: 
States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment 
of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in 
international as well as national law, including ensuring that 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises respect human 
rights. Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises have the 
obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of 
and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national 
law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other 
vulnerable groups.214 
As the UN Norms were presented as being ‘non-voluntary’,215 the business 
community did not accept these terms,216 which, in turn, resulted in the abandonment 
of the UN Norms.217  
In response, the UN Secretary General appointed a Special Representative to 
clarify the roles and responsibilities of States, companies and other actors in the 
business and human rights sphere.218 The UN Special Representative, Ruggie, has 
retreated from attempting to generate legally binding obligations for non-state actors 
in this sphere. Instead, he has established a framework whereby States have a duty to 
protect human rights and corporations have a responsibility to respect human 
rights.219 The corporate responsibility is mainly to conduct due diligence in order to 
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avoid human rights violations.220 It is defined as a responsibility rather than an 
obligation under international human rights law221 to encompass the idea that 
violations may not have legal consequences.222  
The failure of the UN Norms to establish a legally binding regime for 
corporate human rights obligations, and the subsequent retreat from this approach in 
the Ruggie Framework, indicate that the creation of binding legal obligations will 
not be forthcoming in the short term, hindering a more widespread basis upon which 
host states can establish a host state human rights defence. 
5.3.2.3.5 Domestic Law 
As part of states’ obligation to fulfil under international human rights law, they must 
enforce human rights at a domestic level.223 This is often achieved through the 
adoption of domestic laws that mirror international human rights law standards.224 
As a result, domestic provisions reflect international human rights law found in 
treaties. Foreign investors are bound by the domestic law of the host state in which 
they invest.225 Therefore, given the similar content of domestic and international 
obligations, domestic law provisions may provide a source of international human 
rights law obligations that are binding on a foreign investor. Based on a positivist 
conception of public international law, this is the final option from which to source 
binding legal obligations. 
The means by which international human rights law will be implemented into 
domestic law will depend on the constitution of the state in question.226 Customary 
international law is usually automatically binding.227 However, some state 
constitutions require that treaty based international law be incorporated into 
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domestic law by virtue of legislation.228 Other jurisdictions automatically incorporate 
the terms of treaty based international law into domestic law without any further 
steps.229 In states that require the incorporation of international law, it may be 
difficult to clearly identify the obligation as being sourced from international human 
rights law. For example, the right to life may correspond to a prohibition on murder 
within a criminal law regime. Other rights may be implemented in other criminal or 
tortious provisions. Whether based on international human rights law sourced from 
customary international law or treaty law, the host state will need to identify and 
correlate the domestic legal provisions with the international obligation to show that 
it is sourced in international human rights law. Provided the link to international 
human rights law can be established, it is arguable that a general domestic provision 
that gives effect to an international human rights law obligation can form the basis of 
a host state human rights defence given its binding nature on the foreign investor.  
5.3.2.3.6 Preliminary Conclusion  
In summary, given the restrictive approach taken by positivism to the transfer of 
international legal personality to non-state actors, there are very few sources of 
international human rights law that directly bind foreign investors. This is 
particularly true of customary international law and principles deemed to be jus 
cogens in nature. Whilst international human rights law treaties cannot bind foreign 
investors independently, when combined with corresponding provisions in 
international criminal law treaties, a host state human rights defence becomes 
feasible. Individual investors can currently be bound by a host state human rights 
defence sourced from these instruments. Corporate investors can also be bound if 
general principles of international law permit the piercing of the corporate veil. 
International human rights law provisions that take a domestic form will also bind 
foreign investors. It does not appear that other sources of binding obligations will be 
forthcoming in the near future based on existing soft law provisions. Should a 
theoretical basis that is more conducive to establishing international legal personality 
be adopted, the scope of the host state human rights defence could be extended 
further. 
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5.3.3 Preliminary Conclusion 
Counterclaims provide an appropriate mechanism by which international human 
rights law can be introduced into ICSID arbitration in the form of a host state human 
rights defence. The attributes of counterclaims meet the criteria sought in a host state 
human rights defence. They are sourced in ICSID Arbitral Practice, conferring them 
with sufficient credibility. Additionally, they can achieve the aim of minimising dual 
liability for host states.  
 When applying counterclaims, host states should be able to meet all of the 
necessary elements set out in Article 46 ICSID Convention. Provided that party 
consent as set out in the applicable IIA covers ‘any’ or ‘all’ disputes, an ICSID 
arbitral tribunal should permit counterclaims. Some ICSID arbitral tribunals may 
permit counterclaims on the basis of the foreign investor commencing ICSID 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the host states’ standing offer. However, 
this is not guaranteed, and although beneficial for a host state human rights defence, 
does not fit the positivist framework adopted in this thesis. 
 There should also be a sufficient nexus between international investment law 
and international human rights law to satisfy the dual subject matter jurisdiction 
elements set out in Article 46 ICSID Convention. Provided that the violations of 
international human rights law by the foreign investor are the cause of the host 
state’s breaches of the IIA, the requirements of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention 
will be met. Further, the factual connection that gives rise to the intersection of 
international human rights law and international investment law will meet the 
requirement that the counterclaim must ‘arise directly from the subject-matter of the 
dispute’. This is despite the ruling in Saluka, which was premised on incorrect 
assumptions regarding the status of the law. 
 Finally, international human rights law treaties (and potentially custom), in 
conjunction with international criminal law treaties, provide binding legal 
obligations on individual foreign investors. Additionally, domestic law 
manifestations of international human rights law also act as a source of law that can 
form the basis of a host state counterclaim grounded in international human rights 
law. The sources available are limited due to the positivist legal framework adopted 
in this thesis. 
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5.4 APPLICABLE LAW 
Counterclaim procedures in ICSID arbitration are the most promising means of 
establishing the jurisdictional foundation on which to base a host state human rights 
defence.230 Although counterclaims permit a host state to refer to international 
human rights law that binds a foreign investor before an ICSID arbitral tribunal, the 
ICSID arbitral tribunal must be able to apply international human rights law231 for a 
host state human rights defence to be implemented. Therefore, this section considers 
whether obligations sourced jointly from international human rights law and 
international criminal law, and international human rights law sourced from 
domestic law, form part of the applicable law of an ICSID arbitral tribunal in 
accordance with Article 42(1) ICSID Convention.  
5.4.1 Identifying the Applicable Law in ICSID Arbitration  
Applicable law is the substantive law that an ICSID arbitral tribunal refers to when 
determining the merits of the issues in dispute between the parties.232 Article 42(1) 
ICSID Convention governs the process of determining the substantive law that 
applies in ICSID arbitration.233 It states:  
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of 
law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, 
the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the 
dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of 
international law as may be applicable. 
The first sentence of Article 42(1) ICSID Convention addresses the situation where 
the parties have agreed the applicable substantive rules of law. In contrast, the 
second sentence of Article 42(1) ICSID Convention provides the mechanism by 
which an ICSID arbitral tribunal is to determine the appropriate substantive law in 
the absence of a selection by the parties. The application of these two approaches 
will be examined in turn to identify the circumstances in which international human 
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rights law that binds a foreign investor can potentially form part of the applicable 
law of an ICSID tribunal.  
5.4.1.1 Agreed Choice of Law 
The first sentence of Article 42(1) ICSID Convention draws upon the principle of 
party autonomy234 to permit the disputing parties to select the applicable law 
governing the dispute.235 The choice of applicable law can be sourced in a direct 
agreement between the parties,236 in domestic legislation,237 or in an IIA that offers 
consent to ICSID arbitration.238 Although stated as a choice of law, should the 
applicable law be sourced in the IIA, the foreign investor will not have selected the 
applicable law, as this instrument is negotiated by the host state and the home state 
of the foreign investor.239 However, by consenting to ICSID arbitration in the terms 
offered, the foreign investor is deemed to have consented to any choice of applicable 
law in the IIA.240 Hence, the applicable law clause set out in an IIA is considered to 
represent the choice of the disputing parties. 
Determining the parties’ choice of applicable law is a matter of interpreting 
the intentions of the parties.241 Therefore, rather than analysing Article 42(1) ICSID 
Convention, it is necessary to interpret the terms used by the parties when expressing 
their choice of applicable law.242 The parties should make the choice of applicable 
law clearly and unequivocally.243 Nonetheless, there is no requirement that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 A Maniruzzaman, 'International Commercial Arbitration: The Conflict of Laws Issues in 
Determining the Applicable Substantive Law in the Context of Investment Agreements' (1993) 40 
Netherlands International Law Review 201, 233; A Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID 
and Other Subjects of Public and Private International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 182 – 183, 184; 
O Chukwumerije, 'International Law and Article 42 of the ICSID Convention' (1997) 14 Journal of 
International Arbitration 79, 83, 85; Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (n 113) 553, 
558 – 559; RH Kriendler, 'The Law Applicable to International Investment Disputes' in N Horn (ed), 
Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law 
International 2004) 402; Begic (n 232) 5, 11, 13; Leeks (n 233) 10; Banifatemi (n 232) 191, 192; Y 
Kryvoi, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International 2010) 
61.  
235 Begic (n 232) 5. 
236 Kryvoi, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (n 234) 61. 
237 Ibid. 
238 A Parra, 'Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiatived Under Investment Treaties' 
(2001) 16 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 20, 21. 
239 See Asian Agricultural Products LTD (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka ICSID Case No. 
ARB/87/3, Final Award, 27 June 1990 [19] – [20]. 
240 Banifatemi (n 232) 195; See Antoine Goetz and others v. Republic of Burundi [II] [94]. 
241 Banifatemi (n 232) 199. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid 198. 
 
	  
	   	   191 
parties make an express choice of law. Consequently, the parties may imply a choice 
of law.244 In making a determination regarding the applicable law when an implicit 
choice has been made, tribunals have referred to provisions set out in domestic 
legislation permitting ICSID arbitration,245 the terms of IIAs conferring ICSID with 
jurisdiction,246 and the submissions of the disputing parties247 to identify the 
applicable law that the parties are seeking to rely upon. When interpreting an implied 
choice of law, tribunals need to ensure that the surrounding circumstances support 
their conclusion.248 If no choice of law can be discerned, the tribunal may reach the 
conclusion that no choice of law has been made,249 invoking the second sentence of 
Article 42(1) ICSID Convention.250 
When making their choice regarding the applicable law, the parties may 
select either domestic law or international law, both domestic and international law 
or may select particular ‘rules of law’ to govern selected aspects of their 
agreement.251 They may also limit the applicable law to the IIA being interpreted.252 
As a result, there are a variety of means by which the international human rights law 
that binds a foreign investor could fall within the scope of an ICSID tribunal’s 
applicable law.253 
First, the parties may make an express or implied choice of law that 
encompasses international human rights law. In doing so, any choice must also 
include international criminal law, as the ICSID arbitral tribunal will need to 
determine if the obligations relied on by the host state are binding on the foreign 
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investor. This is most likely to be achieved by a choice of international law in 
general terms, rather than by a specific reference to international human rights law 
and international criminal law. International law may be identified as the only form 
of applicable law,254 or it may be selected in conjunction with domestic law.255 
International law in Article 42(1) ICSID Convention should be understood as 
referring to law that can be traced to those sources set out in Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the ICJ.256 Whilst a reference to international law is likely to be interpreted 
as being restricted to principles of international investment law or those of treaty 
interpretation,257 the sources of international law that may be referred to are capable 
of including international human rights law and international criminal law. Thus, in 
theory, there is no reason to prevent international human rights law and international 
criminal law being referred to by an ICSID arbitral tribunal, especially if a 
counterclaim relying on these principles is before an ICSID arbitral tribunal. 
The second means by which international human rights law may form part of 
the applicable law of the tribunal is through the selection of domestic law. In this 
instance, international human rights law obligations only need to be reflected in 
domestic law, as the binding obligation on the foreign investor is established through 
the foreign investor submitting to the host state’s jurisdiction. Should a domestic 
legal regime be chosen as the applicable law, any principles of international human 
rights law that are incorporated into the domestic law of that state will fall within the 
scope of the applicable law.258 When selecting domestic rules, the parties do not 
need to refer to the domestic law of the host state (although the adoption of another 
state’s laws is unlikely).259 Consequently, the content of the legal rules will need to 
be examined to determine whether obligations set out in international human rights 
law are reflected in the domestic laws selected.  
If the state whose rules are selected is party to international human rights law 
obligations at a treaty level, it is likely that domestic rules will reflect at least some 
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of these obligations, as states party to international human rights law are obliged to 
implement these principles in domestic law as part of their obligation to enforce 
international human rights law.260 However, due to the differing ways in which legal 
systems give effect to, and prioritise international legal principles, this approach is 
not guaranteed to result in international human rights obligations being applied in the 
manner envisaged by the parties to the human rights treaty.261 It will also be 
necessary for the host state to connect the domestic law with the international human 
rights law obligation to demonstrate that the domestic provision is an embodiment of 
the international rule. This may prove to be a difficult task. Therefore, this option 
may entail more risk for a host state should they seek to refer to applicable law 
sourced in domestic provisions when attempting to invoke the host state human 
rights defence. A direct reference to international law in the choice of law is 
preferable. 
 Finally, even if the parties have not expressly or implicitly chosen 
international human rights law (in either its international or domestic law forms) as 
their applicable law, it may still be able to be invoked in certain circumstances.262 
Principles drawn from public international law may be referred to by the ICSID 
arbitral tribunal, to give effect to the parties’ choice of law, despite the parties not 
selecting international law as the applicable law. For example, the interpretation of 
IIAs may require reference to principles of treaty interpretation founded on public 
international law.263 It is unlikely that principles drawn from international human 
rights law will be required to serve this purpose in the absence of a host state human 
rights defence. Nevertheless, should a host state human rights defence be introduced 
into ICSID practice, it may be necessary for an ICSID arbitral tribunal to make 
reference to international human rights law (and potentially international criminal 
law) to give effect to the defence. Consequently, this supplementary means of 
referring to international law may justify the inclusion of international human rights 
law within the applicable law of an ICSID arbitral tribunal. 
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 Thus, when the disputing parties have made either an express or implied 
choice to include international law within the applicable law of an ICSID tribunal, it 
is likely to include international human rights law. A choice of domestic law may 
also indirectly include principles drawn from international human rights law, 
although these may not be as easy to identify, or be applied by an ICSID arbitral 
tribunal in the same manner as their corresponding international obligations. As a 
result, domestic law embodiments of international human rights law are not as 
preferable as direct references to international law. Should a host state human rights 
defence be established, international human rights law may also be referred to by an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal in the absence of international law being chosen by the 
parties to ensure the defence is effective.  
5.4.1.2 Absence of Agreed Choice of Law 
The failure of the disputing parties to choose the applicable law does not prevent the 
host state from being able to invoke international human rights law to support a host 
state human rights defence. In the absence of an express or implied agreement by the 
parties on the substantive law that is to be applied to resolve the dispute, the second 
sentence of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention applies.264 This sentence is 
intended to provide certainty by ensuring that rules of substantive law can be applied 
to a dispute.265 The default position under this provision is that the law of the host 
state is to be applied (in conjunction with international law).266 This is because the 
law of the host state is most likely to be the law that has the closest connection to the 
investment that is the subject of the dispute.267 The law of the host state remains the 
default position, but is nonetheless subject to the operation of conflict of laws rules. 
Therefore, if another domestic legal system is more closely connected to the 
investment, that law is to be applied instead.268 This should be an ICSID tribunal’s 
first step in determining the applicable law in the absence of an agreement between 
the parties.269 As a result, much like an agreed choice of law, domestic law may 
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permit a host state to correlate the domestic provision with an obligation sourced in 
international human rights law. 
 In addition the law of the host state (or the most appropriate law under the 
host state’s conflict of laws rules) the applicable law also includes international law. 
This strengthens the ability of a host state to refer to international human rights law 
obligations in the absence of an agreed choice of law. For the purposes of Article 
42(1) ICSID Convention, international law refers to those sources of law referred to 
in Article 38(1) Statute of the ICJ.270 ICSID practice has also extended this scope to 
consideration of prior decisions and soft law instruments such as UN General 
Assembly Resolutions.271 
 However, the application of international law as the substantive law of ICSID 
arbitration is limited to instances in which it ‘may be applicable’. When determining 
the circumstances in which international law is applicable, the conventional 
interpretation given to this provision is to limit the role of international law to fill 
lacuna in domestic law, or alternatively to correct the law should domestic law be in 
violation of principles of international law.272 Consequently, to ensure that host state 
law (or the law to be applied under the host state’s conflict of laws rules) is in 
compliance with international law, both legal systems should be applied to the 
dispute before the ICSID tribunal.273 Domestic law will be the primary source of law 
unless the principles relied upon are only located in international law, or domestic 
law principles are in violation of international law.274 In these instances, reference 
should be made to principles found in international law.275 Hence, the role of 
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international law is more limited in the absence of agreement between the parties 
than when its use has been agreed. 
 It posited that, should this interpretation be adopted, the relationship between 
international law and domestic law would permit international human rights law (and 
international criminal law) to form part of the applicable law of the ICSID tribunal. 
Should the relevant provisions of international human rights law be found in the 
applicable domestic law, they will indirectly apply (albeit subject to potentially 
different interpretations). If there is a lacuna in the domestic law, in that the 
provisions cannot be sourced in national law, then international human rights law 
(and international criminal law) can be applied to fill this lacuna. Further, if any 
provisions in the domestic law are inconsistent with international human rights law, 
international law will prevail. Consequently, international human rights law can 
form part of the applicable law even when not expressly selected by the disputing 
parties. Therefore, should a host state human rights defence be introduced into 
ICSID arbitral practice, it would be supported by this approach to the second 
sentence of Article 42(1) ICSID Convention. 
 An alternative view regarding the manner in which the relationship between 
domestic and international should be approached is that both domestic law and 
international law should be applied with equal weight.276 This interpretation has been 
argued to focus on the use of ‘and’ between domestic law and international law in 
the second sentence of Article 42(1) ICSID Convention.277 This requires an ICSID 
tribunal to consider the issue in dispute and undertake a process of classifying it to 
determine whether domestic or international law should apply278 and utilising 
domestic law and international law in a complementary manner.279 Such an approach 
is supported by the decision in Wena Hotels v Egypt (Annulment Decision) where it 
was stated that: 
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What is clear is that the sense and meaning of the negotiations leading to 
the second sentence of Article 42(1) allowed for both legal orders to 
have a role. The law of the host State can indeed be applied in 
conjunction with international law if this is justified. So too international 
law can be applied by itself if the appropriate rule is found in this other 
ambit.280 
This approach has been reflected in ICSID awards including Santa Elena v Costa 
Rica281 and several awards considering the customary law of the state of necessity in 
light of Argentina’s 2001/2002 financial crisis (discussed in Chapter 3).  In the CMS 
v Argentina decision, the tribunal justified its approach in the following terms ‘[a] 
more pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach has emerged, allowing for the 
application of both domestic law and international law if the specific facts of the 
dispute so justifies’.282 
Should both domestic law and international law apply simultaneously, this 
would also permit international human rights law to form part of the applicable law 
of an ICSID arbitral tribunal. This is due to the process of classifying the nature of 
the law before determining its appropriate source. The introduction of a host state 
human rights defence would require that host state arguments be classified as being 
governed by international law, which in turn, would enable the ICSID tribunal to 
refer to international human rights law as part of the applicable law to apply the 
defence. 
The divergence in approaches to the relationship between domestic law and 
international law within the second sentence of Article 42(1) ICSID Convention 
remains contentious, with ICSID arbitral tribunals applying both approaches.283 
Whilst a consistent approach in ICSID arbitration would be desirable, it is submitted 
that the purpose of the second sentence of Article 42(1) ICSID Convention is not to 
prescribe the manner in which international law and domestic law interrelate.284 
Rather, this is a matter for ICSID tribunals to develop as part of their arbitral 
practice.285 As Broches recognised, the importance of Article 42(1) ICSID 
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Convention is not in its prescriptive nature, but ‘lies in the fact that it opens the way 
for tribunals to pronounce themselves on these questions and thus to contribute to the 
further development of international law in this field’.286 
Consequently, the extent to which international human rights law can be 
considered to fall within the applicable law of an ICSID tribunal in the absence of 
any agreement between the parties remains dependent on the tribunal’s interpretation 
of the second sentence of Article 42(1) ICSID Convention. In accordance with both 
interpretations, international law forms part of the applicable law. However, if a 
narrow interpretation is taken, international law may not be referred to unless 
domestic law fails to address the point raised, or international law is inconsistent 
with the domestic law in issue. In accordance with a wider interpretation, an ICSID 
arbitral tribunal could apply any law that is classified as being sourced from 
international law. In both instances, international human rights law could be 
introduced. However, the wider interpretation is more receptive to the direct 
application of international human rights law as compared to provisions that reflect 
its content in domestic law provisions, thereby benefitting the operation of a host 
state human rights defence. 
5.4.1.3 The Role of Secondary Rules - Systemic Integration 
Reference to international law does not only refer to substantive principles of public 
international law.287 It can also refer to secondary rules of public international law.288 
Of particular relevance to the applicable law of an ICSID arbitral tribunal is the role 
that treaty interpretation may play by indirectly introducing international human 
rights law through the process of systemic integration.289  
As outlined in Chapter 2, systemic integration relies on Article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT to require that, when interpreting a treaty, its relationship with other 
principles of public international law should be taken into account. A reference to 
international law in the applicable law of an ICSID arbitral tribunal includes Article 
31(3)(c) VCLT. Hence, systemic integration could permit ICSID arbitral tribunals to 
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refer to international human rights law when interpreting IIAs. Therefore, although 
not a direct means of establishing a host state human rights defence, systemic 
integration provides an additional means by which international human rights could 
form part of the applicable law of an ICSID arbitral tribunal when international law 
is selected by the parties, or applies by default. A full discussion of the potential role 
of systemic integration in achieving this aim is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, should a host state human rights defence become fully functional, this 
may provide a further means of introducing international human rights law into the 
applicable law of an ICSID arbitral tribunal. 
5.4.2 Preliminary Conclusion 
International human rights law is capable of forming part of the applicable law as 
either international law or domestic legal provisions. The manner in which it arises 
will depend on the precise terms of the choice of applicable law clause and the 
circumstances in which the tribunal might seek to rely on it. 
 If the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed the applicable law, and have 
selected international law, given its broad scope, there is no reason to exclude 
international human rights law and international criminal law from its remit. If 
domestic law is selected, international human rights law will apply in its municipal 
form. A host state may need to identify the obligation in international human rights 
law and ensure that the principles align. Thus, an express reference to international 
law is preferable.  
 Should the parties fail to agree on the applicable law, international human 
rights law is still likely to apply. The manner in which it applies will depend on the 
interpretation given to the second sentence of Article 42(1) ICSID Convention. 
Should the traditional approach apply, the role of international law will be limited to 
correcting domestic law or filling lacunae. If a wider interpretation is given to the 
provision, international law will apply simultaneously with domestic law. Whilst the 
wider interpretation gives more scope for the introduction of international human 
rights law to be applied by the ICSID arbitral tribunal, both interpretations permit an 
ICSID arbitral tribunal to refer to international human rights law. Once a host state 
human rights defence is established, Article 42 ICSID Convention may be 
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supplemented by principles drawn from secondary rules such as systemic 
integration. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
A substantive host state human rights defence is the most feasible form of host state 
human rights defence, despite being more complex to argue than a procedural 
defence. Current defences in ICSID arbitration are unable to achieve what is required 
from a host state human rights defence. However, counterclaim procedures in ICSID 
arbitration provide a clear foundation for a host state human rights defence. In doing 
so, they meet the desirable characteristics of a host state human rights defence 
identified in Chapter 3 which are that the defence should be established outside of 
the terms of the IIA, that it exists in ICSID arbitral practice, minimises the risk of 
dual liability for host states and that it can be augmented by amicus curiae 
procedures. Although counterclaims do not preclude the host state’s liability, they 
act in such a way so as to permit a host state to seek compensation from the foreign 
investor for violations of international human rights law. This sum is balanced 
against the value of the foreign investor’s successful claims. 
To rely on counterclaim procedures, Article 46 ICSID Convention must be 
complied with. This requires the consent of the disputing parties to hear a 
counterclaim. To increase the likelihood of an ICSID arbitral tribunal applying a 
counterclaim, consent to counterclaims should be phrased in wide terms permitting 
‘any’ or ‘all’ disputes to be heard by the tribunal. Further, a sufficient nexus between 
international investment law and international human rights law must be established. 
Although this element has been interpreted in a contentious manner, it remains 
possible to meet this criterion if a factual basis is used to establish the necessary 
connection between the counterclaim and the originating claim. This is likely to arise 
when a host state seeks to justify any breaches of the IIA by reference to the foreign 
investor’s violations of international human rights law.  
Finally, a host state must be able to identify a breach of an obligation owed to 
it by the foreign investor. Based on a positivist interpretation of public international 
law, this can be sourced from a combination of international human rights law and 
international criminal law, or alternatively, from domestic law manifestations of 
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international human rights law. Further options could arise if a less restrictive 
theoretical foundation was applied. 
As the foreign investor can be bound by obligations derived from 
international human rights law, it is necessary to consider whether ICSID arbitral 
tribunals can apply these standards. When determining whether international human 
rights law can be applied to a dispute before an ICSID tribunal the applicable law 
must be identified. This is determined by following the procedure in Article 42 
ICSID Convention. Initially, the choice of law agreed by the disputing parties should 
be considered. International human rights law (and international criminal law) fall 
within the definition of international law. International human rights law can also be 
sourced from domestic law. In the absence of a choice of law, the ICSID arbitral 
tribunal may apply both domestic law and international law. Still, the degree to 
which international law can be referenced will depend on the interpretation of the 
second sentence of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention.  
 Having established this framework, it is possible to conclude that, in limited 
circumstances, a substantive host state human rights defence is feasible within 
ICSID arbitration. A procedural foundation exists that is capable of introducing 
international human rights law before an ICSID arbitral tribunal in the form of 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The diversification and specialisation of public international law brought about the 
creation of lex specialis regimes. The extent to which these lex specialis regimes 
interact, or alternatively, fail to interact, has given rise to claims that public 
international law has undergone a process of ‘fragmentation’. The impact of 
‘fragmentation’ is evidenced by the intersection between the lex specialis regimes of 
international investment law and international human rights law in investment 
disputes. This interaction is most likely to arise when host state regulatory conduct 
violates investment protection standards due to the host state seeking to comply with 
obligations drawn from the international human rights law regime. As a result, host 
states may find themselves in a position where they are faced with a normative 
conflict and, hence, potential international responsibility for their failure to comply 
with an international obligation drawn from either of these regimes. ICSID 
arbitration is not able to easily reconcile this conflict given its preference to resolve 
FDI disputes exclusively by reference to international investment law. This is a 
direct result of the historical context in which ICSID arbitration arose.  
 This thesis has argued that it is possible to reconcile the conflict that arises 
from the fragmented nature of the international investment law and international 
human rights law regimes by demonstrating a procedural basis on which a host state 
human rights defence can be established in ICSID arbitration. This evidences that the 
process of ‘de-fragmentation’ can be achieved.  
 Chapter 2 ascertained that a positivist conception of public international law, 
as opposed to a naturalist conception, provided the strongest theoretical basis for this 
thesis. Positivism was selected as it enabled the formulation of a widely acceptable 
and justifiable host state human rights defence and, thus, enhanced its credibility. A 
consent driven theoretical foundation foreclosed potential criticisms based on the 
selection of a theoretical basis that favoured the moral nature of a host state human 
rights defence. The implications of adopting a positivist approach are that foreign 
investors are not imbued with international legal personality unless it has been 
expressly or implied conferred by states. Although this may be perceived to be a 
conservative understanding of public international law, it reinforces the strong 
foundation required for a widely accepted host state human rights defence. 
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 Additionally, the operation of the defence is based on a systemic viewpoint 
of public international law. The systemic nature of public international law was 
determined by reference to its unifying characteristics, namely, general principles 
and secondary norms. Further, definitions of the interrelated notions of ‘unity’ and 
‘fragmentation’ were elaborated in order to enable the evaluation of the current 
relationship between international investment law and international human rights 
law. The term ‘unity’ refers to substantive unity, that is, unity that prevents conflict 
between substantive norms of public international law.1 ‘Fragmentation’ refers to the 
process by which individual areas of public international law are becoming 
increasingly specialised and divided, that legal principles are becoming incoherent, 
and, as a consequence, public international law is losing general applicability and, 
simultaneously, its cohesiveness.2 ‘Unity’ and ‘fragmentation’ exist simultaneously, 
however, when characteristics associated with fragmentation become too prominent, 
the lack of unity within public international law results in regime conflict. Hence, the 
host state human rights defence was subsequently established by reference to these 
concepts. 
 By utilising the notion of regime conflict, Chapter 3 demonstrated that the 
introduction of a host state human rights defence is necessary to ‘de-fragment’ 
international investment law and international human rights law. To achieve this, 
contemporary regime conflict was considered from three different perspectives: the 
attempted introduction of international human rights law in IIAs; the manner in 
which international human rights law arguments have been received by ICSID 
arbitral tribunals; and the role of amicus curiae in ICSID arbitration.  
 Initially, Chapter 3 evidenced the fragmented nature of international 
investment law and international human rights law in IIAs by reference to attempts 
by states to introduce provisions addressing international human rights law, 
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international environmental law and international labour standards into their Model 
BITs. The absence of provisions addressing international human rights law in IIAs 
can be attributed to the conflicting views of lobby groups. Lobby groups seek to 
establish either a ‘private’ or a ‘public’ form of international investment law. The 
political ramifications for a state of reconciling these competing perspectives leads to 
the conclusion that a host state human rights defence will not be directly included in 
the terms of an IIA. Instead, the introduction of a host state human rights defence is 
reliant on ICSID arbitral practice. 
 ICSID arbitral practice also highlights the fragmentation of international 
investment law and international human rights law. To identify the manner in which 
ICSID arbitral practice currently addresses regime conflict between international 
investment law and international human rights law, arbitral awards with broadly 
similar facts were compared. This permitted the approach taken by ICSID arbitral 
tribunals to be isolated. To undertake this analysis, ICSID arbitral awards addressing 
international human rights law arguments in the context of the Argentine financial 
crisis of 2001/2002 were considered. Following this review, two factors were 
identified that currently preclude the operation of a host state human rights defence 
in ICSID arbitration.  First, it was shown that host states are reluctant to run defences 
based on their obligations in international human rights law given that this may lead 
them to be liable for breaches of public international law in two fora. Second, it was 
demonstrated that the attitude of the arbitrator towards international human rights 
law has the potential to influence the acceptance and, thus, viability of a host state 
human rights defence. Again, a distinction between a ‘private’ view of international 
investment law and a ‘public’ view of the same regime was discerned. 
 Chapter 3 also argued that amicus curiae procedures, despite being a means 
of introducing international human rights law into ICSID arbitration, are unable to 
effectively ‘de-fragment’ international investment law and international human 
rights law. This is due to the unique nature of an amicus curiae’s role, which is 
limited to advising an ICSID arbitral tribunal on general considerations that relate to 
the dispute. Further, so as to protect the disputing parties, ICSID arbitral tribunals 
must restrict the influence of amicus curiae on the ICSID arbitral process.  
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 Consequently, this thesis demonstrated the need for a host state human rights 
defence to bring about the ‘de-fragmentation’ of international investment law and 
international human rights law. Based on the considerations identified in Part A, it 
was concluded that, in order to be effective, a host state human rights defence would 
need to be created independently of IIAs, but would still need to form part of ICSID 
arbitral practice. Further, a host state human rights defence would need to minimise 
the risk of a host state being found internationally responsible in two dispute 
resolution fora. Finally, amicus curiae submissions could support, but not form the 
basis of a host state human rights defence.  
 Part B identified two bases on which a host state human rights defence could 
be established, namely, a procedural host state human rights defence and a 
substantive host state human rights defence. Chapter 4 argued that a procedural host 
state human rights defence, which would preclude an ICSID arbitral tribunal from 
proceeding to the merits stage of the dispute, was not viable. ‘In accordance with 
host state law’ clauses are unable to fulfil this role, primarily due to the need for the 
violation of international human rights law to arise in the pre-establishment phase of 
the investment. The possibly of denying jurisdiction by reference to the admissibility 
of the claim was examined based on international public policy considerations. 
Admissibility is potentially subject to the same temporal limitations as ‘in 
accordance with host state law’ clauses, and was also shown to be inadequate as a 
basis for the defence given its vague content. General policy considerations also 
militated against the use of a procedural host state human rights defence, as the 
complexity involved in merging international investment law and international 
human rights law was better addressed by an ICSID arbitral tribunal at the merits 
stage of the ICSID arbitration. Although Chapter 4 took a conservative stance, this 
was to ensure that the host state human rights defence is able to operate in an 
equitable manner so as to confer it with credibility. 
 Chapter 5 argued that a substantive host state human rights defence would 
display the desired attributes of the defence. It was shown that counterclaim 
procedures provide the most viable means of introducing international human rights 
law into ICSID arbitration as compared to the defences currently used by host states. 
This is despite the inability of counterclaims to preclude host state liability in public 
international law. Instead, any compensation awarded to the foreign investor is 
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balanced against compensation owed to the host state for the violations of 
international human rights law. The disputing parties’ consent frequently 
encompasses counterclaims. To facilitate the use of counterclaims with certainty, the 
express consent of the disputing parties is preferable. Further, a sufficient nexus can 
be established between international investment law and international human rights 
law based on a factual, rather than a legal, connection between the claims. Finally, 
foreign investors are capable of being directly bound by obligations sourced in 
international human rights law through international criminal law provisions and 
domestic manifestations of international human rights law. Both international human 
rights law (and international criminal law), in addition to domestic provisions 
reflecting international human rights law, fall within the applicable law of ICSID 
arbitral tribunals. On this basis, this thesis confirmed that international human rights 
law arguments could be brought before an ICSID arbitral tribunal by a host state and 
that the tribunal could apply this law when deciding the claim. Thus, Chapter 5 
establishes a potential means by which a host state human rights defence could 
operate. 
 International human rights law has been raised in an increasing number of 
investment disputes and the potential remains for FDI to breach international human 
rights law standards. Specific concerns have been raised in relation to indigenous 
rights, the ‘right’ to water and environmental and labour standards. ICSID arbitral 
tribunals have yet to reconcile host states’ international investment law and 
international human rights law obligations. In the absence of an accepted 
methodology that enables the reconciliation of these two lex specialis regimes, host 
states face the possibility of norm conflict and either the foreign investor or the host 
state population risks losing protection under public international law.  
 While it has been argued that the international investment law and 
international human rights law regimes are fragmented, this thesis has proven it is 
possible to ‘de-fragment’ them in the context of ICSID arbitration. Thus, it is 
possible for states to balance their obligations under international investment law and 
international human rights law by utilising the host state human rights defence 
outlined in this thesis. A positivist conception of public international was employed 
in order to provide the most credible legal basis for a host state human rights 
defence. Even within a positivist conception of public international law, it has been 
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possible to identify a procedural basis that allows host states to defend themselves 
against the claims of foreign investors on the grounds that the foreign investor has 
violated international human rights law. Should a more liberal theoretical framework 
be adopted, there is further scope for the development of a host state human rights 
defence. This suggests that the ILC was correct when it stated that public 
international law is ‘not a random collection’ of norms. 
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